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Gh/gh                                        غ 
                                       Q/q ق 
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                                       L/l ل 
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                                       N/N ن 
                                        H/h ه 
                                       Ū/ ū و 
                                                 Ī/ ī ي 
  
Vowels: ◌َ◌ِ◌ُ       u/i/a 
Doubled vowels ّي:  -iyya (as in Ibn Taymiyya)  
  
Note: For spellings and transliterations of quoted sources and formal names of institutions 
and websites, the rendition of the authors and institutions will be maintained. For example, 
‘Salafi Sounds’ does not transliterate its formal name. Thus, it will be rendered as ‘Salafi 
Sounds’, with no transliteration.  
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ABSTRACT  
 
 The present study focuses on significant online intra-Islamic ideological contestations with 
particular focus on the schisms between Salafism and Sufism. The main attention is on the 
content and strategies of Salafī contestations with Sufism and, to a lesser extent, with certain 
creedal schools of thought. The study addresses a gap in Cyber-Islamic Environments studies 
and raises thesis questions addressed through a research design (case study), analytical 
framework (religious authority), and methodology (qualitative ideological analyses). The 
purpose is to contribute to a greater understanding of the role of digital media in understudied 
and yet far-reaching online contestations within Islam—those that seek to define orthodoxy 
in contemporary Islam. First, the study locates and examines significant loci of Salafī 
contestations with Sufism, namely, the mawlid (celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s 
birthday), grave visitation, and tawassul (seeking intercession through the Prophet and past 
saints or spiritual masters). Second, the study unpacks and analyses recurring themes and 
vocabulary that occur in Salafī polemics against Sufism. The arguments against Sufism rely 
on the strategic usage of well-known judicial-ethical and creedal terminologies of Islamic 
scriptural sources and intellectual traditions that are now used to challenge the very 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy of Sufism. These terms have pre-modern roots in Muslim 
scholarship. However, the terms are repurposed in Salafī discourse to create idioms that cast 
aspersions upon non-Salafī ideologies in Islam. Third, the study analyses the strategic value 
of these loci of dispute and terminologies through the analytical framework of religious 
authority, and, toward that effort, the study proffers a methodology of examining online 
content and the key arguments and support terminologies that speak to authority in what is 
essentially transnational and de-territorialized discourses. This dissertation thus seeks to 
contribute original research that helps to fill a lacuna in the study of consequential online 
intra-Islamic contestations.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it 
may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication. 
— John Dewey1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The study of new media and religion is a field of research that has attracted increased 
attention in the last two decades—perhaps more so than most other fields of study during 
that timeframe.2 Research into the media–religion ‘interface’ in the digital age has 
become not only a growing academic discipline but a distinctive one that has roots in two 
legacy fields—media studies and religious studies—and has also attracted allied 
disciplines within the humanities and social sciences.3 
Thus, the diverse relationships between media and religion—their mutual 
influences, negotiations, and ruptures—continue to invite original and merged approaches 
that seek out and analyse how contemporary media increasingly exercise ‘transformative 
power potential for religions’ and their followers today.4 The field also pursues a better 
understanding of interpretative frameworks that address how ‘communication technology 
is influencing’ the very practice, materiality, and profile of religion in personal and public 
spaces.5 As such, methodologies and frameworks from previously disparate fields have 
seemingly merged into interdisciplinary syntheses that are now needed to effectively 
examine what is arguably an inseparable and progressively consequential bond between 
                                               
1 John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: McMillan, 1916), at 4.  
2 Daniel A. Stout, Media and Religion: Foundations of an Emerging Field (London: Routledge, 2013), 
at 1. 
3 Knut Lundby, ‘Theoretical Frameworks for Approaching Religion and New Media’. in Digital 
Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds, ed. Heidi Campbell (Abingdon and 
New York: Routledge, 2012), 25–37, at 25–26.  
4 Gary R. Bunt, ‘Religion and the Internet’, in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. 
Peter Clarke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 705–22, at 705, 711. 
5 Heidi Campbell, ed., Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media Worlds (New 
York: Routledge, 2012), at 1. 
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two mighty forces of modernity: contemporary media systems and expanding spaces of 
religion. Digital platforms have decentralized religious content, praxis, and authority, and 
are ‘now crucial’ in the fragmented affairs, discourses, and performances of religion 
online: so much so that they are studied together in order to ‘understand contemporary 
religious issues’ and what stirs these issues in the online realms and, quite often, how the 
online realm affects the real world.6 
A researcher cannot presume to comprehensively examine aspects of religion 
today ‘without understanding the traits of religious practice online and how they reflect 
larger trends in religious beliefs and practices offline’.7 Bunt, for example, asserts that 
studying contemporary religion and its close association with digital media is vital ‘for the 
understanding of contemporary religious issues’ and their connections with how 
information is conveyed and received.8 But, in advancing this argument, it can be claimed 
that researching almost any field in the contemporary world would, at the very least, 
benefit from studying the subject’s relationships with ubiquitous media systems. 
While there is increased interest and production in digital media and religion 
scholarship, the field has retained its status as a ‘unique area of scholarship’ primarily 
because of the swiftness with which digital media evolve. Emerging technologies 
continue to proliferate and add to emerging human communication avenues and raise new 
questions about their purposes in matters of religion.9 In other words, the field is anything 
but inert. When conducting such research, it is thus important that researchers accentuate 
in their studies what is actually new about new media, answering the large and persistent 
question of how digital media uniquely affect, for example, religious representation, 
knowledge production, conveyance, authority, and ritual performance of religion in what 
                                               
6 Bunt, ‘Religion and the Internet’, at 705. 
7 Campbell, Digital Religion, at 10. 
8 Gary R. Bunt, ‘#Islam, Social Networking and the Cloud’, in Islam in the Modern World, ed. Jeffrey 
T. Kenney and Ebrahim Moosa (New York: Routledge, 2013), 177–208, at 178. 
9 Heidi Campbell and Brian Altenhofen, ‘Methodological Challenges, Innovations and Growing Pains 
in Digital Religion Research’, in Digital Methodologies in the Sociology of Religion, ed. Sariya 
Cheruvallil-Contractor and Suha Shakkour (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 1–12, at 1–3. 
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is seen as an increasingly ‘networked society’ and in a new realm of ‘networked 
religion’.10 
More parsed, this area of scholarship has necessarily come to involve not just a 
partnership of diverse disciplines—religious studies and media studies—but their 
convergence. The study of religion in the modern world summons scholarly attention with 
regard to the details of the promulgation of religious ideas, doctrines, practices, 
contestations, and, quite significantly, the media systems that convey them.11 In addition, 
each field—religion and media—has an elasticity that lends itself to a broad range of 
inquiry and methodologies; and each has durability, in the sense that they have continued 
to attract scholarly attention without stint. As such, it is perhaps better not to view this 
area of inquiry as the study of two autonomous fields. Rather, religion and media often 
join together as a bona fide social phenomenon, which should naturally draw appropriate 
academic notice.12 In proffering a list of suggested frameworks for the study of religion 
and new media, Lundby, for example, says that the ‘forms of mediation should actually be 
regarded as an integral part of religion’. Religions, therefore, are informed or ‘shaped by 
their dominant means of communication’.13 
This present study seeks to contribute original work toward that inquiry by 
locating and analysing an underrepresented area of digital media and religion research. 
While individuals or communities of an array of religious experiences employ digital 
media for varied purposes and objectives, one area calls for further investigation: namely, 
the uses of digital platforms as means of transmitting contestations or polemics—that is, 
views that challenge the orthodoxy of rival ideologies within the creedal and intellectual 
history of a common faith. These are intra-religion debates that occur in digital spheres, 
                                               
10 Heidi A. Campbell, ‘Understanding the Relationship between Religion Online and Offline in a 
Networked Society’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 80, no. 1 (2012), 64–93, at 67–68.  
11 Bunt, ‘Religion and the Internet’, at 705. 
12 Stewart M. Hoover and Lynn Schofield Clark, Practicing Religion in the Age of the Media: 
Explorations in Media, Religion, and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), at 1–3. 
13 Lundby, at 226. 
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have potential real-life consequences, and are generally under-examined and under-
analysed. In an effort to remedy this lacuna within the field, this study investigates 
significant ideological contestations within contemporary Islam as they occur in digital 
space and as they involve a synergy of digital platforms as a strategy in their production. 
More specifically, the research examines critical areas of disagreement within the 
intra-Islamic debates regarding Salafism and its contestations with Sufism and related 
creedal thoughts and considers how the disruptive effects of new media have altered the 
nature and reach of both these major ideological religious disputes and the constructs of 
sacred authority. In doing so, the study analyses online Salafī texts that challenge the 
orthodoxy of Sufism and scrutinizes Sufism’s very place within Sunnī Islam by 
appropriating digital media platforms to convey arguments and juridical–ethical 
nomenclature that essentially summon claims to ‘religious authority’ in contemporary 
Islamic discourse. The research also proffers a methodology that collates and probes key 
terminologies and arguments that the polemics rely on and that indicate how the 
arguments should be framed at a conceptual level. 
In researching digital-religion associations, researchers ‘are studying a unique 
aspect of digital culture’. They are conducting their studies in ‘relation to the frame of 
religion and religious cultures’, which requires them to apply ‘fluency and sensitivity to 
the different offline religious traditions and how their truth claims and worldviews are 
translated and negotiated in online spaces’.14 
Before expanding upon the research questions, research design, and interpretive 
framework outlined here, it should be mentioned that, in the midst of my composing this 
introduction, a major event claimed international headlines and commentary. The event 
and subsequent news reporting merit inclusion here because they implicitly speak to the 
themes and ideological substrates that are submitted in this dissertation, and highlight the 
                                               
14 Campbell and Altenhofen, at 2. 
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importance of the uneasy, complex, non-linear, and perhaps elusive lines of demarcation 
between the content or texts of the online world and actions in the offline or real world. 
On 24 November 2017, Muslim militants attacked a ‘Sufi mosque’, as it has been 
described, in Bir al-Abed, a township located in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, killing at least 
305 worshippers and injuring more than 100, many of whom were children.15 Embedded 
in many of the news articles were brief explanations of what Sufism is and why Ṣūfī 
institutions and devotees have been a target of attack by Muslim extremists. The New 
York Times, for example, reported that the ‘attack injected a new element into Egypt’s 
struggle with militants because most of the victims were Ṣūfī Muslims, who practice a 
mystical form of Islam that the Islamic State and other Sunni extremist groups deem 
heretical’.16 Thereafter, major news agencies (legacy and new) published ‘explainers’: 
articles or videos meant to educate audiences about Sufism and why some Muslim groups 
oppose it. 
 The bombing occurred a week before public celebrations of the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s birthday (mawlid) were to take place in Egypt, including at the Bir al-Abed 
mosque. (The celebration of the mawlid is a point of contention between Salafism and 
Sufism that will be explored in this study.) The Guardian reported that ‘Egypt’s Sufis will 
stay indoors to mark birth of prophet Muhammad’, since ‘elders in the village’ were 
warned not to hold Ṣūfī rituals to commemorate the birth of Prophet Muḥammad.17 The 
militants behind the attack were described in several ways—as ISIS militants, radical 
Islamists, jihadists, or other extremist groups who, according to the reports, view Sufism 
                                               
15 Declan Walsh and Nour Youssef, ‘Militants Kill 305 at Sufi Mosque in Egypt’s Deadliest Terrorist 
Attack’, The New York Times, 24 November 2017. Accessed at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/middleeast/mosque-attack-egypt.html. A Google search 
of articles on the attack shows wide usage of the term ‘Sufi Mosque’ (or similar iterations associating 
the mosque with Sufism). They include: The Washington Post, Al-Jazeera English (online), CNN 
online, National Public Radio online, Haaretz online, The Guardian, and others. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ruth Michaelson, ‘Egypt’s Sufis will stay indoors to mark birth of prophet Muhammad’. The 
Guardian, 27 November 2017. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/27/egypts-
sufis-mark-muhammads-birth-indoor-celebrations-mosque 
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as ‘heretical’ in Islam—while their ideological underpinnings have been characterized as 
Wahhabism and/or Salafism, the militants ‘sometimes [being] called Salafists-jihadists’.18 
 While the Sinai attack was particularly severe, it was not without precedent. Since 
the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, scholars and reporters have noted that Salafism 
(jihādī or quietist19) has been aggressively on the rise in the public spheres of Muslim 
countries. In fact, ‘After the Arab Spring the Sufi-Salafi conflict became more violent’.20  
 Certain iterations thereof have claimed territory, political authority, and military assets in 
failed states or regions such as post-Qadafi Libya and Somalia and in ISIS territory in Iraq 
and Syria, claiming responsibility for violence committed under the pretence of an 
ideological dispute that emphasises the stated aim of eradicating the ritual and creedal 
impurities that have been inserted into Islam, as will be explored in this study. 
Some months before the Sinai attack, on 16 February 2017, a suicide bomber 
killed more than 80 people and injured at least 60 at the Ṣūfī shrine of Lal Shahbaz 
Qalandar, in southern Pakistan. A New York Times reporter mentioned that ‘Sufi shrines 
and mosques have been targeted in the past by Taliban militants, who view Sufi Islam as 
contrary to their beliefs’ and that ISIS ‘regards members of other Muslim groups as 
nonbelievers deserving death’.21 Just months prior to that event, a suicide bomber killed 
more than 50 worshippers at another shrine, that is, the shrine of Shah Bilal Noorani, in 
southwestern Pakistan. Citing local media sources, press accounts reported that extremist 
‘groups have attacked Sufi shrines and gatherings in recent years. The Sufi tradition offers 
a tolerant version of Islam that is spurned by extremists like the Taliban’.22 
                                               
18 ‘Politics and the Puritanical’, The Economist, 25 June 2015. Accessed at: 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2015/06/25/politics-and-the-puritanical   
19 The distinction between jihādī and quietist or purist Salafism is explored in Chapter 3. 
20 Anna Zajac, ‘Between Sufism and Salafism: The Rise of Salafi Tendencies after the Arab Spring and 
Its Implications’, Hemispheres. Studies on Cultures and Societies 29, no. 2 (2014), 97–109, at10. 
21 Salman Masood, ‘Pakistan Shrine Bombing Kills Scores in Worst Attack in Months’. The New York 
Times, 16 February 2017. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/16/world/asia/pakistan-
shrine-bombing.html 
22 Salman Masood, ‘Bombing at Sufi Shrine in Pakistan Kills Dozens’. The New York Times, 12 
November 2016. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/world/asia/pakistan-bombing-
sufi-shrine.html 
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 Besides the human toll of militant action, there have been dozens of attacks on 
Ṣūfī shrines and other Ṣūfī structures (such as zāwiyas, lodges or dedicated physical 
spaces in which devotional litanies are performed regularly by members of a Ṣūfī order) 
in the Middle East and North Africa in the post-Arab Spring tumult. 
 The destruction of such sites was so widespread in post-Qadafi Libya, for 
example, that UNESCO issued statements demanding an immediate end to the destruction 
of ‘Sufi sites in Libya’, namely in ‘Tripoli and Misrata’.23 The prominent sites that 
suffered destruction or damage included the burial place and shrine of the famed Ṣūfī 
master Aḥmad Al-Zarrūq (1442–1493), in Misrata, while the shrine and library of the 
Shaykh Abdul Salam Al Asmari site were severely damaged. In 2014, a group known as 
the Islamic Youth Shura Counsel declared eastern Libya to be part of the Islamic State. 
Subsequently, many other ‘acts of vandalism’ were conducted against Ṣūfī sites.24 Groups 
‘inspired by Salafi ideology’ in Benghazi ‘were responsible for a number of attacks 
against Sufi mosques and tombs in Benghazi, Misrate and Zliten. They bulldozed the 
Sha’ab mosque (and more than 50 Ṣūfī tombs that it contained) in the centre of Tripoli’.25 
In Tunisia, Salafī-affiliated groups, most notably Ansar al-Sharia, committed ‘an 
unprecedented number of acts against Sufi places of worship. At least 38 such places have 
been vandalized since [Tunisian president] Ben Ali was ousted’ early in the Arab Spring 
of 2011.26 
In Egypt, Syria, Somalia, Mali, and elsewhere, Ṣūfī shrines were attacked, 
damaged, and/or destroyed. In Timbuktu, Mali, the Tomb of Asia was attacked and 
                                               
23 ‘UNESCO Director-General calls for an immediate halt to destruction of Sufi sites in Libya | United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’, 28 August 2012. Accessed at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-
view/news/unesco_director_general_calls_for_an_immediate_halt_to_destr/ 
24 M. Lostal, International Cultural Heritage Law in Armed Conflict: Case-Studies of Syria, Libya, 
Mali, the Invasion of Iraq, and the Buddhas of Bamiyan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), at 126. 
25 Anna Zajac, ‘Between Sufism and Salafism’, at 10. 
26 Ibid., at 11. 
  8 
severely damaged by Ansari Dine,27 a ‘Salafi-jihadist group of Mali’.28 O’Dell writes: 
‘Those who are driven to destroy such heritage out of a “Salafi” ideology also believe that 
they are preserving the past—by demolishing all “idols” to “re-create” the conditions 
under which Islam was practiced in the 7th century’.29  In O’Dell’s analysis of the 
violence, the destruction is ‘not just a battle over ideology or heritage—but also 
sovereignty over the past.’30 (It should also be mentioned that parts of the ancient ruins of 
Palmyra in Syria and pre-Islamic antiquities of Iraq were destroyed by ISIS forces.31) 
Ṣūfī shrines are an anathema to Salafists, who claim that shrines attract visitors 
who engage in what Salafists call ‘grave worshipping’. While the recent wave of violence 
in Africa is complex and at least partially represents political power struggles in the 
abrupt absence of strong central governance in the post-Arab Spring, it should be noted 
that even if the shrine-violence is politically motivated, the urging of such violence relies 
on religious authority refracted through the prism a purification campaign that follows 
closely the Salafī–Ṣūfī chasm within Sunnī Islam, as scholars have noted.32 In other 
words, if there is a political strategy that encourages the violence—particularly intra-
Muslim violence—then it borrows heavily from a polemic that has gained ascendancy in 
the last 15 years (particularly in post-9/11 climes) and, in fact, has spread widely through 
digital media—sidestepping traditional, slower, and more localized means of conveyance. 
 
                                               
27 Lostal, at 138. 
28 A full description and history of the organization is found online at: Standford University (2016), 
‘Ansar Dine’, Mapping Militant Organizations (Stanford: Stanford University online resource). 
Accessed at: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/437 
29 Emily J. O’Dell, ‘Waging war on the dead: the necropolitics of Sufi shrine destruction in 
Mali’, Archaeologies 9, no. 3 (2013): 506–25, at 510. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Jason Farago, ‘The Ancient Syrian City ISIS Is Destroying, Preserved Online’. The New York Times. 
The New York Times, 15 February 2017. Accessed at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/arts/design/palmyra-syria-isis.html 
32 See, for example, Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defense, Rethinking and Rejection of 
Sufism in the Modern World (Richmond, Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1999); and Frederick de Jong and 
Bernd Radtke, Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999). These sources have extended accounts of modern and pre-modern criticisms of 
Sufism. 
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1.2 Study Purpose 
This dissertation is not a study of the necropolitics of the destruction of heritage and Ṣūfī 
sites.33 Nor is it an ethnography of violent groups and/or contexts in which the violence 
and destruction are conceived and, at times, released. However, mentioning the events 
above underscores the importance of the current study, as it examines ideological 
contestations in digital space that claim to define Islamic orthodoxy—contestations that 
often cast aspersions upon certain Muslims for their beliefs and practices, which are 
deemed to be heretical or even outside the bounds of so-called ‘pure’ Islam. Undoubtedly, 
these are serious claims. Setting the violence aside, the language of the vituperations 
found in online polemics, at the very least, has the authority of directing negative 
attention toward the criticized groups, most prominently those associated with Sufism and 
its creedal foundations. 
The present study focuses on the discursive communication and strategies of 
Salafī ideologies as they appear in digital space. Discursive communication may allude to 
‘social practices, discursive practices, and the text themselves’.34 The texts of the case 
studies under examination represent a significant attempt on the part of self-described 
Salafīs to convey polemics against Sufism, as well as other ideologies, creedal schools of 
thought, or rites within contemporary Islam. The study raises research questions and 
attempts to answer them through a research design, framework, and methodology that 
seek to add original contributions to the present academic understanding of the role of 
digital media in the religious affairs of Islam today. It seeks to close the lacuna in the 
study of online intra-Islamic contestations. 
                                               
33 O’Dell, at 510. 
34 John E. Richardson (Mis)representing Islam: The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet 
newspapers. Vol. 9. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2004), at 34. 
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What follows in this introduction are the research questions of the study and a 
description of how addressing them contributes original work to this growing field. 
Thereafter, the outline of the dissertation is presented, followed by concluding remarks. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Original Contributions 
Research Question One: In researching contestations in the Salafī–Ṣūfī rift online, the 
first research question (RQ1) asks: what are the key categories and areas of contestation 
that occur online within Salafī disputes with Sufism in contemporary Islam? The question 
places emphasis on performative Islam: that is, contestations over certain devotional 
actions of Muslims groups and questions about the validity of these practices or rites. A 
descriptive component is involved in addressing RQ1 that consists of providing a specific 
account of the typologies and major loci of disputes within contemporary Islamic 
ideologies and/or groups. However, the question also probes the consequences of such 
loci of disagreement. With RQ1, therefore, the research advances the inquiry in part 
through a phenomenological methodology that Bunt applied in his studies and that has 
evolved as new technologies emerged.35 While Bunt’s earlier work surveyed a growing 
field of Islamic discourse online and commented on the content as they relate to 
conceptual religious matters, his methodology applies to RQ1 in terms of detecting, 
gathering, and presenting key ideological disputes that proponents of Salafism 
consistently make. It is the anticipation of this study that texts under review in this study 
have analytical or representational value, in that they exemplify a wider trend or pattern in 
intra-Islamic debates, and help to determine the larger, contextual meaning of the loci of 
disputation through qualitative textual analyses, which interpret the symbolic meaning of 
these disputes. 
                                               
35 Gary R. Bunt, ‘Studying Muslims and Cyberspace’, in Studying Islam in Practice, ed. Gabriele 
Marranci (London: Routledge, 2014), 190–203, at 192–93. 
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The present work examines and locates themes and vocabulary that occur in 
aggressive Salafī polemics against Sufism and related ideological cognates, such as 
Ashʿarī creedal thought and, more specifically, its metaphorical interpretation of the 
names or attributes of God. In doing so, the study seeks answers to the questions: what 
patterns can be observed in online contestations in this intra-Islam dispute? How are 
digital platforms appropriated to advance polemics? What strategy of media usage can be 
seen from the investigation? How does the inquiry proffer original research and advance 
the area of study? 
The research advises that single-platform case study methodologies do not 
sufficiently account for complex appropriations of digital media in polemic-making today. 
It is demonstrable that the dynamic and synergetic uses of multi-platforms or the multi-
modal employment of digital media (written documents, sound, and social media content) 
are applied to promote a common argument or achieve a common aim in the advancement 
of online polemics. This study thus contributes original research that demonstrates that the 
disruptive qualities of digital media offer easier strategic appropriation of various and 
trending digital platforms: social media (as feeders to more substantial online content); 
podcasts (a digital product that is increasing today); well-kept websites with PDFs of 
various articles; and e-books. These platforms are managed by Salafi Publications, a key 
case study, to deliver cross-platform content that frequently criticizes points of view that 
are purportedly in conflict with the theology and practices of the ‘pious generations’, as 
Salafīs claim. The findings and analyses are presented in Chapter Six. The study helps to 
fill a gap in contemporary media and religion studies regarding Islam by researching and 
presenting consistent points of contention within contemporary Salafī–Ṣūfī polemics and 
their patterns in digital space. 
It should also be noted that the Salafī mission—purifying Islam from syncretic 
practices and creeds introduced from either Hellenic (neo-Platonic) thought or non-
Muslim faith communities—represents one of four essential ‘domains’ of religion, as 
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delineated by Bruce Lincoln: ‘A set of practices whose goal is to produce a proper world 
and/or proper human subjects, as defined by a religious discourse to which the practices 
are connected.’36 
 
Research Question Two: The examination of online content and the location of patterns 
of thought and strategy therein are important activities in this changing and developing 
field of research. Emerging digital technologies expand the forms of digital space and 
exert pressure on academe to continue to map out the new iterations in which religious 
content appears. However, description of the content raises questions: What larger 
frameworks do the analyses of such texts and strategies indicate? What higher conceptual 
significances and connections do such analyses signify? In other words, once parsed, 
demonstrable appraisals are required of the content (language and themes) of online texts 
as they connect to an interpretative framework that both situates the study and advances 
the understanding of contemporary Islam, its interfaces with new media and its historical 
connections with Islamic intellectual tradition. In other words, the study contextualizes the 
meaning of online texts in conversation with the past and the present. The disputes under 
analysis here have roots in Islamic intellectual history. But what has changed is how 
advocates of the competing ideologies have appropriated emerging technologies to not 
only advance their arguments against the other but also to stretch their rhetoric in a 
borderless manner, with all the effects that this implies and the unprecedented reach and 
strategies it presents. 
It is argued here that, upon a disaggregation and analysis of the terminologies and 
arguments located in Salafī polemical literature online, the texts are suited to be framed as 
contestations for religious authority, the key interpretive framework of this study. To 
elaborate: the texts represent an appropriation of the disruptive qualities of digital media 
                                               
36 Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), at 5. See also Jeffrey Halverson, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The 
Muslim Brotherhood, Ash’arism, and Political Sunnism (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), at 4. 
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and the new media theoretical paradigm of mediatisation in order to seek out the authority 
to strictly define the boundaries of Islamic orthodoxy. 
While increased attention has been given to digital media and religious authority, 
including that of Islam, the treatments thus far have not fully explored—at the level of 
language analysis—religious authority in online Islamic texts in intra-religious 
contestations. Scholars have noted that religious authority is undergoing significant 
change (if not challenges) that is driven by forces of modernity, primarily globalization as 
compelled by new technological communication means.37 The disruptions of digital 
media, therefore, have permitted unprecedented numbers of content producers to dispatch 
content far more easily than was previously allowed by print technology, for example; 
and, quite often, the impact is felt in the digital media ecology in the form of challenges to 
religious authority as traditionally understood, since authority is now more accessible and 
embedded ‘in a marketplace’ of religious content and choice.38 Mandaville holds that new 
media has ‘vastly enlarged’ the possibility ‘for knowledge (and contestations of 
knowledge) to mingle with a historically unprecedented intensity’.39 These observations 
apply also to online contestations, as argued here. Thus, in order to situate the present 
study and connect it to a larger framework and developments of academic research, it is 
argued here that online contestations are acts of authority-making within contemporary 
Islam. The study thus proceeds with an analytical or interpretative framework (religious 
authority) and a methodology of examining online Salafī texts that contest Sufism’s place 
in Islam—challenging its very orthodoxy and orthopraxy in contemporary Muslim 
milieus. 
The focus here is on an important ‘node’ of religious authority, as Lawrence 
indicates: namely, juridical arguments and nomenclature of Islamic sacred law but used to 
                                               
37 Peter Mandaville, ‘Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in 
the Muslim World’, Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (2007), 101–15, at 101–2. 
38 Stewart M. Hoover and Knut Lundby, Rethinking Media, Religion, and Culture (Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1997), at 292. 
39 Mandaville, ‘Globalization’, at 108. 
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support ideological contestations online.40 Turner states that new media technologies 
‘provide alternative, deregulated, devolved and local opportunities for debate and 
discussion’ and have ‘the unintended effect of corroding traditional forms of authority 
that are either based on oral transmission or […] print-based’.41 But the challenge of new 
media as far as a print-based knowledge economy is concerned is their particular effect on 
religious law, which ‘becomes ever more urgent, and hence there is a sort of bidding war 
in which competing authorities attempt to out-do each other in terms of the strictness of 
their interpretation of legal norms’.42 The analysis also emphasizes the use of phrases that 
attempt to establish boundaries of orthodoxy in Islam, such as Ahl al-Sunna wa al-
Jamāʿa, ‘People of Sunna [the normative practice of the Prophet Muḥammad] and the 
Community’. 
This realm of authority was chosen to be the focus of this study for two reasons, 
both of which are supported in scholarship: (1) the evocation of Islamic law, its 
terminologies, and creedal claims carry religious authority import, for they are meant to 
exert power over the defining Islamic orthodoxy at a conceptual level; and (2) the weights 
of sacred law and creedal nomenclature have the power to exercise authority on the 
individual level, that is, the individual’s choice with regard to extra-canonical practices 
and beliefs. 
Thus, this dissertation adds original contribution to the study of Islam in digital 
space (cyber-Islamic environments) in the following manners as summarized. It examines 
and situates within the ‘wave-research’ convention, as well as a media theory appropriate 
for digital media studies, of an under-studied area of religion and digital media studies 
within Islam, namely, intra-Islamic contestations that have a dual function of (a) 
                                               
40 Bruce B. Lawrence, ‘Allah on-Line: The Practice of Global Islam in the Information Age’, in 
Practicing Religion in the Age of Media, ed. Stewart M. Hoover and Lynn Schofield Clark (New York 
and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2002), 237–53, at 237–39. 
41 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Religious Authority and the New Media’, Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 
(2007), 117–34, at 132. 
42 Ibid. 
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reproaching Muslim groups and ideologies and, in the process, (b) attempting to claim 
greater authority in appropriating pre-modern Islamic phrases for the purpose of creating 
new idioms meant to create hegemonic definitions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy. 
The study pursues a media theory that helps to explain the effects of digital media, 
as opposed to pre-digital mediation theories. Mediatisation  …  
Focuses on a trending digital product that extends the capacity of what is arguable 
a key feature of digital media functionality, that is, mobility. Podcasts represent a growing 
digital media product that represents a [get from podcast section. And distinguish it from 
other forms of digital media]  
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
For the purpose of situating the present study in the recent and past literature of media-
and-religion studies, Chapter 2, Literature Review presents an outline of the key 
literature of the more general fields of media and religion studies, including their 
conceptual foundations, theoretical frameworks, current literature, and relevance to 
contemporary studies on digital media interfaces with religion. The chapter next presents 
how religion and digital media studies have evolved and attracted various fields into the 
discipline, indisputably rendering it an interdisciplinary field. Following this, the chapter 
examines research that relates more closely to the purposes and arguments of this 
dissertation and that highlights the gaps that need to be studied and further explored. It 
situates the study according to recent important trends in the study of religion and new 
media and shows where the study fits in this growing field of scholarship. 
Before presenting the premise and findings of the thesis, it is necessary to examine 
the nomenclatures and support terminologies of the ideological groups under review, as 
their meanings have evolved and, in fact, have been altered over time. Thus, in 
responding to the research questions of the dissertation, it falls to the researcher to 
‘identify the key terms and attempt to define and explain what they mean, and then 
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address the specific question’; this is the function of Chapter 3, Defining 
Terminologies.43 
This chapter, therefore, focuses on articulating conceptually and historically valid 
definitions of key terms on which this study relies. The term ‘Salafism’ has varied and 
often conflicting meanings, which, without appropriate resolution, may create confusion 
and weaken the analytical value of the term’s use. Thus, ‘Salafism’, in this chapter, is 
examined according to its two major historical iterations: a) the early modern reform 
movements of the late 1800s and early 1900s and b) the contemporary iteration of 
Salafism and its typologies, taking into consideration Wiktorowciz’s ‘anatomy of 
Salafism’44 and similar typologies offered by Haykel.45 Further, the term is parsed 
according to its recent use and ascendency in the public sphere in developments after the 
Arab Spring. One aim of Chapter 3 is to present the nominal, analytical, historical uses of 
‘Salafism’: in other words, to ‘conceptualize and operationalize’46 the term and to 
establish a connotation that best represents the online material discussed in this 
dissertation. 
Similarly, the definition of ‘Sufism’ examines the origins and connotations of 
‘Sufism’ as they pertain to the research at hand. It is arguable that in an important way 
‘Sufism’ is a less problematic term than ‘Salafism’ because of the ascendance and variant 
definitions of Salafism in recent years, particularly after the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. 
However, there is complexity in ‘Sufism’ that needs to be addressed. In the chapter, the 
term and phenomenon are distilled to normative and ideation articulations, with particular 
focus on rituals, creeds, and performances that draw disapproval from advocates of 
                                               
43 Lloyd Ridgeon, Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 
2015), at 1 
44 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 3 
(2006), 207–39. 
45 Bernard Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, in Global Salafism: Islam’s New 
Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 33–57. 
46 Bruce L. Berg and Howard Lune, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences, 8th edn 
(London: Sage Publications, 2012), at 38–9. 
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Salafism. The chapter includes the key areas of performance that are frequently criticized 
by Salafists, namely: Mawlid (celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad) and 
grave visitations of Ṣūfī saints and/or shrines, seeking spiritual benefit (tabarruk) or 
intercession from the interred (tawassul). The chapter will briefly explore key creedal 
schools of thought that are often associated with Sufism. These sections fulfil a specific 
purpose, contextualizing and distilling the significant connotations and uses of these terms 
located in this study, as supported by scholarly sources and cognate studies. But, in and of 
themselves, they also contribute to and advance a contemporary discussion in academia 
on the challenges of defining Salafism in the post-Arab Spring tumult. 
 Chapter 4, which concerns framework and methodology, addresses the second 
research question more directly. It presents a review of the literature related to the media 
and their association with religious authority, seeking to demonstrate that the media have 
long been viewed as a challenge to authority (political and religious) perhaps from as 
early as the invention of the printing press. However, in examining what is ‘new’ in new 
media, the chapter argues that digital media represent the greatest (certainly the swiftest) 
technological shift in the media–authority sphere. The ‘disruptive’ attribute of new media 
is defined in this chapter, and how they relate to challenging authority is discussed. As 
such, applying the analytical framework through which the textual analyses will be 
interpreted, the chapter addresses the relatively recent theory of ‘mediatisation’, which 
suggests that new media technologies have not only expanded the reach of 
communications and their effects, as traditionally theorized by ‘mediation’ theory, but 
they now have affected the social conditions in which religion is conducted; technologies 
are in themselves ‘agents of change’ in religion, beyond serving as avenues of 
communication.47 
                                               
47 Stig Hjarvard, The Mediatization of Culture and Society (London: Routledge, 2013), at 78–9. 
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Thereafter, the study discusses religious authority more specifically in terms of 
Islam and important nodes of authority in that religion. It compares the ‘traditional’ norms 
of qualified authorities and the changes in the concept of ‘traditional’ authority brought 
about by new media, as various scholars, such as Bunt, Lawrence, and Mandaville, have 
mentioned in their works.48 
  In following the convention of Lawrence’s ‘nodes’ of religious authority, this 
chapter examines the juridical node in contemporary Salafī cyber-Islamic environments 
and presents the rationale for selecting this node. An examination of online Salafī texts 
shows that several terms appear regularly. These are terms that exert authority by 
impressing upon the audience where the boundaries of orthodoxy and orthopraxy are 
drawn in Islam. The phrases have both juridical and ethical import because they evoke 
words that are common in the vernacular of most Muslims. For example, a declaration 
that a certain act, such as celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad (Mawlid), is 
a heretical innovation (bidʿa) is meant to censure a performative action: that is, it 
implicitly exerts pressure to refrain from such celebrations. Several other phrases with 
similar intended impact are described and defined. (In the following chapter, the 
frequency of the phrases will be demonstrated.) 
The discussion employs Weber’s view of authority types as a conceptual 
background to the framework. However, Foucault’s view of authority as a function of an 
epistemology adds an important nuance to the discussion of authority in the context of 
power.49 In addition, Edward Said’s critique of Orientalist scholarship holds a particular 
appeal for the examination of the foundations of Salafī polemics. For Said, knowledge 
production in Orientalist scholarship is often employed in the service of empire and 
                                               
48 Gary R. Bunt, Hashtag Islam: How Cyber-Islamic Environments are Transforming Religious 
Authority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), passim; Lawrence, ‘Allah on-Line’, 
at 237–39; and Peter Mandaville, ‘Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge’, at 101–05. 
49 Stuart. Hall, ‘Foucault: Power, knowledge and discourse’, in Discourse Theory and Practice: A 
reader, ed. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (London: Sage, 2001), at 72, 
81. 
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imperialism. This dissertation turns Said’s critique inwardly within Islam: namely, 
critiquing the use of knowledge production and conveyance in Salafī discourses to 
ostracize Sufism and other schools of thought and to challenge their very place within 
Islamic orthodoxy. 
 In this dissertation, the discussion of the methodology is placed in close proximity 
to that of the analytical framework, rather than after the literature review. This is because 
the link between framework and methodology is so closely bound that one necessarily 
follows the other. The framework of religious authority relies on locating a pattern of 
argument and on the uses of key nomenclature that evince attempts at claiming authority 
in religious discourse; identifying the arguments and isolating the nomenclature are 
integral to the choice of methodology. The methodology of this study relies on a 
qualitative analysis of online texts that comprise a significant part of the intra-Islamic 
contestations examined in this study. The methodology section reviews the development 
of hybrid methodologies derived from various disciplines but distilled to methodological 
principles and practices that produce results that reliably demonstrate the rationale and 
argument of a given study. 
 Qualitative research draws attention to more than the mere ‘forms of 
information’50 and inferred meanings rendered by way of numerical processes. Rather, 
qualitative inquiries place emphasis on the contextualized meanings of the language of 
narrative streams that, as in this case, connect with larger themes linked with past Islamic 
intellectual history and, presently, a new media space created by digital media. 
Appropriate for this study, the emphasis of the qualitative approach is ‘language-based’51 
and considers strategic uses of terminologies that speak to religious authority. The works 
of scholars in religion and digital media studies who discuss methodological 
                                               
50 David Morgan, Key Words in Religion, Media and Culture (London: Routledge, 2008), at 12. 
51 Larry Z. Leslie, Communication Research Methods in Postmodern Culture: A Revisionist Approach 
(London: Routledge, 2017), at 40. 
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developments in the field are presented. Thereafter, the precise process of data collection 
is explained, and the relationship of the methodology and the collated data to the study’s 
interpretive framework is discussed. 
Chapter 5 discusses data collection methodologies, presentation of Salafī texts, 
and offers immediate analyses of the strategies, terminologies, and contestations located 
in Salafi Sounds podcasts. Careful review and consideration of digital content that relates 
to my study suggest that two important matters stand out with regard to Salafism online. 
Also, to address the ethics of a study proposal, a continuous conversation about the 
proposal with advisors, the development of the research, and its ongoing progress must 
take place. This study is focused entirely on texts that occur in digital space. The study 
does not include, to any degree, the involvement of human subjects or intervention in or 
with online texts and their content-makers. No surveys or interviews were carried out. The 
study does not analyse texts occurring in online forums or chat rooms, not even those that 
are open-source and require no sign-in credentials to join and/or observe. It does not 
review comments left, for example, in YouTube videos’ comments sections. Its sole focus 
is on texts that are purposively posted and made available to be consumed by audiences, 
as any book, pamphlet, or cassette tape would be. In this study, the focus is on podcasts. 
The only requirement to access the texts is a connection to the Internet. The texts under 
review here do not require sign-in credentials and the social media accounts do not 
require the researcher to ‘follow’ or ‘like’ or ‘friend’. They are completely open-sourced. 
The researcher has not commented, ‘shared’, ‘liked’, or ‘retweeted’ any of the texts. The 
research paradigm adopted in this dissertation has not changed from its very initial 
formulations. Any change in approach that would raise new ethical considerations.  
Chapter 6 presents findings and aggregate analyses of the case studies, and it 
organizes its analyses to important categories of Salafi contestations with Sufism and 
offers a contextualization of the varied arguments and the symbolic language and 
nomenclature of the texts gathered. As one example, the findings suggest that collectively 
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the contestations located in major Salafī online discourses and their specific loci of 
disagreement are proxy attempts toward the acquisition of the authority to define the 
proper manhaj of Islam. In reviewing and analysing a significant amount of online Salafī 
content, a common exhortation has emerged, one that pivots on this term manhaj—
whether implied or explicitly alluded to. One may even claim that, in order to examine the 
main positions and ideologies of modern Salafism, it is essential to probe the Salafī usage 
of manhaj as the very substrate of its core argument. Manhaj refers to the proper 
methodology used in deriving guidance and rulings both from Islam’s sacred texts 
(Qurʾān and Ḥadīth literature) and from a strict interpretation of the sacred past: that is, 
the known acts and intentions of the Prophetic period and of generations of al-Salaf al-
Ṣāliḥ—the pious ancestors (from which the name Salafism is derived). As such, it speaks 
to critical matters of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, and to persuasive language that seeks to 
define what is heretical, blasphemous, and impious in contemporary Muslim practices. 
The larger reasons, perhaps pretexts, is that if Salafism hopes to be successfully 
persuasive that it represents or is the only movement that can restore ‘real’ Islam, as has 
been suggested,52 then it must rely on the conceit that it represents the proper manhaj of 
the religion. Other significant terminologies and phrases that have pre-modern roots in 
Islamic intellectual history are likewise presented and pursued. 
Chapter 7 includes a summary and commentary about the current study and 
thereafter addresses the next steps—the potential for a future research agenda that 
advances the substance of and arguments made in this dissertation. It considers, for 
example, a wider range of methodologies and research designs, including ethnographic 
case studies that probe the motivations of the main content-makers of Salafī texts and, 
thus, the new ethical paradigms that are appropriate for that kind of study. The chapter 
                                               
52 Roel Meijer, Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), at 
15. 
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suggests case studies based on embedded or field studies of Sufism and usage of digital 
technology in conveying liminal or numinous information, a growing interest in itself. 
 
1.5 Summary 
It should be noted that digital media have swiftly moved from being new phenomena to 
becoming integral aspects of everyday professional and personal lives in many parts of 
the world. They have become integral in the human experience with culture, politics, 
religion, and social institutions, for digital media have become fully immersive in the 
lives of many.53 In fact, ‘digital natives’, who grew up with new media and have the 
majority of their contact with those types of media, will probably not be able ‘to recall an 
era when there were no blogs, Twitter, or social networking’.54 
As such, the effects of digital technology on perennial human matters as important 
as ‘religious discourse’ require further assessment and undoubtedly ‘will continuously be 
a topic that needs to be addressed by scholars with very different approaches’.55 Questions 
first put many years ago have, at the very least, kept their urgency today: ‘What does the 
Internet do to religion? How are religious experiences mediated online?’56 What do 
content providers (website managers) and users hope to achieve from their Internet 
experience?57 
This study seeks to offer original research that advances understandings of the 
Salafī–Ṣūfī divide within the Muslim world, which is a serious transnational schism that 
has spilled into Western Muslim thought and communities. The contestations studied here 
                                               
53 Dominic Power and Robin Teigland, ‘Postcards from the Metaverse: An Introduction to the 
Immersive Internet’, in The Immersive Internet: Reflections on the Entangling of the Virtual with 
Society, Politics and the Economy, ed. Robin Teigland and Dominic Power. (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 1–12, at 1-3. 
54 Gary R. Bunt, ‘Mediterranean Islamic Expression and Web 2.0’, in Arab Society in Revolt: The 
West’s Mediterranean Challenge, ed. Cesare Merlini and Olivier Roy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2012), 76–95, at 76. 
55 Morten Hojsgaard and Margit Warburg, Religion and Cyberspace (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 
2012), at 9. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Bunt, iMuslims, at 5. 
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have a robust representation in the English-language digital media, which is an expansion 
of reach beyond the traditional languages and geographies of the so-called ‘Muslim 
world’. Some would further contend that the ideological rifts have real-world 
consequences in terms of extremism and acts of violence. The study also makes 
recommendations, in terms of methodology, about how to distil voluminous online 
content and properly contextualize the content with an interpretative framework that 
speaks to Islamic intellectual history and ideological dispute. 
Research into the role of digital media in ideological sectarianism within the 
Islamic milieu needs more research to fill in the gaps. By necessity, the work is 
interdisciplinary, reflecting a gathering of expertise and research frameworks primarily 
from the fields of media studies and religious studies but also from others. It is important, 
however, to decipher how the frameworks (or theories) represented by legacy research in 
each of these fields mesh together in order to produce scholarship in which the 
disciplinary arrangement is nearly invisible. The discourse about media is not one about 
technology per se, but an area of research that pertains to a perennially powerful force in 
human life and history—religion—making great use of media for a variety of reasons and 
arguably leaving a wide range of effects—on communities, individuals, and religion 
itself. As such, Bunt states that studying religions in digital space acknowledges the 
‘complex and field emerging in response to religious, social, and technological changes in 
Muslim contexts and shows how work in this multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary 
subject continues to develop’.58 The field of religious studies recognizes that 
understanding the digital world has become imperative for a fuller accounting and 
understanding of religious communication in the contemporary world.  
                                               
58 Gary R Bunt, Hashtag Islam: How Cyber-Islamic Environments Are Transforming Religious 
Authority (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018), at 18. 
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In 2005 Jonathan Sterne questioned the academic value of digital media studies as 
a discipline unto itself.59 The push to move the field in that direction is more ‘strategic’ 
than it is supported by academic criteria informed by the works of Michel Foucault and 
Pierre Bourdieu, as Sterne argues. It has been 13 years since his comments—and 13 years 
in a digital lifespan is significant. He may have changed his thoughts on this matter since 
2005. Sterne’s observations, perhaps unwittingly, were prescient in an important way: 
digital media studies seem to call for interdisciplinary research. If digital media are 
influencing important aspects of human life, then those aspects almost invariably fall 
under the scholarly gaze of the historian, the anthropologist, the sociologist, the religious 
studies scholar, and experts in other fields. 
  
                                               
59 Jonathan Sterne, ‘Digital Media and Disciplinarity’, The Information Society 21, no. 4 (2005), 249–
56, at 249–51. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The scholarship that is relevant to this dissertation includes significant studies that 
examine digital media and religion in a broad sense. It also includes literature that is 
specific to Islam online and, deeper yet, studies that implicitly concern the research 
questions of this dissertation. This study focuses on an underrepresented area of 
digital media–religion research: namely, online religious contestations in 
contemporary Islamic discourse. There are substantial ideological disputes within 
Islam that occur in digital space, but those of particular import today, in both the 
online and real worlds, are centred upon Salafī/Wahhābī substrate ideologies 
represented in online texts that reproach certain Muslim ideologies or practices, 
especially Sufism and related creedal aspects of Sunnī Islam. The specific areas of 
dispute and the nomenclature used in the polemics are presented in the chapters 
ahead, and their significance and symbolism, as argued in this study, are best 
understood through the interpretive or analytical framework of religious authority; 
that is, the language, themes, and multi-platform strategies of Salafī contestations 
ultimately seek claims of authority in a critically important religious discourse in the 
world. 
While anti-Sūfī polemics pre-date digital media—in fact, they have pre-
modern roots60—what is observed today represents a substantial rupture from the 
past. Digital platforms have altered and expanded the breadth and deployment of 
contestations, bypassing erstwhile hurdles of what is loosely called mass 
communication, such as expense, knowledge acquisition, and rigour. The 
technologies have permitted users unprecedented access to content and ‘private 
                                               
60 For a well-documented historical analysis of premodern anti-Sufism polemics see de Jong and 
Radtke. 
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media consumption’ in the privacy of their homes, which, for some scholars, 
appears to represent not a trivial arrangement of consumption but ‘a shifting media 
ecology and cultural anthropology’.61 And the technologies have made content-
production and assertions of knowledge much easier and far less expensive to 
convey. They also broaden the strategies of polemic-making and their potential 
influence and audience reach—bypassing traditional constructs of knowledge 
production, conveyance, and religious authority—all of which are intellectual 
issues, if not crises, of Muslim milieus.62 The ruptures of the age of digital media 
represent an accelerated erosion of the ‘traditional system of knowledge production 
and dissemination in the Muslim world’.63 In the past, the religious authority of 
‘earlier generations’ derived its gravitas from the ‘mastery of authoritative texts 
studied under recognized scholars’.64 One significant aspect of media disruption, 
then, is the opening of access to sources without the tutelage of a scholar, with the 
benefits and drawbacks thereof. In addition, Salafism, as an ideology, is a modern 
phenomenon that focuses on a purification of Islam that is unique to the 
contemporary age, as discussed in Chapter 3, wherein the word and constructs of 
‘Salafism’ are unpacked and operationalized for this study. 
Aspects of the present work are connected to a longer tradition of scholarship on 
the affinities between religion and media. While new and emerging technologies have 
hastened the evolution of the field of study, in this literature review it is prudent to touch 
upon earlier (pre-digital) research in the media–religion field. In doing so, this dissertation 
is thus situated in an important scholarly tradition of insights, theory-building, and 
                                               
61 Glen Creeber and Royston Martin, Digital Culture: Understanding New Media: Understanding New 
Media (Maidenhead, Birkshire: Open University Press, McGraw-Hill Educationn, 2008), at 110–11. 
62 Susanne Olsson and Carool Kersten, Alternative Islamic Discourses and Religious Authority (New 
York: Routledge, 2016), at 5. Richard W. Bulliet, ‘The Crisis within Islam’, The Wilson Quarterly 
(1976) 26, no. 1 (2002), at 11–12. 
63 Mandaville, ‘Globalization’, at 102. 
64 Dale F. Eickelman, ‘Mass Higher Education and the Religious Imagination in Contemporary Arab 
Societies’, American Ethnologist 19, no. 4 (1992), 643–55, at 643. 
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findings that persist in their relevance. This, in turn, helps to underscore more 
emphatically what is actually ‘new’ about new media: namely, how digital media have 
not only altered the range, ubiquity, and speed with which religion messaging and 
contestations have evolved but have done so in conversation with both past scholarship 
and more contemporary factors, such as globalization65 and post-modern constructs of 
community, selfhood, identity, and individuality.66 This literature review also seeks to 
position the arguments and research questions of this thesis and connect their contribution 
to continuous threads of media–religion scholarship, as well as to frameworks that speak 
to the new affinities between religion and media today. 
The present chapter presents the scholarly literature as follows: first will be 
discussed digital media and religion in conversation with pre-digital scholarship; 
following that, scholarship on digital media and Islam will be examined. The review 
of the literature related to religious authority will be presented in Chapter 4, which 
is devoted to the study’s interpretative framework. 
THE PEDIGREE OF THE RESEARCH PRESENTED HERE 
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2.2 Traditional Media, Digital Media, and Religion 
The complex and increasingly intertwining relationships between religion and media have 
attracted scholarly attention for more than 60 years, but such work accelerated in the 
1970s with ‘a flurry of research’ prompted by the rise of televangelism and its new and 
expansive dissemination of religious content.67 Research in this area continued well into 
the 1980s (and to a lesser extent even today). 
What was of particular concern was how televangelism, and ‘religious broadcasts’ 
in general, represented a departure from more traditional or centralized means of religious 
communication—via church-authorized publications and at church institutions, for 
example. For one thing, the broadcasts were not ‘sanctioned by religious and secular 
authorities’ and, as such, symbolized a change in authority of religious messaging fronted 
by broadcast media technology.68 
In media scholarship, ‘departure’ narratives—noticeable shifts in public 
communication practices and perspectives—have consistently attracted interest because 
of what these major shifts have shown in the relationship between technology, culture, 
and other aspects of human life, notably religion. As such, preaching the gospel on 
television (and radio beforehand) represented an early change from a more coordinated 
(or traditionally constructed) representation of religious authority to one that was more 
dispersed and often separated from denomination-bound institutions. In addition, the 
context of the rise of the broadcasts added urgency to the question of the emergence of 
televangelism, as the role of religion in domestic and international politics in the United 
States at the time was palpably on the rise.69 Horsfield also examined at length religious 
television programming in the United States—its development and the advent and 
marketing methods of the ‘electronic evangelists’—and carried out work in other key 
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areas of television research.70 Frinkl spoke in terms of marketing as well, because of the 
expanded audience reach of electronic broadcasting that created competition between 
various religious programmes and even with commercial television programming, in 
which Frinkl points out that ‘ ministries are combining religious norms and broadcasting 
norms’, which may seem at odds with one another.71 For others yet, the existential nature 
of electronic broadcasts was of primary concern, since ‘a new age of information’ and ‘a 
new technological era’ had the potential to challenge historical religions, ‘which can lead 
either to humankind`s next integrative steps toward new religious insights and meaning, 
or to a collapse of religious development and the emergence of a period of anarchy and 
despair’.72  
Moreover, intra-Christian debates about the validity of preaching through 
television attracted scholarly notice. Public intellectual and satirist Malcom Muggeridge 
objected to the fundamental notion that the gospel can be transmitted through television 
with fidelity, since the main concern of Christ—his passion, as it were—was the truth and 
the chief concerns of television were fantasy and illusion.73 For Horsfeld, the rise of 
religious television broadcasting in America generated alarm among Christian leaderships 
in America, for it was perceived as a threat to the quality and gravity of what was 
preached, as the strength and appeal of the broadcasters were attributed to skills in 
adapting to technology more than the substance of theology. Also, among ‘fearful 
observers, the growth of evangelical broadcasting represented a massive takeover by the 
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political and moral right and a plot to establish a religious republic with the evangelical 
and fundamentalist broadcasters as the major spokespersons’.74 
The broadcast phenomenon raised other issues attracting early research, such as 
the relationships between meaning and media, namely, the personalized ability of 
broadcast audiences to negotiate their own, more autonomous sense of religious 
meanings. Audiences, therefore, interpret a personal reception of symbolic significance of 
religious content conveyed through new mediation that gradually diminishes the 
charismatic authority of religious figures, as well it raises alternative contexts to address 
‘metaphor, symbol, and story’ with television.75 Proselytization became a subject of study 
from an instrumentalist perspective, in which the means of communication seemed as 
important as the content of the messaging, thus influencing spiritual alternatives, such as 
conversion.76 
It should be noted that academic interest in religious broadcasting ‘remains an 
important aspect of the study of media and religion’.77 In their edited book, Thomas and 
Lee introduce research that investigates the notion of ‘global and local televangelism’ 
from a variety of religious groups and with a range of purposes that vary from the 
‘commodification of religion’ to matters of ‘authority’.78 
Past research and theory-making continue to help frame media effects in the 
digital age. The reason, perhaps, is straightforward: one of the major conceits of religion 
and media studies is the fact that mediation always matters: that is, whenever ‘meaning’ is 
conveyed, its reception is influenced, at least in part, by the means of its conveyance. 
According to Marshall McLuhan, the matter is quite stark: ‘In a culture like ours, long 
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accustomed to splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit 
of a shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is the 
message.’79 He also remarked that media are ‘active metaphors in their power to translate 
experience into new forms’,80 which has significance for contemporary digital media 
studies, as technology continually raises non-technical issues of human agency, ethics, 
quality of content, and metaphoric meaning.81 This prospect also suggests broader notions 
of hyper-individuality, a highly personalized experience with media interactions, all of 
which is arguably associated with individualism as a product of modernity. 
Carey likens the means of communication to the actual means of transportation 
that ‘brought the Christian community of Europe into contact with the heathen 
community of the Americas’. Transportation was thus viewed as a means to ‘establish and 
extend the kingdom of God, to create the conditions under which godly understanding 
might be realized’.82 Carey thus located ‘moral meaning’ in communication as 
comparable to physical transportation and its effects—sacred or vehicular. In other words, 
media forms are transporters of information and are in themselves imbued with cultural 
and religious significance.83 
Media theory, as a descriptor used by McLuhan and other scholars, seeks to 
construct a pattern of in the ‘influences of communication technologies’ on the content 
they convey.84 Lundby classifies McLuhan’s theory as ‘technological determinism’ and 
states that the theory ‘focuses on the distinct characteristics and influences’ of media 
forms, such as those of print and television technologies.85 Communication technologies, 
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then, are more than passive means of conveyance; rather they exert influence upon such 
seminal aspects as ‘modes of thinking’ and ‘value systems’.86 For Ess, one of the 
fundamental claims of media theory ‘is that our primary communication technologies 
correlate with different emphases within our conceptions of selfhood and identity’, a 
concern that begins with oral transmission.87 
However, despite this initial flurry of media scholarship and theory-building, early 
media scholarship did not place religion in the foreground or centre of research. 
Essentially, the field remained a media-centric discipline.88 But subsequently that 
disciplinary framing changed, as it became increasingly evident that media and religion 
occupy, to an important extent, a common conceptual and practical space in the lives of 
people in a more mediated age.89 Therefore, at the close of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the present one, there has been ‘a blossoming of academic interest in media 
and religion’. 90 Media and religion were once independent areas of study, but that 
changed. ‘One can speculate about the reasons for this—the growth of religious television 
programs and websites, concerns about how the media should portray religion following 
9/11’. The speculations aside, research of media and religion ‘has now emerged as one 
full of potential for researchers’.91 
This pronounced transition took the study of media and religion in a more explicit 
direction as an emerging subfield, field or discipline of academia92 that involves a range 
and merging of methodologies (qualitative, quantitative, discourse analysis, ethnographic, 
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etc.) native to media studies, religious studies, sociology, history, psychology, and 
theology, among other fields.93 
The ‘disciplinarity’ of digital media studies may still have been only a decade ago 
a debatable matter for some scholars. Sterne, for example, suggested that digital media 
studies have developed into a new scholarly discourse or field. He asks, ‘Is it an emergent 
discipline? Should it be?’94 Thus, what was once considered a growing, albeit provincial, 
area of academic interest within media studies, the research of religion and media has 
developed into a distinctive academic area that has contributed significant original 
scholarship to the larger questions raised in the media–religion ambit. The very notion of 
an audience, for example, has attracted studies that have proffered impact theories and 
narratives relating to the new medium, producing scholarship that examined the 
‘theological origins of the digital’,95 ‘virtual religiosity’ and ‘virtual rituals’,96 and ‘digital 
religion’ (a phrase meant to describe the practice of religion in ‘digital media and 
spaces’).97 These analyses of the existential meaning of digital conveyance are upheld in 
part by the transformation of the very notion of a media audience from passive receivers 
of information to active participants in ‘information gathering and exchange’, as Gary 
Bunt describes.98 In other words, the audience—the nucleus of a media ecology—has 
undergone a ‘participative turn’ that has expanded to a marked extent the sheer number of 
content producers who appropriate digital media disruptions to proffer content with 
noticeable ease and with or without vetted rigour99—a noteworthy concern of scholars 
who study extremist groups and recruitment content online. Other facets of digital media, 
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besides audience, have attracted similar academic responses. For one, research agendas 
now must take into consideration the social media phenomenon, which has introduced 
new avenues of communication, each of which influences religious discourse. 
 Thus, the study of the various intersections of religion and media becomes more 
poignant ‘as we move further into the twenty-first century. It is through the media that 
much of contemporary religion and spirituality is known.’100 The very ‘contemporariness’ 
of religion, as framed, is increasingly driven in large measure by media. 
In response, academia has turned greater attention to the study of religion and 
media, and now particularly digital media. The work of Gary Bunt, for example 
(discussed in greater detail below), contextualizes and chronicles ‘what happens when 
two of the dominant elements shaping life in the twenty-first century, Islam and the 
Internet, combine’.101 Hoover argues that the religion–media inquiry is ‘about the practice 
of religion, the way that religion is done in the context of media culture’.102 Lorne 
Dawson raises important questions that relate to the effect of digital media on the sense of 
belonging that religions have always striven to achieve among individuals and 
communities in pre-digital times, but in the digital space, two social crises seemed to have 
followed: challenges to religious authority and religious authenticity.103 Perennial aspects 
of the religion discourse seemed to be challenged by new media. Heidi Campbell, for 
example, examines the alteration by digital media of the notion of ‘community’ in 
religion, particularly online forums that ‘took on community identities as they generated 
loyal support from members’.104 and Pauline Hope Cheong shows how the notion of 
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‘religious authority’ may be diminished by digital media, as it ‘allows different people to 
have open access and gain greater control over knowledge and social information’.105 
McLuhan’s evaluation of the media more than 50 years ago seemed to have 
anticipated what we observe today with the extraordinary reach and power of digital 
media.106 In fact, there is more than prescience involved in this observation. What 
McLuhan’s remark (and the pre-digital time frame in which he stated it) implies is that 
there is an essence to media, mediation, and meaning that is consistent. This is important 
to remember when considering digital media and their rapport with religion, and the 
relationship between the online world and real life. While it is true that digital media 
represent, in an important way, a paradigm shift, historical scholarship has ‘demonstrated 
that many of the trends and capacities of the media age have deep roots’.107 
These comparisons of new media with the past are useful to bear in mind, as they 
help to frame the examination of the Internet and emerging digital media forms—from 
static websites and blogs to audience-driven content producers to highly interactive social 
media tools such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat and more: a vast social media 
phenomenon that nearly each year introduces new avenues of communication. 
 
2.3 Religion and Digital Media Studies as ‘Waves’ 
There are important overlaps and shared theories between traditional and current media 
and religious studies (as discussed above); however, situating digital media studies in that 
tradition serves to magnify the significant differences between past and present media 
systems, highlighting a unique relationship between media and religion today. For some, 
in fact, it signals an altered sense of religion as practised. Digital media offer 
‘interactivity, hypertextuality, and its method of dispersal’,108 all of which affect not only 
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the means of communication but also the practice of religion itself. Digital media, for 
example, broadens the way in which the rites and requirements of a religion may be 
fulfilled; for instance, paying the required Zakat (Alms-giving) in Islam can nowadays be 
accomplished from a smartphone. As Campbell states, ‘digital culture negotiates our 
understandings of religious practice in ways that can lead to new experiences, authenticity 
and spiritual reflexivity’.109 The realms of both media and religion are ‘transforming’ and 
‘being transformed’ in a highly mediated age.110 
These critical findings on the mutual effects of digital media and religion represent 
a progression of the field of study, which can be seen to have gone through ‘waves’ of 
research objectives and paradigms. Thus, before reviewing the literature on Islam in 
digital space, it is important to speak of the ‘wave’ convention, its accessibility and 
imperfection. 
Hojsgaard and Warburg have accessibly categorized the progress of research on 
religion and digital media into major waves,111 with other waves imminent, as Campbell 
demonstrates in her expansion on the wave history of this discipline.112 The wave 
convention represents ‘how research methods and approaches to various research 
questions have emerged and matured over time’.113 
Ostensibly, the first wave is the idealistic one that began in the mid-1990s, in 
which the Internet was yet considered as ‘fascinating, new, and extraordinary aspects of 
cyberspace’ that were ‘filled with either utopian fascination or dystopian anxieties about 
the surreal potentials of the new digital communication medium’.114 The first wave is also 
descriptive in its approach. Its main contribution is in documenting and mapping out new 
content of religion in digital space, locating, for example, patterns of religious content 
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online—primary scriptural sources, rudimentary interpretations, and the semblances of 
community. In addition, these initial forays in researching religion and the Internet 
‘tended to offer a general survey of religious experimentation with the internet and 
suggested observations on the potential religious and cultural implications’.115 Zaleski, for 
example, explored how followers of religion made use of the Internet, and how Internet 
users engaged with the content. He claimed that ‘Christian Web sites comprised more 
than 80 percent of the Web sites of the world’s five major (most influential) religions.’116 
Such studies were typical of first-wave Internet research. Hojsgaard and Warburg 
attribute the start of the first wave to Stephen D. O’Leary, who saw ‘computer-mediated 
communication’ as representative of a cultural shift comparable in magnitude to the print 
technology’s effect on the Reformation.117 Focusing on the technology itself, the first-
wave scholarship explored the difference between religions’ content in terms of digital 
and broadcast technology.118 The first wave, then, drew attention to the technology per se 
and produced essentialist observations that were ‘filled with either utopian fascination or 
dystopian anxieties about the surreal potentials of the new digital communication 
medium’.119 
The second wave is marked by its emphasis on ‘the diversity of the field and the 
need to put new findings into a broader historical and social perspective’.120 It is called, 
for convenience, the ‘categorical’ wave. In other words, researchers focused on a finer 
parsing of what is on the Internet and who is ‘generating these new forms of religious 
expression online’, moving beyond charting the field.121 Hojsgaard and Warburg observed 
how scholars worked to provide categorizations and typologies of the content to 
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understand common trends within Internet practice. Thus, in the second wave of research, 
‘the significance of computer networks is not neglected’, but is framed and interpreted 
from various perspectives, since the ‘Internet does not generate religion, only people 
do’.122 Thus, scholars turned their attention to ‘the evolution and development of a 
typology of cyberspatial religious discourse’ through ‘category’.123 Karaflogka, for 
example, documented the expansion of Taliban presence in cyberspace. Her search in 
1996–97 ‘produced 895 pages related to Taliban, one of which was the official site. On 16 
April 2001, the sites were 329000.’124 
According to Campbell and Altenhofen, landmark edited volumes on religion and 
the Internet typified the second-wave emphasis. Researchers ‘examined the impact of the 
internet on religious groups and culture’, as seen in Cowan and Dawson.125 Lovheim, 
moving beyond first-wave concerns, studied identity-making among ‘young people’ who 
were increasing immersed in the Internet and, perhaps, have experienced changes in their 
‘identity construction’.126 Similarly, Bunt considered the offline–online boundaries 
against the growing availability of Islamic content online, particularly the Qurʾān and 
access to various interpretations for ‘marginalized or underrepresented groups’.127 
Essentially, the second wave sought answers to the ‘what next’ query: a study of religion 
and digital space beyond merely charting the waters of a new form of religious 
expression.128 According to Campbell and Altenhofen, researchers contended with and 
examined how ‘text became understood as the embodiment of the person online’ and 
explored the question, ‘How do scholars treat and analyse a text that is seen as the 
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representation of a person’s identity and body online?’129 These second-wave studies 
attempted to categorize and begin interpretation of online religious content. 
At the time of introducing their ‘wave’ convention, Hojsgaard and Warburg 
believed that the ‘third wave of research on religion and cyberspace may be just around 
the corner’.130 This wave would come from ‘different backgrounds and […] diverse 
methodological preferences may very well indicate that the topic is maturing 
academically, and that it is maturing well’.131 Since then, the corner has been turned, as it 
were, and Campbell has advanced the wave framework to incorporate and interpret new 
research on religion and digital space. The core question of the third wave shifted from 
‘what next?’ to ‘so what?’ In other words, religious content in new media had become so 
voluminous and diverse, such that the previous waves of research no longer sufficed to 
provide for a fuller understanding of this unprecedented expansion of religious ideas and 
texts online. Thus, a need arose to ‘explain and contextualize research efforts to see how 
studies of religion online illuminated not just trends in digital culture, but pointed to larger 
shifts in religious culture in general’.132 Thus, third-wave research is called the 
interpretative wave, in which content online of necessity attracted theoretical and 
interpretive inquiries. The phenomenological findings of online research revealed the 
need for an assessment that, through key analytical frameworks, would enable an 
understanding of the broader social, creedal, and theological implications—among 
others— of religion online. Advanced theories of identity-making, religious rituals, and 
community construction helped frame what digital space had been doing to religion and 
its followers. A significant framework found in this wave discusses changes in religious 
authority—the interpretative framework of this study—which will be explored more fully 
in subsequent chapters. 
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The present wave, the fourth, expanded upon by Campbell and Altenhofen, is the 
emerging trend in religion and digital media studies. It concerns itself with ‘further 
refinement and development of methodological approaches’133 and is represented in 
contemporary scholarship particularly by studies that are more refined in examining the 
social implications and impact that online religion may have on such critical matters as 
identity and authority, which are perennial materialities of religion but now redefined and 
challenged by new media.134 
It should also be noted that ‘waves’ do not always complement or flow from one 
another in a linear and seamless fashion. A recent wave may offer corrections of previous 
scholarship or overlap significantly. Early contemplations in the field, for example, 
contained suggested that ‘the nature of contemporary religion might be completely altered 
due to online engagement […] current research suggests the features of religion online 
closely mirror changes within the practice of religion in contemporary society.’135 Thus, 
the ‘wave’ convention is not meant to draw fine lines between study types and the 
timeframe of their growth, since one may find instances of early scholarship that seem to 
fit more comfortably into the work of later waves. Bunt, for example, in his early work 
(presumably first-wave research) recommended, as it were, second-wave cautions: that is, 
scholars should avoid exaggerating the ‘transformational’ properties of the Internet, a 
caution that is based on an explanatory or contextualized understanding of new media 
rather than a descriptive one.136 Consider also the work of Hoover and Clark on the 
cultural impact of the practice of religion in the age of new media,137 and that of Jeremy 
Stolow, who addressed the ‘specious’ postulations about the ‘putatively distinct realms of 
religion and media’.138 
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The present study is placed in the third and fourth waves of religion and digital 
media studies. The work examines online contestations, a type of online text that requires 
more than description to unpack its contextual and analytical meanings. In other words, 
the study seeks to answer the question ‘so what?’ as described above in third-wave 
research. Intra-religious contestations online, with regard to Islam, have not received 
sufficient scholarly attention and would be well-served by phenomenological, descriptive 
treatments of such content. However, they also require examination through an 
interpretive framework that addresses the advancement of third-wave considerations. As 
such, even with a thorough descriptive account of online polemics, new research should 
seek out and discuss the analytical value of intra-religious contestations, as this study does 
in the forthcoming chapters. But, as a necessary part of a growing fourth wave in digital 
media and religion studies, a considered methodological approach to interpreting these 
online texts needs to be discussed at length, as described in Chapter 5, the chapter on 
methodology. The study of ‘Islam and Muslims on the internet has necessitated the 
development of new methodological approaches’ that have evolved in recent years.139 The 
section below provides a review of the major works that have treated Islam and digital 
media specifically in the last two decades. The purpose is to situate this study in this 
growing field and discuss its original contribution to the field. 
 
2.4 Islam and Digital Media 
In this section, the literature review moves from a general treatment of religion and digital 
media to the multifaceted expressions of Islam and Muslims online. It begins with an 
examination of the work of Gary Bunt, who has researched Islam and digital media since 
the late 1990s, and continues to this day. His research examines the wide-ranging 
activities of Muslims in the realm of digital communication and has allowed this inquiry 
to be situated in pertinent broader contexts, as explained below. 
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 In coining the phrase ‘Cyber Islamic Environments’ early in his research, Bunt 
introduced an operating taxonomy for subsequent researchers to rely on.140 The descriptor 
is suitable not only toward the classification of a ‘variety of contexts, perspectives and 
applications of the media’ utilized by self-identifying Muslims.141 The phrase offers a 
contextualization from which research analyses content of a veritable library of 
‘worldviews and notions of exclusivity, combined with regional and cultural 
understandings of the internet and its validity’ in knowledge acquisition and conveyance. 
An overarching purpose in Bunt’s work is examining the potential of Cyber Islamic 
Environments to change ‘aspects of religious understanding and expression, and […] to 
enable elements within the population to discuss aspects of religious interpretation and 
authority with each other’, which does not preclude ‘subverting what were conventional 
channels for opinions on religious issues’.142 
 In Virtually Islamic, Bunt shows that there has been a surprisingly robust and swift 
embrace of the Internet among Muslims, even among those who had moral qualms about 
the medium. Virtually Islamic is a thorough look at the early presence of Islam online that 
covers the full gamut that online tools offer: websites with the textual sources of Islam, 
namely, Qurʾān, Ḥadīth (the sayings, descriptions, and accounts of the Prophet 
Muḥammad), and scholarly commentaries; sites that are (or were) formally part of an 
institution or of leading scholars; sites that promote and facilitate marriage; sites that 
advocate or defend doctrinal slants and even lifestyles; online magazines; and blogs and 
chat forums that give named or anonymous users opportunities to offer their views on 
topics du jour. Many of these sites contain content that advance or at least represent 
several movements or ideologies active in the Muslim world: Salafī, Wahhābī, Tablīghī, 
Ṣūfī, and others. Throughout the work, Bunt situates his study in the academic 
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interdisciplinary context of Islamic and religious studies, as well as media studies. He was 
among the first scholars to raise important aspects of disciplinarity in media-religion 
research. 
In Islam and the Digital Age, Bunt turns his focus from a more general accounting 
and situating of Muslim/Islamic online presence toward a more finely drawn examination 
of Muslim utilization of the Internet. Bunt isolated and examined two main purposes that 
inform Muslim ‘zones’ of content online: (a) ‘activism’ in the form of ‘electronic jihad’ 
or ‘e-jihad’ and (b) ‘decision making’.143 
Bunt deconstructs activism into the more virulent activism relating to reactions to 
the poor political conditions in the Muslim world and including recommendations on how 
to confront or resist them, whether in Palestine, Iraq, or Afghanistan; and that activism 
which concerns the benign advocacy of intra-Islamic sectarian aspects and movements 
(such as Ṣūfī orders, Shiites, and others), which advocates good-doing and the general 
activity called daʿwa, which literally means to call for something; in its derived sense, it 
means to educate people about the religion or aspects of it, often with an eye to calling 
people to Islam itself. 
The ‘decision-making’ realm, which often overlaps with ‘activism’, is comprised 
mainly of the various online fatāwā (singular, fatwā): that is, purportedly authoritative 
rulings and opinions about issues ranging from domestic affairs and family law to world 
politics, and they include formal opinions on the permissibility or prohibition of critical 
matters such as suicide bombing. In deciphering these two ‘dominant zones of Cyber 
Islamic Environments’, Bunt establishes a methodological approach to online Islamic 
content that is based on genres of the content and their unique impressions and influences, 
as well as their inseparable relationship to the real-life questions and controversies of a 
Muslim world grappling with disenfranchisement in a globalized context.144 
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Bunt’s book iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam magnifies and builds upon his 
previous works. In key chapters of iMuslims, Bunt lays out more explicitly the ‘framing 
of globalization in an Islamic milieu, with notions of so-called orientalism and the media 
presciently raised by Edward Said’.145 It is interesting that Bunt mentions Said in this 
context, since the effect of Bunt’s work in a way resembles that of Said’s, both drawing 
attention to knowledge, power, and media narratives concerning the Muslim world. Said 
locates his observations on media as an extension of the loci of Western imperial power 
and subsequent framing effects.146 In other words, Said contemplates Islam and the media 
from without. Bunt, however, draws attention to new media but mainly from within: that 
is, he considers largely Muslim-generated content that references major matters, such as 
globalization, knowledge transmission, the altered notions of authority, audience, and 
identity. In iMuslims, Bunt establishes the manner in which to approach Islamic discourse 
and Islamic scriptural sources online. In doing so, he necessarily locates the online space 
with the ‘offline’ realm: that is, he examines the ‘digitization of many long-standing 
essential concepts and practices associated with Islam’.147 
A full accounting of Bunt’s findings would far exceed the space available in this 
literature review. But the value of Bunt’s work is significant to the current research in 
many ways, in terms of establishing methodological approaches. In and of itself, the idea 
of locating ‘purpose’ in media exploitation and usages is particularly important. The 
advantage of ‘access’ associated with the Internet is centred on content producers having 
greater ease in surmounting the previously prohibitive economic and logistic obstacles 
required to compete in offline media. As such, digital media and user-based technologies 
have opened the gates for more participants to express—with marked relative ease—their 
voices and activism online. The plethora of new voices in digital space raises and 
                                               
145 Bunt, iMuslims, at 17. 
146 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
of the World, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), at 142–45. 
147 Bunt, iMuslims, at 77. 
  45 
complicates the question of ‘Who speaks for Islam?’148 The question is complicated by 
the sheer widening and multifariousness of a religious media ecology that has been altered 
by digital media disruptions. This change from the ‘offline world to the online’ is 
characterized by two significant ‘social consequences’: namely, a ‘crisis of authority and 
a crisis of authenticity’.149 However, this phenomenon places pressure on researchers to 
advance the academic discussion from generalizations to the actual location of patterns in 
content and the creation of a representative corpus of online texts. Bunt demonstrates an 
approach to deciphering from a given pattern and corpus reasonably sound conclusions 
about both the discourses themselves and the tools of their conveyance. In doing this, 
Bunt’s work connects the online realm with ‘offline’ ramifications of the modern-day 
Muslim milieu and its grappling with globalism and the rather unclear frontiers of 
‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’. At the centre of this is the battle over the notion of a 
collective identity. As Bunt says: ‘There are numerous parallel ummah frameworks 
operating in cyberspace, reflecting diverse notions of the concept of community.’150 
 
2.5 Case Studies of Cyber Islamic Environments 
Methodological approaches to studying ‘Islamic’ texts online revolve around, in part, 
qualitative content analysis. Usually, this method applies a case-study approach that 
analyses a site or forum that has representative authority, an archetype from which larger 
conclusions can be drawn. The following are important examples. 
Heather Marie Akou examined the online interpretations of ḥijāb (headscarf that 
many Muslim women wear in public).151 Akou contends that ḥijāb is a point of 
controversy among Muslim women themselves with regard to what properly constitutes 
Sharīʿa-compliant attire. Because the Qurʾān itself does not detail its stipulation of modest 
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attire, such details and forms have been relegated to interpretations that have ‘resulted in 
vast differences of dress’ in the Muslim world.152 What, then, is the role of the Internet in 
ameliorating this dilemma? Akou suggests that the Internet has provided borderless access 
to assorted views about ḥijāb. She properly sets up the discussion by going over typical 
citations of verses from the Qurʾān and other sources before she delves into the ‘use of 
cyberspace as a multi-media platform for learning about and debating what constitutes 
appropriate Islamic dress’.153 Akou focuses her analysis on ‘hijablog’ (hosted by 
thecanadianmuslim.ca), which Akou quite confidently says is ‘one of the largest in-print 
discussions on hijab ever recorded in the English language’.154 
Akou works from the assumption that the online–offline worlds are very much 
related. Indeed, she argues that one of the major functions of the Internet has been to 
continue conversations normally limited in pre-digital technologies. She mentions, for 
example, that digital video recordings—which can ‘easily be edited from a desktop 
computer’—permit ‘users to post digital videos for anyone to watch [that] often make use 
of Hollywood-style rhetoric and plots to form their arguments’.155 
Eva F. Nisa’s research examines Internet use by Indonesian women who cover 
their faces (with niqāb). These face-veiled women, who are known in Indonesian as 
‘cadari’, are ‘often understood by mainstream Muslims as oppressed’.156 So, taking 
‘advantage of the freedom of speech that has emerged in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian 
period, they use media strategically for their own purposes in ways quite different from 
those motivating the internet habits of mainstream Muslims in Indonesia’. Nisa explores 
how these women formed ‘subcultures through the internet’. In her case study, Nisa 
focuses on a mailing list formed by Salafī women, and online businesses operated by the 
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veiled woman. As such, the ‘web engagements’ of the women ‘afford them a level of 
sociability that enables them to maintain their pious projects of self-shaping and 
learning’.157 
Celia E. Rothenberg’s study offers an ‘ontological’ inquiry into discussions about 
Jinn (‘creatures made of smokeless fire who can choose to appear to humans in a variety 
of disguises’) on the Internet, specifically relating to one popular Islamic website and one 
chat forum in which animated discourses about these creatures have taken place.158 From 
a methodological point of view, Rothenberg chooses these disparate Internet entities and 
categorises the quality of the discourses therein in terms of textual sourcing and formality. 
The website (www.islamonline.net), Rothenberg notes, contains ‘formal opinions from 
contemporary imams, or fatwas’, which tend to be based on Islamic texts. On the other 
hand, on the chat site (www.islamicweb.com), the ‘virtual world’s equivalent of coffee-
house talk or kitchen gossip’, the discussions lack ‘specific textual references of the 
fatwas’, and they lack contextualisation of the stories.159 In other words, ‘Internet chat 
about the jinn is often brief and stripped of the detail that, on the ground, makes it 
meaningful.’ It is interesting that Rothenberg cites the work of anthropologists who 
coined the ‘Great and Little Traditions of Islam’, which, in Rothenberg’s view, correlate 
with the discourses on websites versus chat forums.160  
In another study, Nabil Echchaibi applies a single case-study methodology and 
subject interviews in examining the online Muslim magazine called ‘Alt-Muslim’ (which 
has subsequently become part of the popular religion portal ‘Patheos’ and is now 
managed by editor-in-chief Dilshad D. Ali). Echchaibi’s stated purpose is to demonstrate 
that in the online world there are multifaceted conversations occurring among Muslims, 
contrary to popular impressions or the ‘simplistic’ view that ‘banalizes our understanding 
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of the complexity of contemporary Muslim discourses and practices as they related to 
modernity and their negociation of cultural differences’.161 These conversations contradict 
the rather simple impression one gains by consuming traditional media means and their 
managers, who collectively ‘banalize’ the nuanced and complex conversations among 
Muslims with regard to negotiating modernity, secularism, and cultural considerations 
with Islam itself.162 Echchaibi views Alt-Muslim’s founder, Shahed Amanullah, as one of 
Islam’s ‘new interpreters’ in an ‘Internet sociology’, as Jon Anderson had termed them.163 
Echchaibi’s examination of Alt-Muslim includes extensive interviews with Amanullah 
and an examination of the various articles on Alt-Muslim, written mainly by Muslims 
residing in or from the West. 
 In a separate treatment, but one similar to his Alt-Muslim study, Echchaibi turns 
his attention to online media activism and ‘choreographies of social change’ among 
Muslims in the form of the website Muslimah Media Watch. In this case, Echchaibi 
conducts his research through interviews with the site’s founder and contributors, as well 
as conducting textual analyses of the content that appears on the site; the content is mainly 
in the form of blog posts that comment on or contest narratives about Muslims (Muslim 
women in particular) that appear in mainstream media outlets.164 Echchaibi situates this 
study within the context of Muslim activism online, the kind of activism that takes on 
narratives that seem implacably supported in mainstream media. 
 Alexis Kort examines Muslim online content dubbed ‘Dar al-Cyber Islam’, a 
somewhat awkward attempt to describe Cyber Islamic Environments. The phrase is 
borrowed from the idea and phrase of ‘Dār al-Islām’, that is, the abode of Islam in lands 
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in which Muslims are the majority population. The sites she examines pursues ‘new 
concepts’ in the realm of ijtihād: that is, the process by which juristic rulings are 
considered and communicated, usually in ostensibly new situations and contexts never 
seen before in Muslim history.165 But her more important contribution in this study is her 
contention that cyber environments have led to innovative ijtihād activities that ultimately 
point to ‘reforming trends in Qur’anic interpretation [which] can help lead to the further 
empowerment of Muslim women’. Kort restricted her research to domestic violence. For 
her case selection, she analysed the following four websites: (1) IslamiCity; (2) the 
Islamic Society of North America; (3) Jannah; and (4) the Muslim Women’s League. In 
her analyses of the websites, Kort says that she found that long-standing notions of 
important concepts of community and edict-making (ijtihād) have been altered.166 She 
noticed, for example, in the website IslamiCity, challenges to the views of traditional 
scholars, such as Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979), an Indian thinker and Muslim 
revivalist who founded the movement Jamaal-e-Islamic. Kort perceives that there are 
‘strong voices’ emerging out of America, where ‘Muslims have the freedom and need to 
seek out modern meanings of Islam. This is evident in the articles cited on the websites, 
which are all written by Muslim American activists and scholars.’167 Kort also concludes 
that her study advances the possibility that ‘traditional Islamic notions’ of community 
(ummah), the scholarly class (ʿulamā’) are transforming.168  
Simona Lavaca investigates the use of the Internet for ‘soft’ daʿwa by Islamist 
movements in the United States. What Lavaca attempts to establish is an overview of the 
online work of Islamic organizations in the United States involved in daʿwa, that is, 
teaching or proselytizing Islam to Muslims and non-Muslims.  These organizations are 
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open, not-for-profit organizations that have employed digital technologies and access to 
‘promote their interpretation of Islam and to attain political goals’.169 
 Murni Mahmud and colleagues have produced a study that pursues an evaluation 
of user experiences with select Islamic websites, all the users of which were Muslim. The 
study relies on surveys of users of these websites (Islamic Relief, Challenge Your Soul, 
Islam A Share, and Islamic FAQ). The statistical results show how users evaluate these 
sites according to factors such as trust, legitimacy, and credibility. The methodology of 
this study does not relate to this study per se, but it does demonstrate a quantitative 
approach to studying user experiences in Cyber Islamic Environments. 170 
 
2.6 Salafism, Sufism, Extremism, and the Internet 
The terminologies and ideological definitions of ‘Salafism’ and ‘Sufism’ are addressed in 
greater detail in the next chapter, in which their meanings, history, and contemporary 
iterations in Muslim thought are defined and operationalized for this study. In brief, 
Salafism is a term that broadly refers to modern reform movements in Islam of the late 
1800s and early 1900s, and it refers also to contemporary movements generally referred 
to as ‘purist’ Salafism in new scholarship. Sufism, on the other hand, is widely referred to 
as the mystical dimension of Islam that includes beliefs and ritual practices that some 
believe are external to the religion. This accusation has drawn negative attention from 
ideological movements such as Salafism and Wahhabism. As such, Sufism receives harsh 
criticism, if not rebuke, from Salafists. The Salafism–Sufism divide is among the most 
significant ideological differences in contemporary Islam. In addition, radicalism and 
extremist views, perhaps indirectly encouraged by the substrate ideologies of Salafism, 
are also of prime concern in the study of Islam online. What follows is a selection of 
studies that speak to either the progress of studying Salafism and Sufism in digital space 
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and/or the importance of this study that examines an understudied area of media-religion 
research, namely, online contestations within Islam. 
Merlyna Lim, for example, discusses extensively the role of the Internet in 
fostering Muslim radicalism and anti-Americanism in Indonesia. Her study focuses on a 
specific region but depends on more generally applicable observations. She contends that, 
through increased use of the Internet, ‘Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has begun to 
develop links with similar radical Islamic movements in other parts of the world.’ Her 
study shows how these radical groups use the Internet to ‘disseminate the messages of 
Islamic radicalism, anti-Americanism, and other sentiments from local to global 
scales’.171 Lim operates from the working postulate that the Internet enables people 
(including radicals) to develop ‘multiple identities’, by which she means that one may 
‘strengthen national identity while also fostering a deterritorialized identity’ to connect to 
global radical angst. In Lim’s study, supra-national identity relates to a worldwide 
phenomenon of religious fanaticism in the Muslim world, the ranks of which represent a 
small minority of the world’s Muslim population but somehow successfully leverage the 
Internet for their purposes. Lim emphasizes the fact that digital media dispose of the ‘one-
way’ conveyance of information characteristic of traditional media, dissolving the marked 
‘distinction between producers and receivers of information’. She says that, because 
‘Internet users can be both producers and receivers’, movements (of any ilk) are able to 
engage audiences more directly and well beyond the immediate city, region, or even 
country of origin. Lim relies on case studies in her monograph. In one, she looks at the 
radical movement Laskar Jihad, founded in Indonesia in 1998, the online presence of 
which has grown stronger over the years. 
Carmen Becker looks at Salafī activism in German and Dutch online forums. She 
begins with the premise that ‘recent years have witnessed an expansion of Salafī activism 
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into computer-mediated environments like online discussion forums’.172 She also explains 
some of the stated core beliefs of Salafism: namely, as the name itself suggests, a return to 
the ‘prophet and the first generations’ who ‘embody the perfect model of a (Muslim) life 
which Salafi Muslims strive to emulate’. Without challenging that Salafī conceit, Becker 
analyses Salafī discussion forums that address religious practices which are purportedly 
constructed around notions of legitimate ‘religious sources’ and interpretation. In the 
process, she dissects four aspects of the practices discussed in these forums. The most 
relevant aspect of her work to the present research is what she terms ‘Fragmentation and 
re-alignment’, a method of applying a ‘digitized corpus’ of Islamic knowledge that 
upholds some kind of traditional ‘Islamic argumentation’ that have pre-modern roots in 
Muslim intellectual history. In so doing, the ‘collaboration’ of the members of the forum 
contributes to ‘a broader decentralizing tendency within Islam’. What is important in this 
observation is that it echoes a popular critique of Salafism and its epistemology in doing 
away with ‘tradition’ and its more rigorous requirements in terms of rational argument-
making and deriving rules from sources. Becker’s approach includes locating common 
threads that she detects in the forums, which become front and centre of her content 
analyses. 
Birgit Brauchler has done lengthy and extensive work on ‘cyberidentities at war’. 
Although her work focuses on the Moluccan Internet conflict in Indonesia, her study 
makes a more elaborate and compelling case about identity dynamics and the Internet, in 
which the author argues that online realms do more than ‘constitute a reproduction’ of the 
conflict in real space. The spaces of virtual digital media and those of offline realms can 
become inseparable in conflict contexts.173  
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 She examines Internet-enabling identities as fuelling the larger conflict. In her 
case study, Brauchler examines a Muslim–Christian conflict in a region of Indonesia and 
considers how its actors employ the Internet to forge identities in a ‘deterritorialized’ 
context, that is, mediated in electronic rather than physical or localized space.174 
Brauchler is detailed in setting up her work in her early chapters, where she describes her 
methodology (an ethnography or anthropology of the Internet). This work is useful to this 
study, particularly her finding that the Internet enables the creation of a ‘counterpublic to 
national media’ and, by extension, a counter-space to traditional frames of identity-
construction within the religion ambit.175 She also raises a significant point that, even 
though the percentage of Indonesians who have access to the Internet is low, this does not 
necessarily or directly correlate to the ‘real influence of the Internet’ in the context she 
studied.176 Like Bunt’s view about the dichotomy of the digital divide and ultimate digital 
effect,177 Brauchler’s case study suggests that Internet penetration rates do not fully 
inform the evaluation of new media’s influence–potential, perhaps, because of the 
potential of a minority who are influenced by the media having the capacity to influence 
others who are less connected, as it were. 
In his work on online Sufism, Bunt examines its representation in what he calls the 
‘multimedia Sufi’.178 He offers a key example of ‘how cyber-Islamic environments have 
evolved—and how Islam can be represented in the modern world’. Taking advantage of 
the ease, immediacy, and reach of digital venues such as YouTube, Ṣūfī orders have 
learned to produce or repost content that proffers their perspectives on matters of the heart 
(prayer requests, dream interpretations, and so on), but also on politics and those groups 
they perceive to be their ideological opponents—that is, Salafī and Wahhābī groups. Bunt 
examines the Naqshbandi-Haqqani Ṣūfī Order and their web presence in the form of 
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SufiLive. Just days after the death of Osama bin Laden, for example, the site uploaded a 
video that was critical of bin Laden and his interpretations of martial jihad.179 
 The responses to the pronouncements against Wahhabism were at times sharp and 
confrontational, Bunt’s research reveals. While it is true that much of what SufiLive posts 
does not represent mainstream Islam, it does offer a glimpse of the vitriolic and growing 
divide between Salafism (and Wahhabism) and Ṣūfīs, something that I would like to 
pursue further, since, in my view, this schismatic has the potential to come close to that of 
the Sunnī–Shia divide. 
 Bunt places his examination of SufiLive in the larger context of ‘religious 
authority’ online. He then moves on to extremist rhetoric and to calls for jihad online, as 
well as online activism. For the most part, the texts or videos communicated in cyber-
Islamic environments are in fact extensions of what is occurring in real life. However, 
having said that, something different has been happening with the advent of the Internet, 
something ‘shifting,’ as Bunts words it. ‘Online articulation of religious values, and the 
use of internet tools as a natural means of acquiring data on a range of issues, has meant 
that cyber-Islamic environments increasingly dominate conversations about Islam by 
Muslims’, Bunt writes.180 This is a critical observation to bear in mind when examining 
the intersections of religion and cyberspace. Bunt studies jihad content and its potential 
links to intra-Islamic ideas, such as Salafism, and examined the so-called ‘Saviour Sect’ 
activism online and its associations with violence.181 
Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor, in her work on ‘online Sufism’, adopts a case-study 
method as well, as she applies a thematic approach, examining three discussion threads 
found in a UK Ṣūfī forum. They are: ‘logic or love’ (debates about thinking logically and 
acting on faith); ‘religion and God’ (discussion of the stress of formal religion and its 
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dampening of an experiential relationship with God); and ‘Women’s discussions’ (a 
women-only discussion group that took on a range of issues from the exchanging of 
recipes to matters concerning Ramadan).182 
Jonas Svensson’s work examined videos posted on YouTube that pertained to the 
celebration of the Mawlid—that is, the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad. In his study, 
Svensson seeks to find differences between online and real-world contestations over the 
debate on the permissibility of celebrating the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday. In so 
doing, he raised the issue of ‘religious legitimacy’ in the innovation of such 
celebrations.183 Svensson also draws attention to the comments section of YouTube 
videos and analyses them according to the various expressed positions about the 
legitimacy of the celebration. In essence, Svensson explores videos and comments about 
an intra-Islamic dispute over celebrations of the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday in order 
to demonstrate the vehemence of the participatory culture online ‘against the background 
of existing off-line discourses, attitudes and practices’.184  
Thus far there have been few studies of quietist Salafī polemics online that pursue 
a methodology involving the gathering and examination of Salafī patterns of arguments 
and terminology as predicates to the interpretation that they represent claims to religious 
authority. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEFINING TERMINOLOGIES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This research concerns the study, analyses, and interpretive framework of significant 
online contestations within contemporary Muslim thought. The main content producers of 
the polemics and the object of their censure that are the concerns of this study have 
descriptors that are readily recognizable and frequently used in popular and academic 
discourses. However, despite the regularity of their use, the terms are often unevenly 
defined, misappropriated, or presented with insufficient parsing, as scholars have recently 
noted.185 The terminologies used to describe the ideological factions fall under the rubrics 
of ‘Salafism’ and ‘Sufism’. The nomenclatures are problematized for good particular to 
each term, and thus require individual attention. Therefore, in this study individual 
sections are dedicated to the typologies of these ideological streams and their support 
terminologies, as their meanings have evolved and have been altered over time, resulting 
in definitions that often conflict with one another across the literature. The urgency of the 
need to affirm and defend the meanings of these important terms has increased in recent 
years, as significant works have been published that directly challenge a long-standing 
view of what Salafism means today, which will be discussed below. While it can be 
argued that polemics and religion seem always to have been inseparable, it is not possible 
to analyse online polemics without understanding the predicates: the ideological purchase 
of the makers of the polemics and the key words located in their contestations. 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to define the key terms according to their 
nominal, historical, and ultimately operational meanings, which, in turn, confer upon 
these separate categories of Islamic visions analytical value in this study and, perhaps, 
similar studies elsewhere. In addition, this chapter, in and of itself, answers the growing 
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need to provide a more precise understanding and presentation of terms that have become 
more complicated because of current events of the post-Arab Spring Middle East region 
and recent research that challenges long-standing definitions of Salafism, as explored 
below. 
 
3.2 Salafism 
The first part of this chapter focuses on ‘Salafism’ with the purpose of providing a valid 
definition of the word from a range of conceptual, historical, and contemporary iterations 
(linguistic and ideological). At a fundamental level, addressing the main question here—
‘What do we mean by Salafism?’—is only partly a linguistic exercise; it concerns more 
the historical and ideological connotations of Salafism as they have evolved. Thus, this 
chapter seeks to offer an operational definition of the term Salafism in order to 
‘concretize the intended meaning’ in relation to this study.186 This chapter also addresses 
a pre-methodological concern: namely, separating the popular or headline use of the term 
(as mentioned in the introduction) from the ideation of Salafism as a substrate ideology 
that informs many of the online polemics and their potential impact in the real world. 
Salafism, it should be stressed, is an especially problematic term that has attracted 
significant renewed interest in recent years, with attempts to redefine more precisely what 
Salafism means as an ideology and as a movement of varied iterations. However, 
Salafism has a history of being ‘ill-defined and often misunderstood in the literature of 
this movement, and in the studies on Islamism more generally’.187 In attempts to study 
Salafism, particularly after 2001, when academic interest in the ideology significantly 
increased,188 it has become clear that the definitions and usages of ‘Salafism’ have ‘never 
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been monolithic’, and the term has become ‘a catchword’ for a variety of phenomena.189 
Lauzière argues that there have been erroneous usages of ‘Salafism’ in academic 
literature, some that seem ‘mythical’, in the sense that the term Salafism has been used to 
describe certain political movements in the Middle East more than a century ago, but no 
longer applies today.190 The word needs to be untangled from past historical frames, 
political realities, and larger violence narratives that make the usage of the word more 
imagined than substantiated. 
As such, ‘Salafism’ and its various derivatives present a challenge beyond 
semantics. The variant meanings of ‘Salafism’ in contemporary discourse (popular or 
academic) can create confusion or, at the very least, suffer from imprecision, and it is 
necessary to guide readers toward an intended signification that frames the term’s usage 
in research and affords it analytical value. The matter is exacerbated by the fact that 
‘Salafism’ and its derivatives have become increasingly popular in the wake of the so-
called ‘Arab Spring’, which started in the winter of 2010–2011 when the Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak stepped down. His resignation opened the doors for previously 
suppressed political interests in Egypt, particularly Islamist parties, to publicly contend 
for authority. Most notable among them were Muslim Brotherhood groups and, in 
opposition, ‘Salafī’ parties, the main ones being Jama’at Ansar al-Sunna a-
Muhammadiyya191 and the Nūr Party, ‘the political wing of the informal religious 
organization ‘Salafī Mission’ (al-Daʿwa al-Salafiyya)’.192 
As a result, Salafism attracted a plethora of analyses from political scientists and 
commentators who turned their attention to the unprecedented opportunity in modern 
                                               
189 Frank Griffel, ‘What Do We Mean by “Salafī”? Connecting Muḥammad ʿAbduh with Egypt’s Nūr 
Party in Islam’s Contemporary Intellectual History’, Die Welt des Islams 55, no. 2 (2015), 186–220, at 
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190 Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016), at 3. 
191 Shadi Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at 127. 
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Middle East history for Islamist parties to compete for political authority, as was the case 
in Tunisia and in the most populated country in the Arab world, Egypt.193 What 
compounds the Salafism quandary, from the point of view of this study, is the fact that 
Salafism studies tend to focus ‘on the political aspects’ of the movement’s various—and 
differing—groups, and in doing so they neglect or dismiss the ‘ideational, theology and 
legal underpinnings’ of the phenomenon.194 In contrast, it is these ideological 
‘underpinnings’ with which this study is primarily concerned, because understanding 
them is vital to defining the parameters and objectives of the study, and to understanding 
the ideological roots of splintered extremist groups. 
Thus, while the mention of ‘Salafism’ may evoke thoughts of contemporary 
political movements, state and non-state actors, and post-Arab Spring militancy, in this 
study the focus is on the ideological moorings of the Salafist phenomenon today: a 
‘purist’ movement that helps explain the oppositional nature of contemporary Salafism 
and its project to purify Islam from alleged heretical influences—a project expressed and 
pursued in the new media frontiers of digital space. In addition, the mere presence of 
debated meanings, if not controversies over the terminology, does not suggest that it is a 
hopeless case to attempt to proffer a distinct signification of Salafism from the ‘maelstrom 
of meanings’ of the word.195 On the contrary, it is quite possible to dissect out from the 
clutter of political frames and variant usages important, stable themes relating to the 
spectacle called ‘Salafism’. Despite the robust discussion surrounding this term, one 
matter is certain: Salafism exists and it is a phenomenon that exerts significant influence 
on Muslim communities and public discourses today, and, as scholars have noted, will 
probably increase its influence in the near future. 
                                               
193 Jonathan Brown, Salafis and Sufis in Egypt, The Carnegie Papers (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2011), at 9–11. 
194 Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, at 34–5. 
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The essential epistemological and methodological features of Salafism—the word 
and its various manifestations—are sufficiently consistent to enable a study of its 
contemporary presence and conveyance in digital media. Thus, this section will offer an 
operationalized meaning of Salafism, locate and analyse key doctrinal stands conveyed in 
new media and consider the challenge Salafism presents to religious authority. 
This section proceeds by (a) tracing the linguistic origins of the word and their 
evolved relationship to the reform movements of the past and the present; (b) outlining 
the emergence of the early modern reform movement named ‘Salafism’, the more recent 
and often conflicting iteration of it, and the problematic issues with the term ‘Salafism’ 
and its cognates as they have been used in academe; and (c) settling upon a more specific 
definition that adds clarity to this dissertation and the phenomenon it addresses. 
Ultimately, the chapter identifies an operationalized definition based on modern (late 
20th-century) Salafism, often referred to as ‘purist’ Salafism; the definition includes the 
epistemological frame and methodological of deriving sacred law from revelatory sources 
(the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth), as researchers such as Brown,196 Mandaville,197 Lauzière,198 
Haykel,199 and Wiktorowicz200 have pointed out. 
 
3.2.1 The Etymology of ‘Salafism’ 
‘Salafism’ is an Anglicized rendition of the Arabic al-Salafiyya, which in contemporary 
discourse describes two movements of recent Islamic intellectual history: 1) the Islamic 
modernist reform movements of the late 1800s and early 1900s; and 2) contemporary 
Salafism and its various iterations—purists, politicos, and jihadists, as will be elaborated 
below. The word’s etymology is important to touch upon because the modern 
appropriations of the term take inspiration from it. Al-salafiyya is derived from the Arabic 
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word salafa, whose basic connotation, according to Arabic lexical sources, refers simply 
to ‘what has preceded’ something in time (or in some cases advanced), whether it is an 
event, a person, money, a generation, a deed, or some cultural practice. It originates from 
the tri-literal root ف ل س  (transliterated as sīn lām fā), from which all the words of this 
connotation derive.201 
Derivatives of ف ل س occur several times in the Qurʾān, each occurrence loyal to 
the original meaning of preceding something. For example, in addressing those who 
exploit usury—as institutionalized in pre-Islamic times in the western strip of the Arabian 
Peninsula, a region known as ḥijāz—the Qurʾān rebukes the exploiters of such usury, but 
also offers relief to those who decide to refrain. Such a person ‘may keep his past gains’ 
(fa lahu mā salaf) (Qurʾān, 2:275).202 In other words, the repentant usurer does not have 
to remit what he or she had earned in the past, so long as he or she adheres to the new 
ruling. With regard to those who violate the sanctified state of the Pilgrimage, ‘God 
forgives what is past …’ (Qurʾān, 5:95): that is, one is not required to make expiation for 
the past violations, so long as one is henceforth constant in the proper observance of the 
rites of Pilgrimage. Similar meanings occur in other verses of the Qurʾān. But we should 
also mention that, in one occurrence, the Qurʾān makes mention of the chastisement that 
befell Pharaoh and his folk, a divine punishment that is a lesson or precedent for future 
generations (Qurʾān, 43:56). In other words, the story of Pharaoh is a strong cautionary 
tale, a precedent advanced for future generations to be wary of; in particular, it is a 
warning to the Makkan elite who opposed the Prophet and the nascent Muslim 
community, implying that the chastisement that came upon Pharaoh and his elite 
noblemen may be unleashed upon the leaders of the Makkan opposition to the Prophet 
Muḥammad. 
                                               
201 Edward William Lane, An Arabic–English Lexicon, Islamic Text Society Edition edn (Beirut: 
Libraire du Liban, 1863). 
202 The translations of the Qur’ān in this dissertation are from M.A. Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The bold italics in this citation are from the researcher. 
  62 
The uses of the derivatives of salafa in the Qurʾān do not evoke ethical points of 
view, per se, although the contexts suggest them. Linguistically the word is a neutral term 
that frames an event or deed according to the passage of time. It should also be noted that 
a derivative of salafa is used when referring to advancing loans to someone; in modern 
parlance, it is a cash advance (without interest), as this meaning occurs in Ḥadīth 
literature. But its main signification points to what has occurred in the past or has 
preceded something now present. 
From this rather neutral term, the idea of al-salaf expanded and became tied to a 
period of Islam in the past that came to be known as the al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (righteous 
forebears). This includes the Prophetic period (that is, the lifetime of the Prophet and his 
companions) and the immediate two successive generations of Muslims. These 
generations are said to have epitomized piety and scholarship untainted by rationalistic or 
Hellenistic thought.203 For most Muslims, ‘the temporal proximity to the Prophet 
Muhammad is associated with the truest form of Islam’.204 This is supported by a well-
known and often-evoked tradition (ḥadīth) of the Prophet Muḥammad, who said, ‘The 
best of my nation is my generation, then those who follow them, then those who follow 
them.’205 
Thus, this connotation of al-Salaf, the people of the earlier generations, may be 
evoked in a favourable way, without the political or ideological signification that is often 
now associated with modern Salafism. It would not be considered unusual or strange to 
hear devout Muslims communicate their aspiration to ‘emulate the model of the salaf’, 
although they do not identify themselves as salafīs.206 Trying to conduct one’s life in this 
manner cannot be viewed as a conceit solely of Salafism—the movement, that is. It is 
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possible, then, for Ṣūfīs to consider themselves to represent the true salaf, but only in the 
sense of their desire to follow the exemplars of the generations of the Muslim past.207 
Therefore, only in an evolved or more derived sense does Salafism reference modern 
intellectual and methodological concerns—namely, ‘an interpretation of Islam that seeks 
to restore Islamic faith’, perhaps even to save it from the contemporary challenges of 
modernism and its encroachment into religion.208 The objective is to purify Islam and 
restore it to the way it ‘existed at the time of Muhammad and the early generations of his 
followers…. Since this early period represented the golden age of Islam in its pure form, 
Salafis believe it should be the example followed by all Muslims today.’209 That is a 
fundamental connotation of contemporary Salafism. 
This background provides an answer to the questions: Why has al-salafiya been 
appropriated in more modern contexts? What makes it appealing? Researchers have 
prefaced their treatments of Salafism by noting that in the centuries after the passing of 
the Prophet Muḥammad the need was urgently felt to record and codify important 
teachings and practices of the religion as informed by scriptural sources, sacred law, and 
interpretations of qualified Muslim scholars. But none of these matters developed in a 
vacuum. According to tradition, sacred knowledge and their varied disciplines were 
conveyed by early generations of the Prophet Muḥammad’s ummah or community to later 
generations. Thus, theological and methodological proximity to the prophetic period 
signifies more reliable and acceptable views and scholarship; and thus their scholarly 
works and opinions were deemed purer and less diminished by the passage of time and 
epistemological incursions.210 
Therefore, an understanding of the etymology of salaf underscores how the term 
has developed to the derived meaning al-Salafiyya (Salafism), as a call and movement for 
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a theological and methodological reform of Islam that, it is claimed, is based on the early 
pious generations of Islam (as explored below).  
 
3.2.2 Salafism and the Early Modern Reform Movements 
Although it is a single phrase that has remained largely unchanged over the centuries, al-
Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ has become an expression used in disparate ways under the Salafism rubric. 
There are two significant historical frames that apply to Salafism and the notion of al-
Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ, and it is critical to distinguish between these historical movements in order 
to carefully deconstruct the usages of Salafism. The early modern reformists of Islam (late 
19th and early 20th century) invoked the phrase in accordance with their purposes, and 
more contemporary proponents of Salafism have done the same, but with important 
differences in terms of intention,211 as it will be explained below. While they each make 
references to the formative generations of Islam, the pious generations, deeper probing of 
early reformist ideas and their association with al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ shows that a marked shift 
occurred in how the phrase is appropriated in contemporary terms, in a way that often 
contradicts its former constructs within the reform movements of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. In this study, the two iterations of ‘Salafism’, or ‘two different 
narratives and characterizations’ of it,212 need to be separated: the ‘modernist’ reformist 
Salafism of the early reform movements and the ‘purist’ Salafism of the contemporary 
age, nomenclatures that have been revisited in recent scholarship. 
One of the main extant connotations of Salafism is derived from intellectual and 
advocacy positions adopted by the Islamic reform movement generally associated with 
the well-known thinkers and scholars Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897) and 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905): a movement founded near the end of the 19th century 
and later advocated and advanced by Rashīd Rīḍā (1865–1935) and thereafter inspiring 
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later scholars of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, each advocating reform (iṣlāḥ) of Islam 
employing various interpretative methodologies.213 (The Arabic word for ‘reform’, اﺻﻼح , 
is, in fact, derived from the second Arabic term in the phrase al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ, translated 
as pious or righteous (forebears).) 
There is an abundance of scholarly literature on these late 19th- and early 20th-
century thinkers (and those whom they immediately influenced) examining the main 
impetus behind their calls for reform and how the nuances of their views vary, including 
their intersections with Wahhabism.214 But what reform meant among the early reform 
movements contrasts with the idea of reform adopted by contemporary purist Salafist 
movements. 
While there are some variations in their thoughts and approaches, these early 
reform scholars sought to restore or set aright a Muslim ummah (global community of 
Muslims) that had suffered setbacks politically and socially. Early in his career, for 
example, ʿAbduh (along with al-Afghānī) advocated and called upon the plurality of 
Muslims to unite under the banner of Islam, to ignore the boundaries of race and nation, 
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to repel the influences of the Europeans, and to regain strength and greatness by relying 
on ways of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ.  However, later in their careers, ʿAbduh and al-Afghānī were 
less concerned with the details of piety and the canons of orthodoxy of the religion (a 
pronounced concern of modern ‘purist’ Salafīs) and more interested in Muslim 
advancement: that is, a desire to see the Muslim world emerge from the pre-modern age 
into a more rationalistic and even scientific age in the 19th and 20th centuries.215 
At the time, many areas of the Muslim world—countries or regions with a 
Muslim-majority population—had been in sharp economic, cultural, and political decline, 
very slow to react to modernity, and colonized and exploited by Western powers that, 
apparently, had created, advanced, and taken advantage of the accoutrements of the 
modern age—all of which afforded the West significant cultural, intellectual, and martial 
advantage over Muslim milieus. The early Islamic reformers examined the condition of 
the Muslim world and located and problematized aspects of Islam’s intellectual and 
methodological practices or assumptions that were seen as hurdles to new opportunities 
and scales of advancement. Regardless of the sensitivities with regard to addressing 
definitions of orthodoxy, these methodological strictures, according to the reformers, 
required re-evaluation or restructuring for the express purpose of reform, if not 
replacement. One of the changes involved a break or ‘rupture’ from the methodologies of 
pre-modern Muslim scholars (but after the generations of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ), who were 
seen as having an inflexible attachment to the four canonical schools of Islamic law, as 
over-privileging a precedent-based approach to interpreting the Qurʾān (particularly its 
legislative passages) and the traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad, and as being reluctant 
to consider new interpretations. More important, there was an unwillingness to consider 
new methodologies to interpret these sources in order to address the new conditions of 
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modernity with dexterity and freedom, even if such a rupture in approach would create a 
‘crisis in confidence’ among more traditional scholars.216 As such, the reformers tried to 
break the inertia that gripped Islamic law and kept it from adjusting to new currents—in, 
for example, scientific advancements, print technology, modern (or public) education, 
financial institutions, gender roles in the public sphere, and even political structures. In 
turn, this anchored Muslim societies in an anachronistic state and stunted their 
advancement. In other words, the Muslim world was incapable of keeping up, as it were, 
with Western societies because traditional Muslim scholarship and methodologies did not 
permit the necessary plasticity in reinterpreting sources of Islamic law for a new age. 
The arguments of the reformers pivoted in part on evoking al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (pious 
forebears) for the perceived malleability in the way they engaging scriptural sources. The 
early reformers saw in the pious forebears a flexibility of hermeneutics that diminished 
over the passage of time. This was before later generations of the Muslim world wavered 
from the path of simplicity and purity characteristic of the forebears—from their direct, 
unfiltered interpretative reading of the Qurʾān and words and deeds of the Prophet, the 
‘second revelatory source of guidance and law in Islam’.217 This was before the canonical 
schools of law had been established and legal theories and methodologies coalesced from 
the fourth century onwards. These subsequent generations had become entrenched in a 
rigid interpretative relationship with the sources of Islamic law, which ultimately rendered 
the Muslim ummah and scholarship locked into taqlīd—blindly following previous 
interpretations—thus rendering Muslim societies unprepared to adjust to modern life. The 
evocation of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ by the modernist reformers was a theological and 
hermeneutic stand more than a descriptor of a movement. 
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But it should be noted as well that these reformists problematized Sufism just as 
purist Salafists do; they pointed to the acceptance of alien (Hellenistic) philosophies into 
Islamic intellectual life and piety and censured what they saw as syncretism and accretion 
in Ṣūfī practices. Thus, the reformists saw Sufism as a misguided foray that took the 
Muslim world away from the straight path of the pious forebears. In a way, the reform 
thinkers had ‘a poignant realisation of the contrast between the present state of subjection 
to an infidel power and Arab might and glory in the days of the Salaf’.218 However, it is 
critical to point out that the underlying misgivings that early reform movement leaders 
had about Sufism related to Sufism’s claim to an epistemology that permitted 
otherworldly experiential knowledge (mysticism) and advocacy of a reliance on canonical 
schools of law and loyalty as part of their ascendance to the path of gnosis—a primary 
concern of mysticism. For the reform movements, like (or in association with) the pre-
modern Wahhābī movement, Sufism became the main target of reproach. Ṣūfīs then, as 
they are today, were declared to be ‘deviators from the true path of Islam, held 
responsible for [Islam’s] so-called decline, and depicted as a major impediment to its 
adaptation to the conditions and needs of the modern era’.219 
Researchers argue that the modern era raised vital questions—informed by the 
scientific age and, perhaps, the Enlightenment—that were, in part, ignored or even 
belittled by those scholars entrenched in classical thought in favour of the established 
Sunnī methodological traditions that the reformers viewed as in need of change.220 And 
change cannot occur, the reasoning continues, unless the very conception of religious 
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authority—the unfettered and decentralized right to derive new rulings for the 
unprecedented contexts of modernity—is reformed.221 
The modernist reform movements represent the ‘first paradigmatic conception’ of 
the Salafist phenomenon, as it is discussed in the literature, and remain a topic of 
discussion in current historical studies, as well as the social sciences and humanities. As 
Lauzière points out, researchers continue to use the term when describing ‘a multifaceted 
movement of Islamic modernism that took shape in the late nineteenth century and lasted 
until the mid-twentieth century’.222 
In sum, in advocating a more scientific epistemology and a cautious and select 
acceptance of Enlightenment conceits, early reformists were critical of aspects of 
traditional Islamic learning. They viewed traditional hermeneutics as outdated and as 
creating inertia that hindered Muslims’ reasoned response to the modern age. As Roy 
points out, Afghani was ‘more of an activist than a theologian’ and his primary concern 
was calling for a ‘return to the true tenets of Islam’, but as a means of ‘castigating the 
backwardness of the religious establishment rather than an appeal for the application of 
sharia’.223 The latter, however, is more of a central concern of contemporary Salafism, 
now treated below. 
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3.2.3 ‘Purist’ Salafism: The ‘Salafism’ of this Study 
The apparent motivations of the early reform movements associated with ‘Salafism’ differ 
significantly from those of contemporary Salafism, although they both evoked the term 
and ethos of the pious forebears (al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ) and both attempted to diagnose, as it 
were, the perceived malaise of the Muslim world, a malaise produced in particular by the 
oppressive conditioning of Western imperialism and the processes of debasement that 
widely affected Muslim lands, as the reformers viewed it; but also, and perhaps more 
significantly, the debasement was ultimately caused by syncretic or heretical beliefs and 
practices that had been accepted in Islam, as in the case of Sufism. Thus, while early 
reform intellectuals turned their attention and hopes of deconstruction to traditional 
methodological matters of pre-modern Islam and, thus, to reconciling sacred texts and 
previous scholarly activity with reason,224 particularly in terms of the influence of the 
Enlightenment and modernity,225 Salafists today resist this connotation of the term 
‘Salafism’ and redefine it as part of their purification project, which dismisses, for 
example, European Enlightenment influences. 
In this section, the focus is on a dominant iteration of ‘Salafism’ in contemporary 
Muslim societies, which has limited connections with the early reform movements 
mentioned above. Purist Salafism is the main concern of this study because of its 
incontestable importance and influences in contemporary Muslim discourse and in 
contemporary Muslim societies, whether they are Muslim-majority countries or Muslim 
minorities in Western nations. Moreover, this iteration of Salafism constitutes much (if 
not most) of the digital content that self-identifies as Salafism in thought and in perceived 
actualization of religious piety. 
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Thus, the ‘Salafism’ that is of particular importance in this thesis is the ‘second 
paradigm conception of Salafism’ known in research literature as ‘purist’ Salafism,226 
which, as intimated above, is a movement with few similarities to that of the early 
reformers of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Lauzière is adamant that the attachment of 
the Salafism label to the early reformers was probably a description after the fact, rather 
than a term used by the reformers to describe their own ideology. In the case of the 
purists, the terminology is applied by the Salafist advocates to themselves. This is a key 
distinction. 
Contemporary Salafism is said to be ‘a revivalist current within Islam’.227 In this 
context, this means that the aim of Salafism, unlike that of early reform movements, is to 
restore Islam as previous conceived by the pious generations, but as a restoration of 
Sharia, which was not the express intent of the early reform movements. 
The purist model of Salafism has a far greater presence and influence today than 
the early reform movements of the 19th and 20th centuries. The most recognizable feature 
of this brand of Salafism is the notion of purity and the project of restoring Islam and 
Muslim orthodoxy to a pure form: that is, freeing it from what are seen as alien and 
heterodox views and practices. Thus, the purist project of contemporary Salafism is seen 
as a practical necessity, for it is these impurities in the religion that have invited God’s 
displeasure and, hence, the debasement of the global community. Purist Salafists make no 
claim to the Enlightenment or scientific age or to navigating a reasoned response to 
modernity as the ummah enters it. Rather, the purity they seek in and of itself suffices to 
raise the community from its moribund state. As such, Salafists claim that what they 
adhere to is ‘nothing other than Islam as it was first revealed, unsullied by an innovation 
(bidʿa), deviation (inḥirāf), or accretion (ziyāda) and uncontaminated by exogenous 
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influences. It is the pure Islam to which the pious ancestors of the first three generations 
conformed’.228 
Purist Salafism focuses on key terminologies that are often and consistently 
evoked by activists in this ideological stream. They are daʿwa, often translated and/or 
interpreted as ‘mission’ or ‘proselytizing’, by which activists hope ‘to establish what for 
Salafists counts as correct ʿaqīda and the right practice of ṭahāra’: in other words, the 
purification of Islam from improper beliefs that have seeped into the religion. Even for 
‘quietist’ Salafism, these terms (ʿaqīda and ṭahāra, orthodox creed or tenets of faith and 
purification of alloyed beliefs) are transformed into ‘ideology’ and ‘political action’.229 
It is helpful to make a further distinction in contemporary Salafism: that between 
purist (sometimes referred to also as ‘quietist’) Salafism and political and jihadist 
Salafism. The latter strand seeks to achieve its purification project by political means and 
by way of armed struggle and violence. The Salafism studied here, however, is the former 
iteration: so-called ‘quietist’ Salafism. Studying this form of Salafism involves the 
important work of parsing out the ideological aspects of contemporary Salafism, without 
delving into the violence narratives of organizations, such as al-Qaida and ISIS and their 
arguable origins in Salafism. That discussion is outside the purview of this study and 
tangential to the study’s framework and methodology. While one can argue that even 
quietist Salafism seeks or at least hopes for (or advocates) an ‘Islamic state’ of some kind, 
the strategies for achieving such a grand goal differ markedly from jihadi ideologies and 
the groups they inspire. For the quietist purists, it is first imperative to establish an Islamic 
society—built on the restoration of ‘proper’ faith within individuals—before any such 
state can be achieved. As such, true Islamic ‘society, in turn, relies on the prior 
purification of the doctrinal commitments and practices of the individual’.230 
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The ‘purist’ project, however, even among non-violent Salafists, ultimately 
becomes a negative force—that is, the activity of rejecting what was not present during 
the age of the al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ—because of the inherently problematic nature of arresting 
narrative control over what purity means in absolute or universally accepted terms. Thus, 
in their ‘search for impurities’, Salafīs ‘reject all forms of speculative theology’ (kalām), 
because proffering interpretations of such weighty matters as the attributes of God 
necessarily invites a discursive methodology of foreign philosophies, which ‘distort the 
meaning of the scriptures’.231 The objectives of the purist agenda of contemporary 
Salafism takes particular aim at Sufism and practices associated with Sufism, such as 
building tombs over the graves of Muslim saints or seeking divine favour through their 
auspices, because they are implicit endorsements of idolatry. Salafīs ‘attack’ Sufism and 
Ṣufīs, who ‘visit graves and engage in ritual practices that are deemed to be contrary to 
Islam’s creed, such as celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (mawlid) and 
seeking to make the dead a means to God (tawassul), or need for assistance (istighatha), 
or an object of intercession with God (tashaffu’)’.232 
The ‘deculturing’ effects of Salafism mentioned by Roy and Mandaville, which 
are an important part of the rupture with traditional Islamic methodologies, apply more to 
the purist Salafism grouping than the early reform movements. They underpin Salafism’s 
challenge of traditional religious authority in Islam and its dismissal of the madhhab 
system of sacred laws or of any practice or theological point that appears to be the product 
of ‘syncretism’, which, ‘in the salafi view, is the enemy’233—it is usually associated with 
Sufism, and represents an ‘epistemological’ break from pre-modern scholarly class.234 
Such a purification protocol renders, perhaps unwittingly, Islamic teachings and 
interpretations outside the confines of time, culture, society, and other aspects of human 
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life. In this sense, Islam, as envisioned, is deemed pure, however impossible it may seem 
to arrive at restorations and interpretations excised of context. 
Thus, purist Salafism espouses a more literal understanding of the Qurʾān and 
Ḥadīth, unchaperoned by the restrictive readings of classical scholars and their canonical 
interpretations. Purist Salafism places the culpability for the current state of Muslim 
affairs on the separation of the Muslim nation or world (ummah) from a more direct and, 
therefore, purer understanding of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, as the Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ themselves 
had understood them. A rigid adherence to the opinions and views of the scholars of the 
classical age—who ‘strayed’ from the ways of the pious generations—blocks the Muslim 
condition from improvement; the hurdles to progress (and God’s pleasure), therefore, 
include those spiritual practices deemed outside the realm of the Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ.235 Based 
on this argument, it follows that Muslims have strayed from the early and, hence, true 
teachings of Islam and its forebears (the salaf) and so have lost their way, have become 
clients of or compromised by the West, worthy of divine wrath, and caught in a dormant 
state. Sufism and ‘deviant practices’ such as ‘the worshiping of saints and other 
dangerous forms of bidʿa (“innovation”)’236 are symptomatic of how astray the ummah 
has gone. Salafism opposes the ‘understandings of Islam “distorted” by centuries of legal, 
theological, and mystical debates, self-serving ʿulamā’, and despotic rulers’.237 The logic 
of this diagnosis continues: if Islam were purified of such deviations, then the Muslim 
world would regain its dignity and stature. As such, Sufism became and remains one of 
the key objections of Salafism. 
 Therefore, the ‘Salafism’ engaged with in this study is not the generic usage of the 
word that has no sectarian or methodological import to speak of. Nor is it the historical 
advent per se of ‘Salafism’ described above—the early reform movements of the late 19th 
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and early 20th centuries. The epistemological rupture and methodologies that animate 
Salafism are at the centre of the Salafism–Sufism schism. This appears to hold true 
whether it is the Salafism inspired in the late 19th century with Rashīd Riḍā—who called 
himself a ‘Salafī Muslim’ who rejects taqlīd (that is, blindly following a previous ruling 
of Islamic law)238—or the Salafism of today. As far as influence and impact are 
concerned, contemporary Salafism is undoubtedly the most active movement under the 
Salafism label. 
 Purist Salafism has been the dominant, if not triumphant, form of Salafism since 
the 1970s239 and in the post-Arab Spring Middle East its profile has become more 
prominent;240 its appeal to Arab youth, for example, is notable. Perhaps the reason for this 
is that Salafism ‘offers a very modern form of socialized spirituality’ and projects ‘a 
discourse of authenticity and prophetic originality’ that appeals to young Muslims 
today.241 
While there is little contestation over the term itself now, it is necessary to further 
refine the definition by distinguishing purist Salafism from its contemporary kindred 
Salafī iterations. As noted above, purist Salafism differs from two forms of contemporary 
Salafism, ‘politicos’ and ‘jihadists’. While they share ideological underpinnings, each is 
distinguished in important ways. Purists do not advocate violence as a means of carrying 
out their purification project. In fact, they tend to ‘view politics as a diversion that 
encourages deviancy’. Their focus is on daʿwa: that is, calling upon Muslims to cleanse 
their faith and practice from foreign elements. Salafīs see ‘syncretism as a major source of 
innovation. Culture is thus seen as the enemy of pure Islam,’ since culture is not 
necessarily related to or informed by the sacred. Rather, purist Salafīs perform their 
obligation of daʿwa through verbal and written persuasion. On the other hand, the 
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‘politicos’ stress the need for the ‘application of the Salafi creed’ in the political realm, 
since the political structure ‘dramatically impacts social justice and the right of God alone 
to legislate’. Jihadist Salafism advocates militancy ‘to achieve their goals’.242 All three 
factions share a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary world 
and its concomitant problems and thus propose different solutions. The matter of 
categorization between contemporary Salafīs has added complexity, further increased by 
internal discord among the purists themselves. 
The case studies in this dissertation present purist or quietist Salafīs with a 
significant digital footprint. The digital spaces they occupy, Salafi Sounds podcasts, Salafi 
Publications’ website, and Salafi Publications’ Twitter account, are closely associated 
with one another. Representing purist Salafism, they are explicit in their rejection and 
critique of violence as a means of purification. They have ‘for years opposed rebellion 
against Muslim governments and had reproduced a fatwa by Grand Mufti of Saudi 
Arabia, Sheikh Bin Baz, condemning the theology and tactics of Bin Laden and his 
followers’.243 However, despite purist Salafism’s harsh criticism of extremist violence, 
scholars state that the ideological bases of the violent groups are similar to those of the 
purists. When purist ‘Salafists criticize the jihadists, they restrict their objections to the 
practices and exclude the worldview’.244 Thus, the ideology of purist Salafism is, to an 
important degree, a distillation of Salafī ideology more broadly. 
 
3.2.4 Additional Important Matters of Definition  
It is worth mentioning that some scholars favour the word ‘fundamentalism’ (or some 
form thereof) when referring to ideological features of Salafism or the movement or 
ideology itself. Therefore, when researching Salafism, it is useful, perhaps necessary, to 
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consider ‘fundamentalism’ in academic and archival searches. Roy, for example, 
expresses his preference for the term ‘neofundamentalism’ over ‘Salafism’. Although the 
term is, by Roy’s own admission, ‘less elegant’, it is preferable to Salafism because, as he 
contends, Salafism can be delimited to the historical associations with the early reformers 
and their objectives, as described above ‘program to [purify] Islam from cultural 
influences that encumber the Muslim world’s advancement vis-à-vis modernity.245 Roy’s 
position is actually a commentary on the confusion between the Salafism of the 
contemporary world and the Salafism of the early reform movements.  
Brinton problematizes ‘fundamentalism’ in her study, but nonetheless she uses it 
as a contradistinctive term to the reformist Salafism of a century ago. When defining what 
‘fundamentalism’ means, she points out features that speak of early  reformist Salafism: a 
political movement that is more concerned with worldly authority over mysticism, rejects 
reason-based interpretations of the scriptural sources of Islam, and is critical of exegetical 
sources after the time of the pious generations—here relying on Euben’s usage and 
definition of the term fundamentalism.246 However, when finding an ideological 
descriptor for the well-known Egyptian scholar and popular teacher Mitwalli Sha’rawi, 
whom Brinton studied, ‘fundamentalism’ does not apply.247 In his study of Salafī–Ṣūfī 
strife, Weismann uses the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ for what seems to be Salafī 
discourses and their long history of vituperations against Sufism. Weismann’s ‘working 
definition’ of Islamic fundamentalism, which he sees as a hegemonic discourse in Islam, 
is: ‘the contemporary religio-political discourse of return to the scriptural foundations of 
the religion as developed by Muslim scholars, mystics, and increasingly laypersons and 
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movements, which reinterpret these foundations on the basis of their living traditions for 
application to the sociopolitical and cultural realities of the modern world’.248 
However, any preference for ‘neofundamentalism’ or ‘fundamentalism’ suffers 
from its lack of acceptance among most contemporary scholars; and, in fact, it is rejected 
among Muslim activists, who identify themselves as Salafīs. In addition, the use of 
‘fundamentalism’ with historical specificity to describe some aspects of contemporary 
Evangelical Christianity argues against applying it to Islam. For Sedgwick, 
‘fundamentalism’ has become a less desirable descriptor in academia, as it is ‘an etic term 
applied from the outside rather than an emic term used by those it described’.249 In 
contrast to ‘fundamentalism’, ‘Salafism’ is an emic term that ‘seems to describe a 
phenomenon that is far less varied than those described’ by the word fundamentalist and 
its various derivatives. As such, Salafism is ‘anything but an “imagined category”’.250 
Perhaps to distinguish between the early modern reform movements and 
contemporary Salafism, Duderija relies on the term ‘Neo-traditional Salafism’ to describe 
the Salafī method of interpreting the scriptural sources of Islam ‘as understood by the 
most eminent authorities belonging to the first three generations of Muslims’. This Salafī 
interpretative method results in teachings that Salafism advocates, teachings that should 
‘literally [be] adhered to and imitated in a temporal and spatial vacuum by all subsequent 
generations of Muslims, primarily by being faithful to a literal and decontextualized 
Qur’an–Sunna hermeneutic epistemologically and methodologically anchored in Ḥadīth-
based literature’.251 
It is worth noting that discussions on Islamists in Egypt (and likely elsewhere, 
such as Pakistan) that took place decades ago employed the word ‘Salafism’ and 
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‘Salafists’ when referring to the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, Yudian Wahyudi 
states that his use of ‘Salafism’ in his research ‘will always designate the Muslim 
Brotherhood, whereas secularism stands for liberalism, Nasserism, and Marxism’.252 
Wahyudi is not necessarily misguided in using ‘Salafism’ for the Brotherhood of the 
1960s and 1970s, as at that time the term was far less defined (and even studied) than it is 
today253 and could be applied to any modernist Islamic movement that, at least ostensibly, 
took interpretive inspiration from the ‘salaf’—that is, the early generations of the post-
prophetic period. Also, perhaps ‘salaf’ was appropriated for strategic purposes, since 
evoking the pious forebears appeals to Muslims as a sign of authentic or well-founded 
understandings of Islam—a useful designation for movements such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. But what is particularly interesting is how this particular use of the term had 
changed in a relatively short period of time. It would now be considered incorrect to 
describe the Muslim Brotherhood as Salafists, mainly because Salafists in Egypt today 
readily distinguish themselves from the Brotherhood and often cast harsh aspersions on 
the movement, particularly in post-Arab Spring political contestations.  
In Syria, as well, Salafists have distinguished themselves from the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s struggle against the Assad regime. The Brotherhood is one distinct social 
and political entity, whereas political Salafists have separate political parties and 
aspirations that are almost invariably at odds with the politics of the Brotherhood.254 
Similarly, Roy speaks of the ‘opposition between the Muslim Brothers and Salafist[s]’,255 
an opposition based on the suspicions that the Brotherhood had taken political positions 
and made compromises that demonstrate a weakening of connections with the righteous 
forebears of Islam. As such, contemporary Salafīs ‘claim to be the most authentic bearers 
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of [the Prophet Muḥammad’s] authenticated words and deeds’,256 a claim they deny for 
the Muslim Brotherhood, as it became apparent in the textual analyses of online Salafī 
content presented in the study.257 
In his exploration of the idea of ‘reform’ within ‘Modernist-Salafiy’, Saeed 
distinguishes between the various phenomena associated with or incorporating the 
Salafiyya descriptor, such as ‘the Islamist-Salafism of the Muslim Brotherhood’ in Egypt; 
the ‘Puritanical-Salafism’ of the followers of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb; and the 
‘Militant-Salafism of Usama Bin Laden’.258 
Finally, it should be noted that Lauzière’s careful and critically sourced arguments 
recontextualize the claim that Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʿAbduh, founders 
of an intellectual trend in the late 19th- and early 20th-century Egypt, were ‘Salafis’ as it 
is understood today. Salafism, as a particular and recognized term that refers to a 
movement, was constructed much later,259 and it is important to point out Lauzière’s 
criticism of the usage of Salafism when in association with early reform movements. He 
argues that ‘Salafism’ has been misappropriated and misinterpreted by contemporary 
scholars, who seem to have been instrumental in popularizing Salafī ‘labels’ for early 
Muslim reformers.260 
 Thus, Salafism as an ideological construct has undergone dramatic changes since 
the era of ʿAbduh and Riḍā. To study Salafism today, it is imperative to make the 
distinction between the usages of Salafism, as an operational terminology, from previous 
applications of the word. This section has aimed to make that distinction, but it also 
unpacked and framed the term in order to further contemporary discussions on the 
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nomenclature and, ultimately, in order to then proceed with the analyses of Salafī texts 
online. 
 
3.3 Defining Sufism and its Key Doctrines and Practices 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The study’s attention now moves to the second ideological or theological phenomenon of 
Islam under examination, namely Sufism, and a definition thereof—a definition that, first, 
suitably defines the phenomenon and, second, relates to this study’s framework. Given 
that Sufism is ‘so broad’ a phenomenon, with ‘its appearance so protean that nobody can 
venture to describe it fully’,261 and that it ‘cannot be stereotyped or reduced to a single 
paradigm’,262 this section, out of necessity, draws attention to key features or aspects that 
are arguably fundamental qualities of Sufism and that offer a definitional framework 
through which the study may examine digital content that animates Ṣūfī–Salafī 
contestations. The qualities described are those that have received affirmation across a 
number of academic works on Sufism. 
In proffering a generalized account of Sufism, this chapter also pivots on those 
aspects of Sufism that have attracted criticism in modern and pre-modern history within 
Islamic circles. Intra-Islamic critiques of Sufism and its advocates and followers remain 
‘crucial forces shaping’ and influencing ‘socio-political configurations in the world of 
Islam while constituting an integral part of an ongoing debate inside Islamic tradition’:263 
while the ‘currents of dissatisfaction with Sufism had long been present in the umma, they 
were to grow substantially from the middle of the eighteenth century’.264 This study 
would argue that these types of contestation have been given unprecedented range by 
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digital media, permitting active content-makers to produce and/or convey polemical 
communications in such a way that challenges religious authority when taken as a whole. 
This section thus proceeds by (a) giving a general connotation of ‘Sufism’ 
supported by scholarship and examining (b) the linguistic roots of the word and (c) the 
key doctrines of those so defined, with special, though not exclusive, focus given to those 
doctrines and practices that have received (and receive) critical disapproval from 
Salafists. 
 
3.3.2 Defining Sufism 
A word commonly used in treatises on Sufism is ‘mysticism’ (along with its various 
derivatives). For example, Sufism has been said to be the ‘major mystical tradition of 
Islam’, a ‘mystical’ dimension of the religion,265 ‘mystical Islam’,266 or the ‘phenomenon 
of mysticism within Islam’.267 While the terms ‘Islamic mysticism’ or even ‘Islamic 
esotericism’ have received criticism for being oversimplifications of Sufism, tangential 
interpretations thereof, implications of ‘a negative value judgment’,268 or 
dehistoricized,269 the ‘mysticism’ descriptor does offer a good starting point, particularly 
when considering the original import of ‘mysticism’ and its connection with the esoteric. 
For some scholars, it is, in fact, proper to call a Ṣūfī a ‘mystic’, when it ‘denotes one who 
has access, or seeks access to the “mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven”’.270 As such, it 
may be said that ‘mysticism’ does fairly represent the meaning and objective that Sufism 
claims for itself as the ultimate goal of Islam’s spirituality project: namely, attaining a 
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realm of awareness whose veils cannot be breached by means of sheer rational 
contemplations. In other words, the ‘intellect by itself’, or any other sheer human effort, 
‘cannot lead to God’, since only God Himself can take an aspirant to the experiential 
knowledge of God.271 To become an ʿārif, a gnostic or a knower of God, involving 
walking a pathway, according to a paradigmatic view of Sufism, that varies widely among 
Ṣūfī orders (ṭuruq), most of which require the aspirant to be devoted to specific litanies 
and other practices that are beyond what is otherwise obliged in Islam: the canonical five 
daily prayers, the fast of Ramadan, the performance of the Pilgrimage (Ḥajj) and the 
paying of the alms. It is through the practice of these supererogatory litanies, observing 
them with consistency and presence of heart, that one may—with the guidance of a Ṣūfī 
shaykh—attain gnosis (maʿrifa), a direct experiential knowledge of God. It is thus 
important to bear this in mind, for modernistic movements of Islam, such as purist 
Salafism, argue that this outlook leads to a claim of an inner dimension that cannot be 
attested to by scholastic means or, more importantly, explicitly found in traditional 
sources, namely the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth (sayings and accounts of the deeds of the Prophet 
Muḥammad). It is the claim of Sufism, however, that the common practices obliged by 
Islam are not sufficient to bring one to gnosis—a point of agreement, it seems, with 
various faiths of which mysticism is an aspect,272 which adds to the suspicions that some 
may have toward Sufism. Some also accuse followers of Sufism of giving preference to 
the inner and unseen world of religious devotion, going beyond scriptural evidence and 
opening the opportunity for antinomian views to seep into Ṣūfī Islam (a possibility that 
even Ṣūfī personages and scholars, such as Muḥammad Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), 
have strongly warned against).273 
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This generalized connotation of Sufism depicts one of the core aspects of Sufism 
as a methodology (manhaj) or sciences (hilum) within Islam—a supererogatory practice 
of litanies and rites that helps a devotee to ascend from the worldly realm of common 
faith and knowledge to the realm of certitude in the unseen and, ultimately, gnosis—as 
Sufism is often defined. 
How, then, does Sufism bring an aspirant to such a lofty degree of faith? While 
Sufism builds upon the exoteric and canonical qualities of Islam (namely the Sharīʿa), as 
Ṣūfīs contend, what it seeks—the esoteric or non-rational awareness of the supernal—
requires an extraordinary regime bequeathed by a Ṣūfī shaykh to his (or her) disciples, as 
will be explored below.274 It is this aspect of Sufism, the supererogatory practices and 
litanies, particularly those that appear to have originated after the Prophetic period and the 
age of the Righteous Forebears (al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ), along with attachment to the saintly 
figures (awliyāʾ) who Ṣūfīs claim to be possessed of knowledge that they alone can pass 
on to their devotees through inspired litanies, that have attracted negative attention and 
contestations in the past and the present.275 
An important aspect to consider when studying Sufism is the stance from which a 
researcher approaches the subject and its relationship to origins narratives. In other words, 
is Sufism founded in Islam or from outside? The answer is contested, as mentioned above. 
Those scholars or advocates of Sufism ‘who take seriously the self-understanding of the 
Ṣūfī authorities usually picture Sufism as an essential component of Islam’. In contrast, 
those who are ‘hostile toward Sufism, or hostile toward Islam but sympathetic toward 
Sufism, or sceptical of any self-understanding by the objects of their study, typically 
describe Sufism as a movement that was added to Islam after the prophetic period’.276 
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Modern scholarship, it appears, has spent a great deal of ink on the ‘origins of Sufism in 
Islam’, often tracing it to Christian Gnosticism and other sources.277 The debate within 
Orientalism scholarship about the origins of Sufism, while interesting, however, is a 
distraction in terms of this study. Nevertheless, a discussion of the intra-Islamic 
contestations involving Sufism is appropriate because the arguments and language of 
contestations among Muslims draw on the theories of the extra-Islamic origins of Sufism. 
As such, considerations of Sufism’s origins are not off-topic, per se, but are better framed 
as strategic points of contestations within Islam itself; in this case, contestations waged by 
Salafists. 
Thus, following the approach of Chittick, Schimmel, Rahman, and others, it is the 
self-understanding of Sufism—from within, as it were—that serves best to offer a 
definition,278 just as it is the self-understanding of purist Salafism that animates its 
operationalized definition. This will facilitate the analyses of Salafī contestations in 
digital media platforms. Both Voll and Schimmel suggest that scholars of Sufism would 
benefit from approaching the subject as it is understood by followers of Sufism, but with 
the added provision that the approach should be defensible as an objective foundation for 
the analyses, rather than a tool of advocacy.  
To understand what Sufism is, then, it is necessary to examine one of the 
overarching, articulated goals of Sufism itself, which, as scholars have often noted, is the 
purification of the heart of spiritual diseases, the attainment of an ‘experiential knowledge 
of God, Maʿrifat Allāh’, and the methodology of arriving at this knowledge.279 The origin 
of this impulse, as Ṣūfīs often state, is found within the revealed sources of Islam: namely, 
the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth of the Prophet Muḥammad.280 Ṣūfīs often invoke the statement of 
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the Prophet Muḥammad, known popularly as the ‘Ḥadīth of Gabriel’,281 in which the 
Prophet said that faith has three levels: submission or commitment to exoteric religious 
obligations (islām), firmness of faith in the tenets of Islam (īmān), and excellence in 
worship, an extraordinary station in which one virtually or metaphorically ‘sees’ God or, 
as Chittick describes it, has a ‘realization of the inmost reality’.282 This third level, called 
iḥsān, is prominent in the literature of the various Ṣūfī orders, or ṭuruq.283 In other words, 
upon the ‘plane’ of iḥsān the ‘origin of the Sufic brotherhoods’ lies.284 
Chittick argues that the level of ‘islām’ draws a distinction between the outward 
form of religious praxis and the ‘more inner dimensions’ of faith and piety. Moreover, it 
may ‘designate the voluntary submission of any prophet or any follower of a prophet’; 
thus, islām in this tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad is a descriptive noun that addresses 
exoteric aspects of the religion, rather than the formal name or the proper noun of the 
religion, Islam.285 Chittick thus sees the three aspects of religion as body, soul, and the 
‘innermost reality’—namely, the ‘spirit’, which is the main focus of Sufism.286 
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Thus, to reach iḥsān, the realm of the heart—the metaphorical heart—receives 
attention, as the ‘purification of the heart’ is a pathway that Sufism insists on being taken. 
An aspirant thus learns to cleanse his or her heart of vices (such as hatred, arrogance, 
miserliness, love of the world, overwhelming ego (nafs)) because, ultimately, these vices 
distract a person from the unseen and thicken the separation or ‘veil’, as Lings calls it, 
between a person and knowledge of God. ‘When one’s heart is purified, the manifestation 
of the Divine is reflected in the mirror’ of that heart.287 The claim to achieving 
purification of the heart is not a conceit of Sufism per se, but a more general aspect of 
Islam as a whole. However, what attaches the ‘purification’ discourse particularly to 
Sufism is the purpose behind the purification of the heart, for the ‘pure heart thus 
becomes the locus of divine manifestation, where the aspirant comes to “see” God and 
gain direct, experiential knowledge of the divine essence (dhāt)’.288 It is preparatory for 
what comes next. 
Thus, the ‘experiential knowledge of God, Maʿrifat Allāh’ is said to be the central 
quest of a Ṣūfī, ‘the height of mystical aspiration’, a path shown and taught by a Ṣūfī 
master through a system of extra-Sharīʿa training known as tarbiya, which focuses on 
constancy and commitment to supererogatory religious performance, such as the 
repetition of certain litanies.289 These goals and their pathways constitute the 
‘quintessential Ṣūfī concept’, and the history of Sufism can be (sympathetically or 
emically) viewed as ‘the history of maʿrifa’.290 Chittick describes it in a different way but 
comes to a similar conclusion: namely, Sufism is ‘the intensification of Islamic faith and 
practice, or the tendency among Muslims to strive for a personal engagement with the 
Divine Reality’. Chittick adds that Ṣūfīs are those ‘Muslims who take seriously God’s call 
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to perceive his presence in the world and the self. They generally stress inwardness over 
outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over legalism, and 
cultivation of the soul over social interaction.’291 Lings is more evocative: ‘From time to 
time a Revelation “flows” like a great tidal wave from the Ocean of Infinitude to the 
shores of our finite world; and Sufism is the vocation and discipline and the science of 
plunging into the ebb of one of these waves and bring drawn back with it to its Eternal 
and Infinite Source.’292 
 
3.3.3 The Linguistic Origins and Significations of Taṣawwuf (Sufism) 
The debate over the origins of the word Ṣūfī and its derivatives connects with the larger 
discussion about the origins of Sufism itself, for one of the points of contestation against 
Sufism relies on problematizing what is perceived to be the strangeness of its name. To 
this, however, the defenders of Sufism have replies. It has been said that ‘Sufism’ was 
once a reality without a name, but then became a name without a reality. Implicit in this 
observation is an internal critique of those who claim an association to Sufism but do so 
only nominally. Ṣūfīs have emphasized the first half of that aphorism to make the point 
that the religious outpouring of Sufism is rooted deeply in Islam, from its earliest days; 
indeed, the aphorism itself is far from a modern convention. Abū’l-Ḥasan Fushanjī said, 
three centuries after the Prophet Muḥammad, ‘Today Sufism (taṣawwuf) is a name 
without a reality. It was once a reality without a name.’293 A century later, a scholar 
commented on Fushanjī’s aphorism, saying, ‘In the time of the Companions of the 
Prophet and their immediate successors the name did not exist, but its reality was in 
everyone. Now the name exists without the reality.’ However, those who rejected 
opulence and preferred a devotional and more ascetic life became distinguished by the 
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title Ṣūfī.294 As Ṣūfīs themselves would agree, and as has been outlined above, ‘Sufism’ is 
a descriptor that became associated with those who adopted ascetic practices, made 
regular supererogatory devotions, and attached themselves to living saints as their 
spiritual guides, all of which practices were codified and described as the Muslim world 
expanded. 
Linguistically, Ṣūfī is derived from the Arabic root letters transliterated as ṣād fā 
waw, from which the Arabic word for wool comes: ṣūf. A Ṣūfī, as such, is said to signify a 
person who, metaphorically, wears woollen material.295 Historically, and before the 
Islamic period, the traditional garment of ascetics was wool, particularly among early 
Christian penitents. The mystics or Ṣūfīs of Islam were not known to be wearers of 
woollen garments per se; however, some scholars argue otherwise, saying that ‘some 
renunciants and pietists […] wore wool as opposed to other renunciants and the majority 
of Muslims who wore linen and cotton’.296 Whatever the case may have been, wool 
became symbolic of an ascetic life or a life devoted to spirituality, often separated from 
worldly life.297 Linguists have also argued that Ṣūfī is related to ṣafā or ṣafwā, a state of 
purity or station of the elect or the chosen, respectively. Finally, it has also been suggested 
that the word is related to a group of indigent followers of the Prophet Muḥammad, who 
were called the Companions of the Bench (Aṣḥāb al-Ṣuffa); this was a group of people 
known for longing always to be near the Prophet Muḥammad, although they were 
otherwise materially impoverished.298 The bench, or veranda, was an outdoor area 
adjacent to the mosque of the Prophet Muḥammad in Madina. Their apparent attachment 
to this bench or veranda is hypothesized as the origins of Sufism’s ascetic practices and 
the word itself. 
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Ernst examines the origins of ‘Sufism’ as a suffixed term. The word ‘Sufism’ was 
introduced by Orientalist scholarship at the close of the eighteenth century and was 
‘inspired by accounts of dervishes and ascetics that Orientalist researchers came across. In 
their accounts, they cited Ṣūfī poetry in which the word and metaphor ‘wine’ was 
mentioned. As Ernst suggests, ‘wine’ in Ṣūfī poetry was cited in order to advance the 
claims that Sufism was detached from the precepts and proscriptions of Islam’s laws, if 
not the religion altogether. Ernst cites Orientalists such as William Jones (d. 1794) and 
John Malcolm (d. 1833), who argued that Sufism was not only disconnected from Islam, 
but originated from Hellenistic philosophy and Hinduism. Subsequently, the ‘concept of 
the non-Islamic character of Sufism has been widely accepted in Euro-American 
scholarship’, which, Ernst continues, is a ‘classic example of Orientalist 
misinformation’.299 The irony of this classification or typology of Sufism is that 
opponents of Sufism mimic these Orientalist tropes in their contestation with Sufism, 
although, generally speaking, Orientalist scholarship is harshly criticized by these same 
opponents of Sufism and is viewed with great suspicion. In contrast, researchers who 
accept ‘the self-understanding of the Ṣūfī authorities’ conduct their qualitative textual 
research premised the emic view that view ‘Sufism as an essential component of 
Islam’.300 
 
3.3.4 Origins, Key Doctrines, and Practices of Sufism 
As such, among the bases upon which criticisms of Sufism rest, notably from modern 
Salafī advocates and early reform movements, is the claim that Ṣūfī practices (perhaps 
Sufism itself) are extra-Islamic phenomena—rooted in Neo-Platonism, Christian monastic 
mysticism, and other sources301—framed in the language of Islam. For example, the 
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celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday (Mawlid) among Muslims, particularly 
those influenced by or formal devotees of a Ṣūfī order, is borrowed from the practice 
within Christianity, opponents of such celebrations claim. Salafism views any practice or 
theological position that appears to be a construct of syncretism as an anathema to pure 
Islam,302 and public practices of Sufism, such as group recitations of litanies (often to the 
beating of drums and so on), exist outside the boundaries of Sacred Law (Sharīʿa).303  
Therefore, the ‘origins’ of Sufism as an expression of Islam itself, as the Ṣūfīs 
contend, needs to be engaged with here.304 It is important because it relates to an essential 
dissonance between the advocates of Salafism and Sufism in modern discourse, which 
this study seeks to examine; it does not necessarily reflect the views of this researcher. 
The response of Sufism to this discourse may be seen as predicated on pre-modern 
scholarly assertions of the scriptural authenticity of Sufism, even (and perhaps ironically) 
among the salaf of Islam in the early generations of Islam.  
Both contemporary Ṣūfī and academic specialists cite Muslim scholars of the pre-
modern age to support the assertion of the ties between Sufism and Islam itself. Ernst, for 
example, as previously mentioned, is highly critical of European oriental scholarship 
viewing Sufism.305  
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A prominent example often cited in support of tasawwuf as within Islam is Ibn 
Khaldūn (1332–1406), one of the most well-known Muslim historians and 
historiographers. He is frequently mentioned to add gravitas to the assertion that Sufism 
existed in the early generations of Islam but was too widespread and ubiquitous to have 
been given a name. He stated: 
The Ṣūfī training is a religious one. It is free from any such reprehensible intentions. 
The Ṣūfīs aspire to total concentration upon God and upon the approach to Him, in 
order to obtain the mystical experiences of gnosis and Divine oneness. In addition to 
their training in concentration and hunger, the Ṣūfīs feed on dhikr exercises by which 
their devotion to that training can fully materialize. When the soul is reared on dhikr 
exercises, it comes closer to the gnosis of God, whereas, without it, it comes to be a 
Satanic one.306 
The claims of Sufism hold that the very first manifestations of Sufism existed in 
the time of the Prophet Muḥammad and his Companions, and with the revelation of the 
Qurʾān itself. In the Prophetic generation, ‘there were persons who wanted more than just 
to strive after the outward observance of the religious law and of the usages founded by 
the Prophet’. While they were observant of their formal religious obligations, as 
prescribed by Sacred Law (Sharīʿa), ‘they paid attention to what was happening to their 
souls, and tried to harmonise these internal experiences with the external observances by 
means of renunciation of the world and asceticism’. These devotees saw in many of these 
characteristics qualities that mirrored the Prophet’s message. However, the material 
success of the Muslim world had proved to be overwhelming for many Muslims, whose 
religious outlook, it seems, was dampened by ‘a certain secularisation of life and luxury, 
contrary to the ideals of the original Islamic community, and from which the truly 
Godfearing person could save himself only by withdrawing from the world’. 307 
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3.3.5 Ziyāra: Visiting Graves of the Saints  
In the methodology section, the practice of celebrating the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday 
are discussed more fully, as is the act of grave visitation as a rite.308 However, the practice 
of visiting graves merits special mention here, to elucidate the place and meaning that 
grave visitations have within Sufism. It is this practice that is central to the Salafī critique 
of Sufism, at least equal to, if not more, than the reproach of the Mawlid celebrations. 
The basic meaning of ziyāra relates to the act of visiting someone or a place. The 
essential linguistic connotation of ziyāra is not associated with doctrine or ritual practice, 
since the simple act of visiting may have entirely social motives of no doctrinal or 
ideological import. However, in the context of Sufism and its performances, ziyāra 
assumes a more complex meaning that has historically drawn both approbation and 
criticism—criticism particularly, in modern times, from Wahhabism and Salafism. This 
permutation of ziyāra, then, is the practice of visiting a living saint or, especially 
problematically, his or her grave, for the purpose of gaining providential grace or blessing 
(baraka), realized by the process called tabarruk; or for intercession with God (tawassul). 
This form of ziyāra is often vested with ritualistic meaning as part of the path to sacred 
knowledge and often as an obligation of members of a Ṣūfī order to have suḥba, that is, to 
have a close association with the order’s spiritual figure, alive or otherwise. As such, this 
form of ziyāra is imbued with a sacred meaning normally preserved for the canonical 
obligation of the Pilgrimage (Hajj). While visits to a grave of a saint (walī) may be made 
privately (as they often are) and at any time of the year, in some areas of the Muslim 
world ziyāra took on a more formal celebratory meaning. ‘The practice of pilgrimage 
(ziyāra) to the tombs of saints was generally considered to be beneficial, but was 
especially valued at the anniversary of the moment when the saint was joined with God; 
all this assumes the saint’s ability to intercede with God on behalf of pilgrims.’309 In 
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Egypt, India, and other countries (including those of North Africa), ‘hundreds of 
thousands of pilgrims may congregate for days at the annual festival, with many 
distinctive local rituals and performances’.310 It can be argued that such major outpourings 
of festivals around a Ṣūfī saint attracted the disapproval of scholars of the pre-modern 
age, but ‘with the rise of the Wahhābīs in Arabia and kindred Salafī reform movements 
elsewhere, there has been extensive criticism of pilgrimage to tombs and the notion of 
saintly intercession, all of which is considered to be sheer idolatry. Although in Saudi 
Arabia the tomb of practically every Ṣūfī saint and family member of the Prophet has 
been destroyed, elsewhere pilgrimage to saints’ tombs continue to be popular.’311 
The visitation of graves for the purpose of intercession and/or attaining blessings 
is, as noted, an anathema to Salafī thought and is a major point of Salafist disputation with 
Sufism. The practice is pejoratively referred to as ‘grave worship’, a phrase that in itself 
imputes to the ritual the status of cardinal sin or deviation from the oneness of God, the 
preeminent doctrine of all of Islam: ‘A proper understanding of God’s singularity means 
that no other being other than Him shall be worshipped, no other human, not material 
wealth, not worldly power or institutional authorities, and particularly not the graves of 
bygone humans.’312 
It should be noted that the seemingly inherent anti-Sufi bias in Salafism has been 
problematized by Sirry, who contests the ‘general assumption’ that Salafism is necessarily 
vehemently anti-Sufi. Sirry bases his argument on a Syrian Salafī thinker, Jamāl al-Dīn al-
Qāsimī, who actually defended Sufi paragon Ibn ʿArabī (1165–1240) and opposed Ibn 
Taymiyya (1263–1328), who is claimed to be the inspiration of Wahhābī/Salafī thought. 
Sirry states, ‘The main argument put forward here is that the Salafis took a more nuanced 
position towards Sufism than is sometimes supposed.’313 However, the Syrian scholar 
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upon whom Sirry bases his argument died in 1914, long before contemporary Salafism 
came into being and coalesced into an ideology, as discussed in this dissertation and 
supported by recent scholarship. What this demonstrates is an unparsed use of the term 
‘Salafism’ in recent scholarship. In purist Salafī thought Ibn ʿArabī, for example, is not 
spoken of favourably, and Ibn Taymiyya’s works are not challenged. Sirry’s argument is 
more convincing when referring to Salafism as developed by the early reform movements 
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But, as regards the Salafī ideology of today, 
Sirry’s contention is weak. 
Similarly, a recent academic article by Yasir Qadhi examines pre-modern 
theological debates, particularly in the eighth century, concerning the Āthārī ideological 
criticism of Ashʿarī creedal thought. However, he describes the debates as ‘Salafi–Ash’ari 
polemics’, although the term ‘Salafī’ was not in currency at that time.314 Though Qadhi 
does reference Āthārī thought per se, his assumption that Āthārī views are synonymous 
with Salafism appears to be unfounded or, at the very least, is an assumption and a choice 
of terminology that required a more vigorous defence of in the study. In this case, the use 
of ‘Salafism’ to describe an anti- Ashʿarī school of thought is, at best, anachronistic. 
What these researches show is a need to carefully define and defend the use of 
‘Salafism’ in scholarship. Without doing so, the research can be challenged or is 
diminished in terms of its methodological and analytical values, since defining Salafism is 
an important part of presenting the significance of contemporary research on Salafī 
polemics.315  
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no. 3 (2016), 433–47. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 
RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND MEDIATISATION 
 
 
This chapter discusses the analytical framework of this study and an emergent 
media theory (mediatisation) that helps to explain and theorize the manifest shifting 
media ecologies, particularly those affecting religious authority. The chapter proceeds as 
follows: 1) an exposition on the authority construct; 2) religious authority and its 
relationship with mediatisation theory; 3) general overview of media and authority; and 4) 
a contextualization of Islam and authority, and then media, authority, and Islam. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
With its varied meanings and diverging iterations, religious authority has attracted 
research in the fields of religious studies, social sciences, and history for several decades, 
if not longer. The impetus to carefully address the matter of religious authority stems from 
the proposition that it is ‘an elusive concept and notoriously difficult to define’.316 In 
recent years, however, there has been a repositioned interest in religious authority, mainly 
as a consequence of its more synergetic relationship with contemporary media platforms 
and technologies. It is argued that religious authority has seen significant shifts in public 
and private spheres in the digital age.317 The purported changes have attracted evolving 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary academic interest318 that includes research into new 
media’s roles in or effects on important aspects of religion and religious practices,319 and 
on the concept and nature of the ‘public sphere’ in ‘transnational’ Muslim identity 
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politics.320 The advent of new media, as such, is said to be a ‘watershed [moment] for 
Islam and Muslims with regard to textual, exegetical, and legal authority’ in Islam 
today.321 
Inquiries into religious authority have raised questions that have become more 
urgent as a result of ‘disruptive’ emerging media technologies that have permitted more 
voices—multifarious and vast—into the media ecology regarding religion-focused 
discussions and inquiries: ‘What is religious authority in Islam’;322 and, more 
fundamentally, ‘Who speaks for Islam?’323 And who may claim interpretive control of 
scriptures and the drawing of the boundaries of orthodoxy? What authority or 
qualifications—ecclesial, charismatic, or formal knowledge acquisition—must one have 
to issue religious pronouncements that potentially affect the choices or lives of the 
faithful? How, then, have new media technologies transformed Muslim concepts of 
traditional authority itself?324 Finally, what do content providers hope to achieve in the 
new media ecology, and how will ‘rewire the House of Islam” as Bunt states?325 
These critical questions—contentious and often unevenly framed—stimulate 
research in this field because of the extraordinarily voluminous, varied, cacophonous,326 
and often contradictory expressions and ‘texts’ of religion and ritual performance online. 
They also speak to the participation of numbers of previously locked-out individuals who 
normally would not have access to a new ‘public sphere’ and, more specifically, often do 
                                               
320 Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, New Media in the Muslim World: The Emerging Public 
Sphere (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), at 1–3, 8. 
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Newsletter 2 (1999), at 23–24. 
325 Bunt, iMuslims, at 226. 
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not meet the authority threshold, as traditionally established, to comment on issues that 
tend to be juridical in nature, as shown below. 
But, first, where does interpretative framework fit in the history of recent media 
and religion studies? This needs to be addressed here in order to further situate the study 
in this developing field. As expanded upon in the literature review, the progression of 
digital media and religion studies has involved ‘waves’ of research, each wave defined 
according to the objectives of the research. The first wave tended to be descriptive, 
mapping out the content of religious texts or communication in what was then considered 
a new and expansive medium; and it also sought to place the digital phenomenon in 
existential terms, as, for example, utopic or dystopic markers of a new age. The second 
wave concerned itself with ‘the evolution and development of a typology of cyberspatial 
religious discourse’, as accrued forms and categories of content became more distinct in 
what began to be viewed as digital ‘space’,327 which arguably provided the venue for a 
new genre of rhetoric or ‘digital rhetoric’.328 The third wave saw research directed to 
‘theoretical and interpretative inquiry’, through which the digital texts examined in a 
given study are scrutinized through an analytical framework.329 This wave ultimately 
seeks to provide an answer to a post-descriptive inquiry: namely, ‘so what?’330 As if to 
say, now that it has been determined that there is an extraordinary and growing quantity 
of content that relates to religion, how does this formidable actuality impinge upon such 
substantial matters of religion as identity, authority, ritual, pedagogy, and community 
formation? 
While research in the third wave has proceeded within select frameworks to an 
important degree, scholars ‘point out that there is still a gap between the increasing 
number of studies concerning media and religion and the few attempts to develop a 
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conceptual or theoretical framework with which to analyse it’.331 The present research 
seeks to help close that gap by putting forward a framework that goes beyond typologies 
of online texts and examines their symbolic meanings as discourse. It seeks a framework 
by which online texts are interpreted and thus connected with discourses rich with 
historical and contemporary representation, and attempts to answer the question: what 
analytical framework best presents itself as a means of constructing research designs for 
and interpreting the online polemics and intra-religious contestations in contemporary 
Islam? 
This chapter argues that the framework through which the online texts studied in 
this dissertation are best investigated is through the prism of religious authority, and, it 
should be noted, that religious authority operates in close association with mediatisation, 
a media theory that is increasingly evident in the digital age. Scholarship has 
demonstrated that emerging media technologies are bona fide players in the sphere of 
religious authority. Online texts—websites, social media, forums, podcasts—are thus 
interpreted and analysed through religious authority to expand upon the role of these 
media and their effects on essential aspects of religion. As Turner points out, new media 
technologies ‘provide alternative, deregulated, devolved and local opportunities for debate 
and discussion’.332 New media systems, therefore, have ‘the unintended effect of 
corroding traditional forms of authority that are either based on oral transmission or on 
print-based forms of textual learning that is linear, hierarchical, imitative and 
repetitive’.333 Roy’s remarks about authority and knowledge in digital space are 
underscored. He writes: ‘The new intellectual has an autodidactic relationship to 
knowledge. Knowledge is acquired in a fragmented (manuals, excerpts, popular 
brochures), encyclopaedic, and immediate manner: everything is discussed without the 
                                               
331 Martino, at 31–2. 
332 Turner, at 118. 
333 Ibid. 
  100 
mediation of an apprenticeship, a method, or a professor.’334 The rise of new media, as 
such, represents a subversion of what is referred to as the genealogy of religious 
knowledge.335 
However, as Campbell points out, ‘It is not enough to say that the Internet 
transforms or challenges traditional authority; rather, researchers must identify what 
specific form or type of authority is being affected’336 and then decide upon a 
methodology. In part, the methodology is used to identify and collate language in online 
content which speaks to authority. This study seeks to follow Campbell’s injunction by 
locating claims of religious authority in the language of Salafī online contestations that 
evoke juridical–moral connotations, which, in turn, attempt to define or perhaps narrow 
the confines of Islamic orthodoxy with regard to certain Muslim practices and creedal 
thought. 
  Thus, this research addresses how online contestations speak to the changing 
profile of religious authority in contemporary Islamic milieus. While there is increasing 
research in this field today, as explored below, lacunas still exist in the study of Islam, 
digital media, and religious authority, particularly in describing and then framing the 
pathways of such media effects on religious authority. This study contributes original 
research to an under-attended field by proffering the process by which digital media 
actually alter or influence traditional notions of religious authority.  
 
4.2 Religious Authority and Mediatisation Theory 
When one examines the mediation of religion in the digital age, the concept of 
‘mediatisation’ comes to the fore as a more parsed and nuanced rendering of ‘mediation’ 
theory. Both mediation and mediatisation theories build upon Carey’s paradigm linking 
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media and culture: that is, the concept of media as culture. However, mediatisation ‘has 
emerged as a new research concept to reconsider old, yet fundamental questions 
concerning the role and influence of media in culture and society’.337 In pre-digital terms, 
scholarship on media effects addressed the influence of mass media ‘on political systems 
and other institutions’ of society. The scholarship proceeded mainly through analyses of 
what happens after the media has conveyed content (in whatever way) and how the means 
of conveying content affect audiences and social institutions. The traditional views of the 
role of media in society were ‘reworked and labelled “mediatisation” to widen the 
framework by including new media and new areas of application’.338 In other words, 
mediatisation picks up where mediation leaves off, for the former strongly infers that 
media do not just have a close partnership with religious messaging but are ‘intertwined’ 
in a way that affects religion and society itself in our contemporary world, with media as 
an ‘agent of change’, as Hjarvard words it. Mediatisation does not merely operationalize 
the process of communication but has generated ‘a new social condition in which the 
power to define and practice religion has changed’.339 Thus, Hjarvard distinguishes 
mediatisation from the narrower construct of ‘mediation’, which focuses mainly on the 
‘communication process’. With mediatisation, the ‘structural transformation of 
relationships between media, culture, and society’ is the focus of attention.340 The 
changing complexion of religious authority in the digital age, then, is central to the 
proposition of the aforementioned structural and cultural transformations of religion and 
authority, and, as such, directly relates to this study, as explored below. More specifically, 
what mediatisation does is alter the religious economy in important ways, affecting the 
very performance of religion and rituals (for example, virtual prayers, online church 
masses, conversions through online confessions of faith, and more). 
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But there is a gap in the literature as it pertains to a more defined framework that 
examines how new media and new content-makers destabilize traditional notions of 
religious authority in contemporary Islam: that is, how do we frame new media’s 
challenge to religious authority in the Islamic milieu? 
First, new media permit members of a religious community to perform religion 
online: practising rites online (such as scripture readings and meditations); fulfilling 
obligations, such as the paying of obliged charity (zakāt) online; engaging in forums in 
which congregants can carry out scriptural study, converse about topics of spiritual import 
virtually, request prayers for trials and illness, and search out religious verdicts (e-fatwas) 
online and anonymously; and other activities that are normally in done in personal contact 
with religious figures or among real-life congregations. New media have thus affected 
religion, according to mediatisation, by encouraging interaction by members of a religious 
community who might have shied away or have been discouraged from entering physical 
spaces of religious institutions or communal events. Cheruvallil-Contractor and Shakkour 
stress this point in their study of online Sufism, for example. Their research shows ‘the 
increasing role of the internet in creating “safe” social spaces for young Muslims to 
discuss and debate their faith to an extent that would not be possible offline’. In their case 
study, they said that young people were ‘attempting to experience their Ṣūfī practice 
online, where they felt they had the freedom to interrogate and critically engage with their 
faith’.341 For these young people, online space was not limited by the traditional 
perspectives of community elders. In other words, the mediatisation effects of digital 
media expanded, for new audiences, choices in the kind of content they now have access 
to, the discussions they feel safer to engage in, and the ways of even practicing their faith 
in a way not possible in physical spaces. 
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Second, the construction of religious identity has been changed by new media, as 
scholars have noted.342 In this new media-inflected age, traditional identities with 
religions were associated with a passive process, whereby a religious identity was 
something ‘inherited’ from one’s immediate family or forebears or from a single 
communal religious institution established in one’s community. Scholars argue that 
‘group identity’, as a traditional way of constructing identity, has been challenged by new 
media, as individuals search for and are exposed to an unprecedented ‘range of available 
beliefs, practices, and symbols’ online from which they are able to ‘pick and choose’. 343 
Individuals may thus consider Western and Eastern religious paradigms, as well as 
mythology and psychology, in their religious identities.344 As a theoretical framework, 
mediation is not constructed in a way that allows interpretation of how media affects the 
very religiosity of people (or groups of people); as scholars argue, however, mediatisation 
is.345 As for Muslims online, Bunt argues that Muslims have taken advantage of ‘technical 
innovation to galvanise an audience unsatisfied with convention, for which the Net is a 
natural place to acquire knowledge and converse with peers’.346 
Another key aspect of mediatisation and religion speaks to ‘disruption’: that is, the 
opening of possibilities that providers of religious content have at their disposal, with the 
potentialities themselves influencing, for example, the rhetorical strategies, audience 
targeting, and actual material that can be conveyed for more directed purposes. As such, 
the changing concept of audience reflects a connotation imbedded in mediatisation, in the 
sense that the previously conceived ‘audience’ and the passiveness it suggests of readers, 
listeners, and viewers is not as applicable in the digital world, a world that permits an 
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interactivity347 that has no precedent. Therefore, it could be said that, as a research 
paradigm, the concept of mediatisation applies to the content and approaches of Salafist 
contestations with Sufism which are tailored to contemporary media platforms and 
resources and to the new iteration of a media audience. The researcher contends that, as a 
framework for this study, religious authority is an important prism through which to 
interpret online contestations; however, mediatisation adds a measure of completion to the 
ties between religion and media studies, contextualizing this framework of religious 
authority with media studies. In his study of aspects of mediatisation as ‘agents of 
change’, Hjarvard offers a framework to ‘conceptualize the ways that media may change 
religion’. For Hjarvard, the framework of mediatisation is apropos since ‘religious 
imaginations and practices become increasingly dependent upon media’,348 meaning that, 
consequently, ‘media have become the primary source of religious ideas, in particular in 
the form of banal religion … . [A]s cultural environments the media have taken over 
many of the social functions of the institutionalized religions, providing both moral and 
spiritual guidance and a sense of community.’349 
From the perspective of this study, new media alter the balance of the authority–
authorization threshold, whereby popularity has the potential to transcend qualification in 
the authority realm, traditionally upheld and maintained by the community of scholars 
(ʿulamā’) and the language of their discourse, as Zaman argues.350 Media should no 
longer be equated with passive channels of information; rather, present-day media alter or 
shape religious discourses from a discursive form toward populist vernaculars. This shift 
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in the quality of language of instruction also influences the decentralized and pluralizing 
state of authority and claims to it in contemporary Islam today.  
 
4.3 Religious Authority and Media: An Overview 
Digital media have rapidly become integral to professional, academic, and personal lives 
in societies in much of the world. O’Leary observed more than 20 years ago—long before 
the expansion of digital media in everyday life and culture as we know it today—that the 
‘Internet expanded in a few years from an elite core of academic and science experts to a 
global network with millions of users’.351 Now forward 20 years from O’Leary’s 
statement, the inquiry is less about sheer demographics of users but more about a social 
phenomenon, with digital media becoming ‘central to the ways in which we experience 
others and ourselves as well as the way we interact with all manner of cultural, social, 
economic, and political processes’.352  Digital natives will find difficulty remembering an 
era unaffected by the Internet;353 and they will not be able to fully experience knowledge 
acquisition outside the realm of digital media products such as search engines. Thus, the 
discourse about media is not about technology per se. Rather, this discussion examines a 
powerful force in human life (religion) making unprecedented use of media for a variety 
of purposes and leaving a wide range of effects—on communities, individuals, 
subjectivities of authority, and on religion itself—within the timespan of a single 
generation. As such, Bunt is correct in stating that studying contemporary religion and its 
relationship with digital media ‘is now a crucial area for the understanding of 
contemporary religious issues’.354 Without taking new media into consideration, any 
understanding of religion today will be incomplete. 
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To locate the contemporary pressures placed by digital media on religious 
authority in their historical context, however, it is important to connect the issue with 
previous technological encroachments on authority. Contrary to what one would imagine, 
the innocuous lightbulb, when first invented in the early 19th century, was ‘accompanied 
by debates on the nature of authority and changing communication barriers between the 
elites and the masses’.355 In order to offer historical contextualization, researchers have 
looked at those media developed centuries ago and their effects on religious thought and 
the deconstruction of religious authority, gravitating particularly toward the printing press 
for their analogies. 
Hoover, for example, said that the invention of the printing press had a significant 
impact on religious discourses and authority because it ‘provided the means for the 
development of alternative centres of power based on ideological argument rather than 
military, political or ecclesiastical power’.356 Kort extends this idea by comparing the 
Internet with ‘the print revolution’ and what it did for ‘the Protestant movement (Christian 
Reformation)’.357 Loach is more explicit: ‘Printing was considered by most sixteenth 
century Protestants to be a weapon peculiarly suited to their purposes: it was, after all, 
Luther who had greeted the press as “God’s highest and extremest act of grace, whereby 
the business of the Gospel is driven forward”.’358 New typographic technologies received 
an apocalyptic reception; they were called a ‘great mutation’ and the alarm was raised 
‘about the extent to which a “run-away technology” was severing all bonds with the past’ 
and threatening the Bible-reading culture.359 Assmaan raises stark comparisons between 
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the printing press and the Internet as a function of globalization, though she does not 
emphasize religion per se.360 
In terms of religious authority and modern technology, researchers have noted that 
the radio, classified as an early electronic communication means, was the starting point of 
the ability of electronic media to address a ‘generalized and often national public’ and, as 
a result, it evolved into a ‘cultural institution’.361 The radio, then the television, became 
part of the experience and identity of the public sphere, only to be challenged by new 
technologies, such as satellite and cable broadcasts—and then, of course, being eclipsed 
by digital media. 
Research suggests that digital media—including social media—have influenced 
religious authority in two ways, both connected with the idea of ‘disruption’: first, digital 
media disruption has permitted an increase in voices that convey or engage with religious 
content, with or without credentials; and, second, digital media have provided a much 
broader field and a greater volume of content that audiences can easily reach and learn 
from. Some researchers, such as Horsfield, compare the changing landscape of religious 
content with the idea of a ‘marketplace’, in which religious ‘entrepreneurs’ circumvent 
constraints of institutional religious frameworks, as traditionally constructed, to directly 
access audiences across national boundaries and with little expense. In other words, 
content makers can compete ‘directly in the media market, with packages of branded 
religious and secular content that ignore old religious loyalties and sensibilities’.362 While 
it is possible, indeed likely, that using the nomenclature of capitalism and its markets to 
describe the Salafī discourses examined in this dissertation would not be well-received by 
content makers, part of the argument made in this study is that the reach of a local Salafī 
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organization in Birmingham, England, for example, is much broader than it would have 
been in the pre-digital age. 
For scholars such as Aly, media disruption manifests itself as ‘a discursive 
relocation of the Islamic tradition of discussing religious disputes’, which, in her study, 
results in significant demonstrable impacts on extremist religious content. She writes: 
‘The Internet serves as a marketplace of opinions in which opinion givers vie for the 
status of leader by adopting communication behaviours that confer authority.’363 
Cheong, in her review of the nascent literature in this field, locates trends or 
clusters of perspectives related to media and religious authority. One perspective 
describes new media as an ‘upheaval’ that confronts traditional constructs of religious 
authority, ‘supplanting power and furnishing an equivalent authority in place of another’. 
One authority, typically traditional (patterned in pre-modern eras), is ‘displaced’ by the 
presence and proliferation of new actors and content makers, whose admission into the 
media ecology is smoothed by media disruptions central to digital media. Other scholars 
see new media as complementary, rather than necessarily confrontational.364 Cheong 
shows how the notion of ‘religious authority’ may be altered and in some respects diluted 
by digital media, since the phenomenon ‘allows different people to have open access and 
gain greater control over knowledge and social information’.365 
Turner, however, locates the loci of transformation in the ‘social conditions’ that 
new media technologies have ushered in, conditions in which ‘political and religious 
authority are produced’.366 Political control over new media streams and narratives are not 
as easily ordered as for a print-based media model. Turner sees new media as having a 
‘contradictory’ effect, suggesting a democratization of information, while at the same 
time new media ‘[threaten] to swamp traditional voices’, which is hardly an egalitarian 
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outcome suggestive of democratization.367 Barker’s study of ‘new religious movements’ 
considers how new religions that were confronted with ‘one type of authority structure’ in 
real life came to be ‘affected by the arrival of cyberspace’.368 
 
4.4 Contextualising Religious Authority and Islam 
Religious authority, it can be argued, has never been an unchanging idea or practice. 
However, when there is a noticeable acceleration in the changing profile of religious 
authority—particularly when influenced by external forces and social and political 
realities—researchers are prompted to examine the changes and the complex forces that 
have led to them or exerted important influence thereof. Thus, it is important to note that 
the question of religious authority and its changes in contemporary Islam has been well 
connected to the digital turn; however, the pressures of the changes in authority are pre-
digital. The issue of authority is arguably one of the key crises in contemporary Islam, as 
Bulliet contends.369 It is, therefore, constructive to first briefly address the main challenge 
of authority today for Muslims and Islam, in conversation with the shifts of the Muslim 
world and concisely discuss the question of authority with meta-media contextualisation.  
  Thus, in addressing the relationship between digital media and religious authority, 
it is beneficial to start by addressing the key challenge of authority for Muslims and 
Islam: namely, the role of traditionally trained scholars in the adjudication of matters 
relating to personal and communal Muslim affairs, particularly in seeking to provide 
guidance to individuals. At its most basic, if not its most traditional connotation, authority 
addresses two poles of the religious phenomenon, signifying a ‘reciprocal relation always 
incorporating two parties’:370 those who produce and convey religious content and those 
                                               
367 Ibid. 
368 Eileen Barker. ‘Crossing the Boundary: New Challenges to Religious Authority and Control as a 
Consequence of Access to the Internet’, in Religion and Cyberspace, ed. Morten T. Højsgaard and 
Margit Warburg (New York: Routledge, 2005), at 68. 
369 Bulliet, at 11. 
370 Robert A. Segal and Kocku von Stuckrad, Vocabulary for the Study of Religion (Leiden: Brill, 
2015), at 1:145. 
  110 
who receive it—that is, those who, depending on creed and degrees of commitment or 
scepticism, may (or are expected to) show deference to what is being conveyed, often 
affecting choices in conduct. Perhaps more formally, ‘authority denotes a social 
positioning of an institution, object, or person that gives direction or a normative standard 
in terms of thought and action to one or more people’.371 As Weber would have it, 
authority addresses the ‘probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) 
from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons’.372 
The concept of authority in Islam does not have a homogeneous definition per se, 
because of the sectarian divides within Muslim societies and history (consider the notable 
differences in authority and the qualifications for authority between, for example, Sunnī 
and Shīʿa Islam). However, there are arguably salient features of authority in Islam that 
serve as a plausible ‘positioning’ of authority in contemporary media climates.373 Few 
Muslims will argue that within the lifetime of the Prophet of Islam sacred authority was 
vested in the person of, the statements of, and the revelations that came to the Prophet 
Muḥammad. In his lifetime, the affairs of the Muslim community in the Ḥijāz (the 
western strip of the Arabian Peninsula) were ‘governed by the special authority’ of the 
Prophet Muḥammad and by the Qurʾān which was revealed to him in his 23 years of 
prophethood, until his death (the year 632), as Muslims believe.374 In other words, to his 
followers, the Prophet’s statements and normative practices represented the highest state 
of authority in a religious paradigm because he was guided by revealed inspiration that 
‘came down’ to him375—about which the Qurʾān states: ‘Obey God and obey the 
Messenger’.376 
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After the passing of the Prophet, however, the role of religious authority 
continued, but without the ‘special authority’ of the Prophetic period, since the Prophet 
Muḥammad was not only the prophet of Islam but the ‘seal of the prophets’,377 after 
whom no new prophet would come, as per Sunni Islam creedal beliefs. However, the 
affairs of the community of the Muslims (or Ummah) were not left without guidance after 
his death. The community received the Qurʾān (the sacred scripture of Islam) and the 
statements and normative practice of the Prophet Muḥammad, which would eventually 
make up the corpus of Hadith literature, the second primary source of Islamic law. 
Together, the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth form the textual sources of religious authority in 
Islam.378 But the affairs of Muslims, which expanded and became multifarious as the 
Muslim lands expanded, were increasingly in need of direction, particularly in terms of 
new issues and dilemmas that appeared but lacked precedent. As such, the burden of 
providing that guidance fell upon the ʿUlamā’, the ‘scholars specializing in Islamic 
religious sciences’.347 This scholarly class emerged in the first three generations of Islam 
who had come to be seen by their contemporaries and successors as especially 
knowledgeable in matters relating to the Qur’ān, as sources of information on the life and 
teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad, and as jurists.379 After a period of autonomy, the 
scholarly class became increasingly involved in the political dynamics of the Muslim 
realm (Dār al-Islām), which, as a topic, is beyond the purpose of this study. 
However, researchers caution against presumptions that the structures of authority 
in Islam have been and are similar to those of Catholicism or Protestantism. Such 
generalizations concerning Islam ‘are notoriously dangerous and unreliable’.380 For 
example, there is no ecclesiastical order of authority in Sunnī Islam per se (and to an 
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extent in Shia Islam) as far as knowledge acquisition and teaching are concerned, and no 
formally ordained clerics (again, particularly in Sunnī Islam). In approaching the question 
of authority in Islam, then, the perspective that this study takes focuses on the 
qualifications threshold, which is reached through the acquisition of knowledge (ʿilm) and 
training (tarbiyya)—rather than through an ecclesiastical structure. As elaborated below, 
knowledge acquisition and juridical experience have been historically essential 
components of religious authority within Islam. With this in mind, there are discernible 
differences between traditional and contemporary paradigms of, for example, 
qualifications of a scholar, as well as discernible parallel differences between the roles 
that media have played and continue to play in the question of religious authority. 
In Sunnī Islam, the ‘authority’ vested in the scholars emanated from their 
demonstrated scholarship. In other words, a qualifications threshold was expected of 
scholars in order that they might pass judgement and make legal rulings. Those who did 
not possess advanced learning in the religious sciences were, in general, to be ignored. 
The alterations that affected scholarship thresholds predated digital media, with the ‘rise 
of new authorities with inferior credentials’, but with aptitudes associated with media 
technologies of their times. This subsequently led to the marginalization of ‘traditional 
Muslim authorities’.381 
As such, it is perhaps because of the non-hierarchical structure of Islam, which is 
‘without denominations, hierarchies, and centralized institutions’, that an authority crisis 
emerged within Islamic milieus.382 Thus, one of the key components of authority in 
contemporary Islam relates to historical developments of the nation-state and modernity 
that have impinged upon the question of authority in contemporary and mediated 
globalized Islam; meaning, the identity of the contemporary Muslim has been influenced 
by the colonial experience and the challenges that it posed with regard to Western cultural 
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dominance and its breaching of traditional Islamic teachings and education. It also 
influenced territorial constructs of an Ummah, the global community of Muslims 
(however imaginary that category may be) with the development of nation-states in the 
post-colonial age. The main historical pressures that exerted influence on authority were 
formidable.  
Researchers, such as Bulliet, Brinton, Mandaville, and Roy, have stated that the 
traditional scholarly class of Islam (the ʿulamā’) underwent structural marginalisation in 
the colonial period. Brinton, for example, traces seminal changes of authority to early 
19th century Egypt, when ‘changes were set in motion to reform religious institutions for 
the sake of modernizing the country’ under the pressure of Western modernity and its 
increasing spread.383 The pressure of these transformations ultimately led to a redefining 
of the class of scholars, whose public station as Islam’s scholarly class of ʿulamā’, was 
weakened in order to better negotiate modernization and its perceived benefits as 
evidenced in the West. In other words, the stagnation of the traditionally trained and 
valorised ʿulamā’ was considered to be a significant hindrance to modernization. 
Specifically, the hermeneutics of traditionally trained religious authorities were viewed by 
reformers, such as al-Afghānī, as obsolete and thus stalled Muslims in accommodating the 
coming of the modern age.384   
The effects of the transformation of authority were not perfunctory; the diminished 
status of the scholarly class as the custodians of the interpretation of the revealed sources 
of Islam, namely, the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, was not only undermined but encroached upon 
by more rationalistic hermeneutics that traditionally trained scholars were said to have 
lacked. For Roy, the roots of cordoning off the powers of traditional religious authorities 
led to what he coins ‘new Islamist intellectuals’ of the modern age and its new mediation 
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prowess.385 Muslim reformers, under the influence of ‘European anticlericalism’, 
challenged the power of the ʿulamā’ by replacing sacred law edicts and the processes of 
their derivation in the terminologies and approaches of ‘legal codes of European 
inspirations’.386 
Thus, the notion of stagnation in the Muslim world when juxtaposed to Western 
advancement was seem as a crisis that needed a response among the Muslim 
intelligentsia, who were in search of answers to the question related to the success of 
Europeans in taking control—colonial and intellectual—of large swathes of areas that 
were under the rule of Islam’s marshal, legal, and religious authority. Thus, the shift in 
authority began as an attempt of reformers to contest ‘European ascendancy through 
modernization, that is, as an imitation of European models of government and of 
knowledge production and distribution.’ 387  
The very foundation of religious authority constructs concern knowledge and its 
related epistemologies. It was at the roots of this foundation and their perceived inertia 
that the unproductivity and sluggishness of Muslim societies were imputed. Thus, it 
‘could be rectified by giving those who were not religious scholars the opportunity to 
partake in activities seen to exemplify Muslim intellectual production’.388  But how? The 
focus turned toward a new and modern ‘rational capacity—and not specialized learning in 
centuries-old interpretive techniques—became the criteria for interpretive rights’.  The 
resistance of the ʿulamā’ to modernization and their attempt to ‘maintain control over the 
transmission of religious knowledge became more difficult—in fact, almost impossible—
as time went on’. What this was leading to can be summarized as ‘stripping the ʿulamā’ of 
their regulating rights over the production and distribution of religious knowledge’.389   
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Since the historical periods mentioned above and their particular pressures on 
authority, the globalization of knowledge and its correlation with authority have taken a 
marked turn with the advent of the print press and, later, electronic media, which only 
further challenged the centres of authority in Islam. (The issue of new media and authority 
is discussed below.390)   
Religious authority, particularly when applied as a framework of research of 
contemporary Islam and digital media, may also be contextualized in an expanded 
breadth of such research but in conversation with globalization and religion. For 
Mandaville, the new global or transnational realities generate what he calls the 
‘pluralizations of Islamic authority’. The phrase denotes ‘a situation in which structures of 
authority become increasingly diffuse, disparate, polyvalent and translocalized’. The 
pluralization, in turn, exerts influence on ‘textual bases, discursive forms and 
personifications of authority’.391 
As mentioned above, traditional more centralized forms of Muslim religious 
authority focused on scholars interacting with and interpreting scriptural texts for the 
public; and, in terms of discursive forms of textual engagement, the juridical sciences of 
Muslim intellectual history produced the sciences and methodologies of deriving rulings 
from sacred texts (the science of Uṣūl al-Fiqh) and detailed accounts of the rulings 
themselves that cover the daily routines of rituals, as well as commerce, family matters, 
and more. It is thus important to note that ‘formal jurisprudence of this sort has been 
largely confined to a particular class of invested interpreters’ who were recognized for 
their knowledge.392  
What has been observed as a reoriented view of authority—reoriented away from 
classical religious authority in Islam in the mid 19th to early 20th centuries—has 
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accelerated from a gradual change to a ‘revolution in religious authority’, particularly in 
light of increasing literacy and modern mass education reforms in the Muslim world. 
Turner views the changes provocatively as a kind of ‘deprivatization of religion’, that is, 
breaking the seeming monopoly of authority from the traditionally trained ʿulamā’ to a 
broader network of educated people who have non-religious training.393 In addition, the 
‘emergence of new technologies and modes of communication, and a shift from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ attitudes – involves a significant transformation in the 
constitution of the aforementioned categories’.394  
At the core of the pluralization of knowledge notion is the decentralized landscape 
of religious authority in Islam, in which access to media technologies has permitted a 
plethora of voices to make claims and edicts that may potentially influence choice and 
conduct among adherents to the faith. The new voices have been termed from the early 
years of the internet as ‘Islam’s New Interpreters’.395 Similarly, Mandaville categorizes 
the more immediate effects of media on the globalization of Islamic authority by 
attending to the question of how individual ‘Muslims understand the social purpose and 
ends of knowledge seeking’, as well as the space of mediated religious authority. He calls 
it ‘the spatial pluralization of Islamic authority’ over distances.396 Thus, the spatial 
dimensions of knowledge production and conveyance wield changes in terms of ‘how far 
away and in what kinds of spaces one seeks authority or authorization’.397 The spatial 
reorientation of knowledge production and its consequential effects on authority 
represents a technological enabling of globalization, as explored below in the discussion 
of media and authority within Islam. 
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Another point about Roy’s view of globalized Islam, his approach and criticism of 
the failure of Islamists in achieving their aims in a more globalised and trans-territorial 
world avoids making essentialists arguments. His criticism for contemporary Islam’s 
struggle for a voice and position in a globalization framework is a result of what he 
believes is a political failure, rather than a failure of the religion itself. Thus, the external 
influences of post-colonial Muslim contexts are products of Westernisation and 
globalism, and not necessarily the theology and epistemology of the religion.398 
 But Roy’s declaration of the ‘failure’ of Islamism should be briefly addressed as it 
relates to Islamism and media. The failure of Islamism in Roy’s argument is rooted in the 
observation that the advocacy of Islamism in producing ‘Islamic’ nations and 
governments based on strict teachings of Islam, as framed by Islamists, has been a failure 
in the sense that such visions have not been actualized. However, ‘Islamism’ is hardly 
homogeneous. For the type of Salafism examined in this study, the central message and 
purpose, as described in Chapter 3, concerns purist Salafism, which deals more with 
teaching, preaching, and condemning beliefs and practices related to heterodoxy, rather 
than statecraft. As such, the failure of global Islamism, especially in a highly-mediated 
age, is limited to the failure of the grander, globalized views of political Islamists 
(including the politicos of Salafism). The emphases of purist Salafist teachings, on the 
other hand, underscores the importance of the role of modern media, through which the 
teachings are conveyed. For Mandaville, the destabilized and decentralized effects of 
digital media on authority has permitted the content production of contestations that are 
generated with ‘unprecedented intensity’.399 And the successes or failures of such goals 
are thus not dependent on a nation-building conceits of political Islamists.  
Now, with regard to intellectual and intra-Islamic contestations, it is useful to 
consider the views of Weber, whose assessments of power and authority, include the 
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power vested in the form of pronouncements that may affect the beliefs and conduct of 
followers—not through violence or other coercive means, but through the power of 
persuasion. Authority addresses the ‘probability that certain specific commands (or all 
commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons’.400 For purist 
or quietist Salafism (as opposed to Jihadist Salafism), the discursive significance of online 
texts relates to the degree of moral persuasion that they exercise. As such, of the various 
forms of religious authority that are visible in cyber-Islamic environments, this study 
focuses on the authority ‘to define correct belief and practice, or orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy, respectively; to shape and influence the views and conduct of others 
accordingly’, as well as to marginalisze those who are said to have deviant views and 
practices.401 
As a framework, religious authority is undergoing significant change (or 
challenges) because of the notion of ‘disruption’, as a function of ‘mediatisation’—
principally as it relates to digital media and the challenge they pose to traditional means of 
knowledge acquisition, conveyance, and access. Media disruption has permitted 
unprecedented numbers of content producers to make their appearance and, quite often, 
impact felt in the digital media ecology, challenging religious authority as traditionally 
understood, since authority is now more ‘imbedded in a marketplace of religious 
choice’.402 
 
4.5 Religious Authority, Media, and Islam 
Before the advent of the Internet and subsequent emerging technologies, the idea 
of religious authority in Islam envisioned a public sphere ‘exclusively dominated by a 
group of theologians and religious elites—the ʿulamā’—who had the ultimate say and 
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authority over the transmission of the religious message’.403 While the definition religious 
authority of the pre-digital media age is resistant to such a singular description, it seems 
clear that, with the development and spread of digital media, the domination of the 
religious elites has been challenged. 
The traditional paradigms of knowledge acquisition were viewed as an extension 
of the tradition of revelation and its interpretation. God revealed the scriptures, for 
example, through ‘charismatic’ personages, namely prophets and messengers, and the 
‘texts’ of revelation were first committed to memory, then to parchment. In the post-
prophetic period, then, the duty of interpretation fell upon qualified scholars who were 
presumed to be responsible for the mighty task of interpretation for the masses. In Islam, 
the traditional elites of religious authority, therefore, ‘required specialised hermeneutics 
as the basis of their authority to interpret’.404 Thus, the question of media technologies 
and religious authority touches upon sensitivities that indirectly relate to what is 
essentially a sacrosanct matter. 
The relationship between knowledge and authority in the Islamic paradigm is a 
representational one, since ‘assertions of authority are represented, in some fashion, with 
validated forms of knowledge’. As such, knowledge is the ‘cardinal quality in the 
legitimization of Islamic authority’.405 However, with digital media, what qualifies as 
‘validated’ knowledge is brought into question, as the links between scholar and audience, 
traditionally physical and communal, become within digital media impersonal and highly 
mediated. 
Researchers have ‘emphasized the role of the new media … in democratizing 
Islamic knowledge by breaking the monopoly of the ulama [the scholarly class] on 
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accessing and interpreting the sources’.406 In 2003, Bunt was among the first to document 
and analyse ‘Cyber Islamic Environments’ as transformative in terms of their ‘power to 
enable elements within a population to discuss aspects of religious interpretation and 
authority with each other’ in new ways that could potentially subvert traditional or 
‘conventional channels’ of opining on religious matters.407 
In his study of Islam online, Lawrence asks a principal question, ‘What is 
authority in Islam?’ It is an appropriate question, and always a good starting point. 
Lawrence locates three nodes that relate to Islamic religious authority: the scriptural, the 
charismatic, and the juridical. The Qurʾān and the Prophet Muhammed represent the first 
two respectively. Observant Muslims accept the scriptural node as sound sources or 
authorities from which the third node is derived—namely, the juridical, the rules of 
Islamic sacred laws, which rely on an interpretive epistemology.408 To an important 
degree, the ‘authority’ under examination here concerns the ‘juridical’ node of authority, 
which covers the affairs of the faithful, ethical and moral and even creedal matters, and 
decisions made by individuals influenced by the power of religious authorities. 
In connecting the constructs of authority of the present age with those of the recent 
and pre-modern past, Mandaville examines the ‘changing boundaries’ in religious 
knowledge in Islamic intellectual history, beginning with print culture in the Muslim 
world: namely, books, pamphlets, and newsletters produced in the 19th century. These 
‘new’ forms of text were ‘taken up with urgency by Muslims in the nineteenth century in 
order to counter the threat posed to the Islamic world by European imperialism’.409 The 
religious scholars of that time steered this transformation of knowledge transfer, 
employing means of distribution that challenged the more traditional means and vectors 
of teaching. But there was a ‘side effect’. The growing print culture encroached on the 
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realm of influence of traditional Islamic scholars and loosened their grip ‘over the 
production and dissemination of religious knowledge’. The literate among the masses 
were now able to circumvent a highly formalized method of knowledge acquisition, since 
texts were, in theory, available to be read and interpreted by anyone. ‘These media opened 
up new spaces of religious contestation where traditional sources of authority could be 
challenged by the wider public. […] The move to print technology hence meant not only a 
new method for transmitting texts, but also a new idiom of selecting, writing and 
presenting works to cater to a new kind of reader.’410 
The nuanced matter of modern ruptures within the religious authority terrain is not 
necessarily new. For Bulliet, the ‘crisis’ within contemporary Islam relates to crises in 
religious authority that have grown over a century. When Osama bin Laden ‘became the 
world’s best- known Muslim during the 1990s’ after the attacks of 11 September 2001, he 
advocated that all Muslims take up ‘jihad’ or armed struggle against perceived enemies of 
Islam, which, in bin Laden’s mind, included most the West, particularly the United 
States.411 Bulliet’s reflections on the forensics of religious thought in contemporary Islam 
that led to the attacks of 11 September 11, 20011, and the perceived slow reaction of 
Muslim religious authorities to condemn it, lead to the conclusion that they are firmly 
related to the ruptures of traditional authority in Islam. ‘This strange silence [the lack of 
condemnation by Muslims] does not reflect the attitude of traditional Islam but is a 
painful manifestation of a crisis of authority that has been building within Islam for a 
century.’412 But, more importantly, Bulliet pointed out that it is precisely this crisis in 
authority in modern Islam ‘that allowed bin Laden, despite his lack of a formal religious 
education or an authoritative religious position, to assume the role of spokesman for the 
world’s Muslims’.413 
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Brinton thoroughly examines the role of television as an ‘extension of religious 
authority’414 in her study of a popular Egyptian scholar and preacher, Muḥammad 
Mutwallī al-Shaʿrāwī (1911–1998), whose sermons and study circles were broadcast on 
Egyptian television for decades. The show, being broadcast as reruns in much of the Arab 
world, remains popular, and is readily found on YouTube. Brinton saw that, for the 
viewers, al-Shaʿrāwī’s televised sermons represented ‘a new practice that highlighted a 
reciprocal type of alteration in which viewers were no longer tied to the original space and 
time of delivery. Instead they now participated in a ritual that was both separate from the 
ordinary and embedded in its environment.’415 Brinton’s research associates the mediation 
of television with the popularity of a charismatic learned man who was apparently 
effortlessly, if not naturally, skilled in two aspects of ‘preformativity’: namely, rhetoric 
and theatrics. The image of al-Shaʿrāwī, as a result, came to be regarded as saintly and a 
means of obtaining baraka or blessings, even if mediated by broadcast technology.416 
Brinton’s work was among the first to associate television mediation with the subtleties of 
religious symbolic meaning characteristic of contemporary Muslim figures and the 
broadening of the confines and reach of religious authorities. (In a similar vein, Messick 
examined religious radio broadcasts in Yemen, in which formal religious edicts were 
broadcast by local muftis—scholars qualified to make edicts.417) 
Generally speaking, religious television and radio broadcasts in the Muslim world 
were part of the political and religious establishment, as was the case in Saudi Arabia, 
where the national ‘visions for education, worship, social services, politics, and 
entertainment’ were conveyed and, to an important extent, controlled by such broadcasts. 
It was essentially a ‘top-down pattern of communication, so that competing voices are 
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more likely to emerge through the alternative small media’.418 The limited alternative 
platforms for counter-narratives and audience engagement, however, were burst open by 
digital media technologies reconfiguring access and definitions of what an audience 
actually constitutes, thus ‘disrupting’ a system that offered narrow pathways of mass 
communication outside the establishment. ‘As is characteristic of all these new media, the 
social and cultural distance on the Internet between producer and consumer is radically 
reduced.’419 
In a similar vein, Turner sees Muslim religious authority as once being almost 
exclusively a ‘local, discursive and popular form of authority’. A religious leader is ‘one 
who has achieved considerable popular recognition and support’. 420  New technologies, 
however, are confrontational when it comes to religious authority, in part because of the 
entry into the public sphere of a variety of voices. The ‘ideological’ effects of new media 
technologies revolve around providing ‘alternative, deregulated, devolved and local 
opportunities for debate and discussion’, qualities, as Turner points out, that are required 
for ‘democratic civil society’. Contemporary media technologies also ‘have the 
unintended effect of corroding traditional forms of authority’ that was based in oral 
transmission and textual learning based on printed texts’. 421 
In his case study of Muslims in Europe, Caeiro examines edict-making systems 
(iftā’) in the Muslim minority community of Europe and the status of religious authority 
in the production and conveyance of these edicts. He writes that, ‘with the spread of 
literacy and the liberalization of access to sacred knowledge, this relation [between 
authorities of religion and their audience] has started to change’. But how? He attributes it 
to the mass education of Muslims in Europe and the rise of ‘new media’, which have 
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‘contributed to the displacement and fragmentation of religious authority’, thus admitting 
that modernity itself has contested established authority.422 
Bunt addresses authority and the Internet by examining the online presence of 
religious authorities well known before the digital age, including Egyptian cleric Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi, Iran’s Ayatollah al-Sistani, Shaykh Abd’ar-Rahman as-Shadhili, muftis of 
Syria and Saudi Arabia, and even the popular preacher Amr Khaled. In his detailed 
analysis, Bunt writes: ‘Those Muslims, living and dead, who have a sacred status within 
their communities’ history hold a prominent place in cyberspace.’423 Digital media, 
moreover, create a ‘transnational hypermarket’ that affects the very notion of ‘Muslim 
publics’424 and admits new voices into the revered space of religious discourse. The 
veritable library of online ‘worldviews and notions of exclusivity’ has the capacity ‘to 
transform aspects of religious understanding and expression within Muslim contexts’.425 
A theme in Bunt’s work concerns the potential of digital media ‘to enable elements within 
the population to discuss aspects of religious interpretation and authority with each other’, 
thus ‘subverting what were conventional channels for opinions on religious issues’—that 
is, religious authority.426 
Brown underscores this observation by parsing out the familiar authorities in 
Islam—namely the muftī (a scholar qualified to advance edicts based on sacred law) and 
the judge—from popular preachers who are more adept in rhetoric than in deeper 
scholarship. These two categories of religious personage have deep historical roots. 
Brown, however, suggests that the authority vested in them has given way in the age of 
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cacophony, as he terms it. ‘The proliferation of new media and the revival of some older 
ones have led to many new entrants into religious arguments besides mufti and judge’. 427 
Elsewhere, in studying Arab politics and new spaces for religious arguments therein, 
Brown suggests that the ‘linkages and classes’ of debates do not ‘end hierarchies and 
authority, but they diversify them’.428 
Van Bruinessen examines the production of ‘Islamic knowledge’ in Western 
Europe, identifying two models of knowledge production and dissemination. One 
resembles a market economy. On the ‘supply side’ are the specialists of religious sciences 
or various movements producing Islamic knowledge, and on ‘the demand side’ is the 
public, ‘who more or less critically make a choice out of what is on offer’. The second 
model applies mainly to young Muslims, who ‘established institutions’ and constructed 
‘their own forms of Islamic knowledge in an eclectic and creative process’. The first 
model draws a ‘strict distinction between producers and consumers of religious 
knowledge’, while, in the second model, ‘everyone is to some degree involved in its 
production’.429 It is in Van Bruinessen’s second model that challenges to traditional 
authority can be located. For Hoffman and Larsson, the spectacle of new media likely 
represents a ‘watershed moment’ in the realms of information sharing and exegetical 
approaches to Islamic law texts. The ‘philosophical and theoretically driven research’ of 
new media represent ‘two grand trajectories’ that ultimately will ‘ushering in a watershed 
of epochal dimensions’.430 Scholars have examined the role of digital media in various 
communities within European nations, drawing attention to specific online Islam within a 
given nation and its relationship with religious authority. 
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In his review essay, Peter associates changes in religious authority with the notion 
of ‘individualization.431  Peter’s essay focuses on the Muslim minority community in 
Western Europe, but makes little mention of the role of media in the process of 
individualization and its association with Islamic religious authority. Several researchers, 
meanwhile, have examined the role of media in religious authority in connection with 
globalization. Roy, Mandaville, Anderson, and others have used the frame of 
globalization more than that of mediatisation per se.432 
The review of the literature concerning media and Islamic religious authority, 
while not fully exhaustive, is representative of current research. It also shows a need for 
more research that takes as its central theme Islam and new media. There is little research, 
thus far, that centrally concerns itself with digital media, disruption, and religious 
authority in the Islamic milieu. Willemse and Bergh note that ‘the demographic “youth 
bulge” in the region [Middle East], coupled with the growing use of the new media and 
technologies, has caused political culture to be more individualistic and less attracted to 
holistic ideologies, whether Islamist or secularist’. New media, the authors state, have 
permitted a new public to ‘bypass state and religious authority and debate the diverse 
interpretation of religious principles within their own national boundaries and beyond’.  
What this chapter puts forward, then, is a media analytical framing, through 
mediatisation and disruption, of contemporary religious authority in Islam that is 
significantly underrepresented in the literature.  
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4.6 Religious Authority and Modern Salafism 
This study argues that the brand of Salafism examined here is adept in utilizing digital 
media to convey arguments and scriptural texts with a practised skill that makes the 
ideology attractive, if not seductive, to audiences. For Haykel, Salafī messaging (whether 
online or offline) has an allure that is rooted in the ‘form of authority that [Salafism] 
promotes, and reproduces, as well as the particular hermeneutics it advocates’.433 He 
disputes arguments that the appeal of Salafism lies in its ‘de-territorialised’ or 
‘fundamentalist’ qualities—that is, a transnational ideological presence that is not 
associated with seemingly profane facts of geography or citizenship. He also denies that 
Salafism takes advantage of globalization as a ‘condition of modern life’. Rather, 
Salafism’s ‘claims to religious certainty […] explain a good deal of its appeal, and its 
seemingly limitless ability to cite scripture to back these up’.434 
For purist or quietist Salafism (as opposed to Jihadist Salafism), the discursive 
significance of online texts relates to the degree of moral persuasion that they exercise. As 
such, of the various forms of religious authority that are visible in cyber-Islamic 
environments, this study focuses on the authority ‘to define correct belief and practice, or 
orthodoxy and orthopraxy, respectively; to shape and influence the views and conduct of 
others accordingly’, as well as to marginalize those who are said to have deviant views 
and practices.435 
Thus, this dissertation seeks to analyse popular online Salafī texts that make use of 
or put forward a populist rhetorical style of knowledge transmission, a hagiography of 
historical figures, a facility with quoting primary and secondary sources, and the use of 
powerful language patterns and vocabulary that speak to the claim of religious authority. 
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The chapter on methodology, below, addresses the means by which this argument is 
defended. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
In studying the connection between religious authority and emerging media 
technologies, the discussion must ultimately migrate to the effects that the changing role 
of authority actually has on the lives and choices on people. What is religious authority if 
it does not include a parsing of texts, edicts, or content that exert influence on the faithful? 
For Lawrence, the ‘juridical’ node of authority cannot be overlooked in discussions of and 
research on authority in Islam. In this study, the focus is on the juridical node of authority 
and the disruptive qualities that new media introduce, permitting content-producers to 
enter the media ecology and, in some cases, exert influence and make statements, despite 
appearing out of their depth. 
Digital media have had unique effects that invite study, such as the vast social 
media phenomenon that nearly each year introduces new avenues of instant 
communication. Studies have produced impact-theories of ‘virtual religiosity’.436 These 
forays in the existential meaning of digital conveyance are upheld in part by the 
transformation of the very notion of a media audience, from passive receivers of 
information to active participants in ‘information gathering and exchange’, as Bunt 
states.437 In other words, the audience has undergone a ‘participative turn’ that has greatly 
expanded the sheer number of content producers who can now easily introduce competing 
ideological stands within a given religion.438 
Digital space, and proselytizing therein, are increasingly seen as indications ‘of 
shifting power dynamics in public-religious discourse in Muslim societies’.439 This 
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observation was made eight years ago, when Echchaibi noted that, among the power 
dynamics of digital media, is the contestation or ‘control over meaning’.440 In the 
following years, Salafists have significantly increased the adeptness of their multi-modal 
use of new media for their missionary work, known as daʿwa, at the centre of which are 
contestations over the meanings of key powerful terminologies within Islamic intellectual 
history. This study seeks to pursue those important contestations. 
  
                                               
440 Ibid. 
  130 
CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY: BACKGROUND AND APPROACH 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Nearly three decades ago, researchers anticipated that the study of ‘new media’ would 
undertake a marked transition toward greater interdisciplinarity. This, in turn, would 
require methodological approaches that amount to more than the ‘extensions of existing 
methods’, especially those exclusively exercised within a departmental media studies 
paradigm. The researcher of new media and religion would thus need to ‘consider 
alternative methods, or even multiple methods’ in studying online religious content, 
performances, and messaging in an expanding digital space.441 The conceptual 
underpinning of these projections of the 1990s is rooted in the notion that digital media 
signify more than an innovation of instrumentality with negligible disruptive or 
epistemological meaning for religious communities, individuals, and leadership. 
For O’Leary, who was among the first researchers to have foreseen the 
‘revolutionary’ nature of digital media in the realm of religion, the media forms are 
collectively nothing less than a ‘cultural force’.442 To emphasize his argument, O’Leary 
quotes Pope John Paul, who commented in 1990 that no one ‘thinks or speaks of social 
communications as mere instruments or technologies. Rather they are now seen as part of 
a still unfolding culture whose implications are yet imperfectly understood and who 
potentialities remain for the moment partially exploited.’443 The significance of this quote 
is its emphasis that the transformative nature of digital media was recognized and 
commented upon by traditional religious leadership, who had much at stake when it came 
to appropriating new media at a pace equivalent to that of their parishioners. 
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 In contemporary terms, the relationship between digital media and religion is now 
more than partially explored as a result of new methodologies and research designs. 
Nonetheless, discussions regarding developing methodologies continue to be appropriate, 
if not necessary, when introducing new research on this subject because of its complexity, 
which revolves around the fact that studies in the field are ‘interdisciplinary projects’, 
drawing on various fields, such as religious and theological studies, sociology, political 
science, psychology, and anthropology, as well as traditional media studies.444 As such, 
the methodologies available to researchers are necessarily evolving and often involve 
methods acquired from these various fields and applied to new religious experiences, 
texts, and engagements made possible by new media. This view has been acknowledged 
by recent scholars and has naturally ‘given rise to new methods of investigation in order 
to carefully observe and analyse the religious practices and meanings’ of online 
religion445 and to allow the meaningful ‘exploration of the speculated relationship 
between the Internet and an emerging new religious consciousness’.446 
The methodology of this study—a selection made in close connection with the 
study’s analytical framework—is situated within the contemporary ‘wave’ of research 
paradigms in digital media and religion studies, as first proposed by Hojsgaard and 
Warburg447 and elaborated upon by Campbell and Altenhofen.448 The phenomenological 
bases of previous studies and methodologies resulted in critically important descriptive 
treatments of the varied presences and purposes of online content of religion and their 
categories. However, a methodology for interpreting online content in dialogue with, for 
example, an analytical framework that addresses social phenomena (such as the assertive 
spread of Salafī ideologies in the post-9/11 world and, especially, in the post-Arab Spring 
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Muslim milieu) is now more vital. Applying a similar methodological approach, 
Gaffney’s 1994 analysis of sermons in Egypt sought out political messaging. Gaffney’s 
approach represents political textual analyses, demonstrating, as Gaffney concludes, that 
Friday sermons in Egypt are a platform for seeking or establishing religious (as well as) 
political authority.449 
The methodology adapted for this thesis builds on the phenomenological approach 
to studying online texts, as pursued by Bunt in his early450 and later works.451 Here it is 
utilized to locate the critical loci of contestations in which Salafīs censure Ṣūfī practices. 
However, the analytical methodology used to interpret the texts through the framework of 
religious authority is categorized as qualitative analysis: ‘the nonnumerical examination 
and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings 
and patterns of relationships’.452 It seeks to locate and interpret qualitative data in the 
form of nomenclatures and displays of argument found in online texts associated with 
quietist or purist Salafīs, a discourse that exemplifies the ‘transformative potential for 
religions’ of the digital form as a ‘proselytizing tool’.453 The methodological approach, to 
an important extent, may be described as pursuing a ‘hermeneutic’ approach to ‘data 
extraction and interpretation’.454 Thus, the nomenclatures and the strategies of 
contestations, once extracted and collected, are analysed according to ideological textual 
analysis, which connects language and arguments in online Salafī texts to transcendent 
claims of religious authority; in turn, this relates to a broader and highly significant public 
discourse, as previously described. The objective of the qualitative analysis is to ‘identity, 
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interpret, describe and analyse the specific ideas and the specific ideological content’455 in 
the following areas: 
• Modes of thought as expressed in language use 
• Propagated messages designed to influence modes of thought 
• Ongoing public debates or ideational struggles, which may be referred to as 
‘culture wars’, with regard to ‘whose ideas are “the best”, and whose language use 
and world-view shall prevail’.456 
This methodological approach is that advocated by Campbell and other scholars in 
conducting digital media and religion studies.457 It involves textual analysis, which is 
applicable in both the social sciences and digital media studies. The objective is to 
examine the use of language in online content that evokes signs or ‘nodes’ of power or 
authority.458 One of the advantageous aspects of qualitative research is that it is premised 
on the principle that ‘knowledge is constructed by people in an ongoing fashion as they 
engage in and make meaning of an activity, experience, or phenomenon’.459 A consistent 
feature of digital media is, in fact, the ‘ongoing’ development of the media’s new 
applications and technologies. 
The methodology takes into consideration religious studies processes (namely, 
demonstrating the performance or exertion of religious authority) and media studies (that 
is, analysing media texts placed in expanding, and perhaps unmanageable, new spaces and 
forms). The positioning of a qualitative methodology in close proximity to an analytic 
framework is done for the purpose of ‘linking theory and analysis’, as Babbie describes 
it.460 In other words, while qualitative analyses may be ‘undertaken for purely descriptive 
purposes’, in this study the analyses are coupled with ‘the search for explanatory 
                                               
455 Mats Lindberg, ‘Qualitative Analysis of Ideas and Ideological Content’, in Analyzing Text and 
Discourse, ed. Kristina Breus and Goran Bergstrom (London: Sage Publications, 2017), at 88 
456 Ibid.  
457 Campbell and Altenhofen. 
458 Lawrence, ‘Allah on-Line’, at 237–38. In his descriptions of the nodes of authority, Lawrence states 
that one should consider that the nodes may be subject to debates and refinement.  
459 Sharan B. Merriam and Elizabeth J. Tisdell, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and 
Implementation (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), at 23. 
460 Babbie, at 391. 
  134 
patterns’.461 The analysis of language found in Salafist material, therefore, is a relevant 
part of the methodology; as, among the seminal purposes of language, the expression and 
performance of religion are based on the grouping of ‘verbal performativity’ of religious 
discourse with ‘power’.462 
A connection may be observed between our methodology and ‘discourse 
analysis’: the latter has become a broad rubric for research methods (including 
qualitative) that originated in linguistics, semiotics, and other fields.463 For this study, 
however, the analysis of online discourses is better described as ‘primarily a qualitative 
method of “reading” texts, conversations and documents which explores the connections 
between language, communication, knowledge, power and social practices’.464 In sum, the 
textual analyses of this study interpret key terminologies and arguments as a performance 
of religion authority. 
The analysis of online discourses undertaken here seeks to address the two 
primary research questions described in the introductory chapter: 1) identify, collate, and 
examine the key points of Salafī–Ṣūfī dispute as they appear in online intra-religious 
contestations in the contemporary Islamic intellectual economy (an understudied area of 
research); and 2) through a case-study approach, interpret the meanings of language and 
arguments (discursive actions465) of significant Salafī online texts that speak to claims of 
religious authority. Of particular interest is the analysis of the meanings of the texts that 
pass judgment on practices and beliefs of ‘other’ Muslims and adjudicate whether or not 
they are properly within the fold of the Islamic canon. These raise sensitive and 
consequential questions of orthodoxy, orthopraxy, heterodoxy and heretical syncretic 
practices that purportedly have been introduced into Islam after the generations of the 
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pious ancestors of historical Islam, and include Salafī evaluations of Sufism and certain 
practices thereof, with the aim of determining whether they are within or outside the 
bounds of Islamic orthodoxy. The textual analysis seeks out terminologies and arguments 
that strongly suggest the evocation of authority, with emphasis on the usage of juridical–
ethical language as one of the key nodes of religious authority, as Lawrence proffers466 
and that to a certain degree evokes Weber’s dissection of authority, albeit framed in terms 
of the Islamic experience: 
• Scriptural Authority 
• Charismatic Authority 
• Juridical Authority 
Respectively, the nodes listed above refer to the Qur’ān (the Muslim scripture); 
the Ḥadīth (sayings and normative practices of the Prophet Muḥammad); and the rulings 
and laws that guide Muslims in their lives—laws that are, it is asserted, derived from the 
preceding sources. But, as Lawrence points out, while these are authentic nodes of 
authority within Islam, and few Muslims, if any, would deny their importance as 
authoritative guides, each node is contested to various extents. Lawrence expands on 
these differences, but, for our purposes here, these nodes of authority are legitimate 
sources of authority in Islam and provide a useful framework. It is important to note that 
the usage of the word ‘node’ offers a flexible understanding of authority, since each of 
these nodes (not ‘sources’ or ‘principles’) does not exist fully separate from the others. An 
argument can be made that the nodes are, in fact, branches of the same tree that shows 
itself in the Salafī texts described and analysed in this thesis. 
The relationship between law and religion is an expansive topic. Briefly, the use of 
juridical language in digital space (opposed to the space of, for example, a nation-state) is 
not regulated in any formal, state-enforceable or traditional, institutional or societal-
enforceable way. However, the moral connection between law and human behaviour 
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remains important for consumers of religious content online. At a conceptual level, moral 
pressure is rooted in the fact that law and religion ‘function normatively’ and that ‘[l]aw is 
one location for thinking and enforcing duty and obligation’.467 As such, the space in 
which normative or, more importantly, neo-normative senses of duty, obligation, and 
orthodoxy exist has expanded dramatically because of digital media, posing a challenge to 
pre-digital, print-based conceptions of authority in Islam. In this new space, ‘the appeal to 
religious law becomes ever more urgent, and hence there is a sort of bidding war in which 
competing authorities attempt to out-do each other in terms of the strictness of their 
interpretation of legal norms’.468 It is likely in the case in Salafism that ‘inflationary 
expansion of claims to purity and strictness [have] a compulsory upward trajectory’.469  
The focus on juridical, creedal, and moral language in Salafī texts, therefore, emphasizes 
the importance of interpreting the nomenclature as a performance of authority in a new 
‘relational perspective’.470 The observations of the ‘newness’ in media studies are 
convincing that digital media is more than an extension of previous media forms. 
Scholarship has shown that new media, in fact, do represent a significant and innovative 
space for religious messaging (as shown in the previous section). “For religious 
communities, the arrival of electronic media can have dramatic implications for textual 
authority and oral argumentation.471 Moreover, as it pertains to this particular study, 
‘[f]ace-to-face transmission of texts can give way to the emergence of virtual audiences 
who consume media without meeting those who produce the content’.472 
In terms of the changing profile of authority in the digital era, digital media, as 
shown previously, provide a platform for ideologues and ‘for opinion leaders to construct 
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asymmetrical communication practices with social networks: a competitive market place 
of religious ideas where anyone can claim religious knowledge and authority, issue 
religious rulings, and give advice’.473 The rise and prevalence of the e-fatwa phenomenon, 
for example—online religious rulings or verdicts pronounced with the language of Islamic 
sacred law—is well established.474 Thus, the language of the juridical node of authority 
plays a significant role in exerting moral pressure, and is becoming an increasingly 
important, yet under-attended, topic for research.  
As stated above, the appearance of juridical–ethical nomenclatures in the Salafī 
texts are of primary importance here, since 1) they represent both a valid node of 
authority and a product of the first two nodes of Islamic authority; 2) they potentially 
wield a high degree of moral pressure on observant Muslims audiences; and 3) they are 
prevalent in Salafī discourse. As a result, juridical–ethical nomenclatures represent a rich 
vein of qualitative ‘data’ consisting of language that has ‘a qualitative meaning co-shaped 
by complex forces located not only in the technological context … but also in the broader 
social settings wherein information is distributed and aims to have some impact’.475 In 
other words, the content under examination can be best understood more completely in 
the ‘broader social’ setting, as Salafī contestations and points of views—in competition 
with co-existing views of Islam—are among the most influential and consequential 
discourses in contemporary Muslim milieus, if not in all of religion today. 
Before introducing the case studies and the nomenclature and arguments of Salafī 
discourses, it should be stated that research in online and/or digital content has attracted 
approaches that, in one aspect, relate to the degree to which researchers interact with 
online communities or individuals. These approaches include interviews with online 
content providers and with users of forums or other online communities, focus groups, 
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and online surveys. In contrast, this study is organized around an observational, non-
interactive approach, one that may be categorized as Internet research, referring 
specifically to the ‘Internet as an object of research’—that is, its content—as opposed to 
the Internet as a tool for ‘innovative methodological practices’.476 The ‘texts’ of online 
content are the focus here. As such, interviews, surveys, interactions in forums, and 
imbedded ethnographic techniques are not appropriate for the analytical framework these 
texts speak to in this study. It also seems counterintuitive to attempt a content analysis, in 
which coding and statistical computations are utilized, for this study seeks language usage 
informed by ideology, indicating an active interpretative framework; in contrast, classical 
content analysis is a process of ‘counting’ textual material because it is assumed that ‘the 
fact that there is more or less of something in texts, [is an indication] of something outside 
of the texts’.477 
As regards the word ‘ideology’, it should be noted that this term is vulnerable to 
misinterpretation. In popular discourse, ‘ideology’ may carry a derogatory connotation, in 
that it may signify the view or ideas of ‘others’ who are not in possession of ‘truth’.478 
Hence, this use of the term implies a belittlement of those who are associated with a given 
ideology. In this study, ‘ideology’ follows, with modification, van Dijk’s definition: 
namely, ‘general systems of basic ideas shared by members of a social group, ideas that 
will influence their interpretation of social events and situations and control their 
discourse and other social practices as group members’.479 The modification of ‘ideology’ 
as used herein expands on the ‘interpretative’ function to include scriptural exegeses: that 
is, the prism through which thought-leaders of Salafism employ passages from scriptural 
sources to affirm their ideas, inform their discourses, and censure others with charges of 
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heterodoxy. In addition, the term ‘member’ does not apply in this study, since formal 
membership of Salafism (or Islam itself) would be problematic to defend. The 
methodological approach of the thesis seeks simply to ‘identify and describe the ideas and 
the ideological content irrespective of their truth or falsity’.480 
With regard to Salafism per se, the process of the ‘ideologization’ of Salafism 
began, according to Lauzière, in the 1970s, when scholars and thinkers ‘recast purist 
Salafism as a totalizing system … ’.481 Salafism, in other words, moved from a doctrinal 
or epistemological approach to the interpretation of Islam’s scriptural sources to ‘a 
worldview that encompassed the whole of existence, from knowledge to practice, from 
morality to etiquette, and even from religion to politics. Salafism was now a total 
ideology.’482 From the purchase of this ideology, then, Salafism and its advocates engaged 
in its purification-of-Islam project, which almost by necessity employs the casting of 
‘religious warnings and accusations’ against other Muslims whose views are judged an 
anathema to an imagined pure Islam. The vocabulary of such warnings and accusations 
are directly appropriated from the juridical–ethical vocabulary of Islamic sacred law and 
creedal thought, as expanded upon below.483 
The case studies examined here are prominent Salafī digital spaces: namely, the 
digital presence of Salafi Publications, which includes a rich corpus of texts in the form 
of podcasts (an expanding mode in digital space, as discussed in the next section) 
produced and posted by the Salafi Sounds website, the main body of content under 
review; a Twitter account that serves primarily as a feeder with links to Salafī Sounds; 
and a website with hundreds of articles. Information about the content sites will be 
expanded upon in the next chapter.  
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5.2 Salafi Sounds Case Study and Approach 
Podcasts posted in 2017 on the Salafi Sounds website made up the primary corpus of texts 
examined. These comprise 25 podcasts, varying in length from 25 minutes to more than 
one hour. Some podcasts posted before 2017 were also selected because the content was 
highly indicative of the loci of contestations between Salafism and Sufism. In addition, 
certain podcasts from 2017 were excluded because they addressed issues that were not 
related to the chief arguments of the study, such as podcasts on marriage counselling, 
health and diet, and the like. They were nonetheless reviewed to ensure that no pertinent 
content was embedded in the course of the podcast. 
Each podcast was listened to in its entirety, from the opening benediction to the 
concluding prayer, both of which were in Arabic. The language of the actual lectures and 
sermons was English. Each podcast required frequent stops and periods of rewinding, and 
extensive notetaking, to document the language usage and the arguments the speakers 
made in the course of their presentations. The relevant nomenclature and arguments were 
extracted, contextualized, and documented. The findings, which are parsed and presented 
in the following chapter, found two major areas of Salafī contestations. 
The first major area comprised arguments or loci of disputation that were 
anticipated in Salafī texts concerned with Sufism: 1) celebrations of the birthday of the 
Prophet Muḥammad; 2) grave visitation; and 3) the seeking of intercession. What was 
unanticipated were the frequent vituperations made toward creedal schools of thought 
such as the Asharite school of thought, as presented below. 
 The second major area consisted of distinct terminologies that evoked a node of 
authority: namely, juridical–ethical nomenclature. These terminologies are further divided 
into 1) terminologies related to the categories of actions addressed in Islamic sacred law, 
in terms of their degrees of permissibility or proscription; and 2) terminologies related to 
‘proper’ and ‘deviant’ creedal schools of thought, as described below. 
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5.2.1 Category One: Loci of Disputation 
To address RQ1, the practices of Sufism that are most commonly reproached by the texts 
in the case studies were elucidated. 
 
5.2.1.1 Celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad’s Birthday 
The word Mawlid is an Arabic noun that may refer to both the time or place of one’s 
birth.484 Its bare linguistic meaning is disassociated from any doctrine or ritual practice, 
since someone’s birthdate has no ideological value per se. However, Mawlid assumes a 
more specific meaning in the context of Islam that has historically drawn both favour and 
criticism in Muslim circles—more vehement criticism in modern times from proponents 
of Wahhabism and Salafism.485 This connotation refers to the practice, quite common in 
the Muslim world, of celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad as an act of 
veneration and piety. It is said that the Prophet was born on Monday, the 12th day of 
Rabīʿ al-Awwal, the third month of the Muslim lunar calendar (there is some 
disagreement on the actual date, though the month is generally agreed upon).486 The 
significance of Mawlid lies in the fact that it is vested with ritualistic meaning, for it 
represents an important path to sacred knowledge that is said to begin with reverence and 
love of the Prophet Muḥammad, which, often, is an obligation of members of Ṣūfī orders 
in Islam or highly recommended, for the Prophet is ‘primarily the intercessor at 
Doomsday; as the only prophet, he will intercede for his community, as the Koran has 
promised’.487 
                                               
484 Nico Kaptein, ‘Mawlid’, in P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition 
(Leiden: Brill Online, 2012). Accessed at: 
http://dx.doi.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0716 
485 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the 
Modern World (London: Routledge, 2014), at 22–24.  
486 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1975), at 216. 
487 Ibid., at 217. 
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Critics of the celebration, however, claim that the practice is a heretical innovation 
or bidʿa,488 as the Prophet Muḥammad himself did not institute the practice of celebrating 
his birthday. His immediate followers, and the generation that followed them, did not 
institute it either, the argument continues. It is a practice that represents a syncretic 
insertion of a foreign rite into Islam. Katz, however, says that the origins of the Mawlid 
cannot be narrowed to one historical moment. ‘The origins of the mawlid can be traced, 
not to the single innovative act of some identifiable authority, but to the slow coalescence 
of a constellation of devotional narratives and practices that eventually converged to form 
a single, highly flexible, and attractive form of ritual action.’489 The debates about 
celebrating the Mawlid have premodern roots, and those in the past who issued edicts or 
engaged in public debates for or against the celebration were largely learned people or 
scholars who had the credentials of religious authority, as historical treatises on the 
subject show.490 
 
5.2.1.2 The Ritual of Visiting Graves (Zirāyatu’l-Qubūr) 
Islamic law permits and even encourages Muslims to visit graves for the purpose of being 
reminded of their own mortality and to pray on behalf of the loved ones interred.491 
However, the matter becomes a point of reproach, as Salafīs claim, when visiting graves 
or shrines is viewed as a rite of worship or even pilgrimage, or is undertaken for the 
purpose of tabarruk: that is, seeking blessing for being in the presence of a saint in his or 
                                               
488 Jonas Svensson, ‘Itz Bidah Bro!!!!! GT Me??–Youtube Mawlid and Voices of Praise and Blame’, 
Muslims and the New Information and Communication Technologies (Springer, 2013), 89–111, at 89–
91. This study primarily examines the reactions to the Mawlid among viewers as posted on YouTube 
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489 Marion Holmes Katz, The Birth of the Prophet Muhammad: Devotional Piety in Sunni Islam 
(London: Routledge, 2007), at 208. 
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Development in the Muslim West until the 10th/16th Century (Leiden: Brill, 1993).  
491 Ondredj Beranek and Pavel Tupek, ‘From Visiting Graves to Their Destruction’, Crown Papers 
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her grave. The source of contention is that Salafīs consider that seeking blessings from 
anyone other than God is tantamount to idolatry. 
 
5.2.1.3 Seeking Intercession (Tawassul) and Seeking Aid (Istighātha) 
These practices are often associated with the preceding locus of dispute, although they 
may be performed anywhere. They are unambiguously declared to be acts of idolatry 
(shirk) or outright disbelief (kufr) by Salafī ideology (both terms are further defined 
below). Essentially, they represent ‘the act of supplicating’ to God through the 
intermediary or ‘intercessionary powers’ of the Prophet Muḥammad or a saint.492 Though 
they are similar in nature, tawassul and istighātha differ in that the former is a general 
term that refers to the practice of ‘seeking closeness to God by petitioning a deceased 
pious person’, while the latter implies ‘asking those in the grave for assistance’ for a 
specific need. For Salafists, both practices are ‘infested’ with heretical meaning and 
idolatry.493 Such practices are sometimes alluded to by way of the neutral descriptive 
word tawassul, but more frequently by the pejorative use of the words ‘grave 
worshippers’ and Qubūriyya, the Arabic term for those who are accused of ‘worship 
graves’, as it is commonly stated. The most common form of Tawassul is praying to God, 
but through the auspices or intercession, that is, the ‘intermediation of saints or the 
Prophet Muḥammad’.494 This is usually performed at the gravesite of the intermediary, 
owing to the belief that physical proximity adds spiritual value to such prayers. These 
gravesites can be found in the zāwiyas (lodges) of Ṣūfī orders: that is, the places of 
gathering for the purpose of performing litanies (awrād) of remembrance (adhkār) and 
religious practices such as the Mawlid and tawassul. However, the presence of graves in 
mosques draws ire in Salafī teachings, and, placing online discourse in the context of 
                                               
492 Zajac, 10. 
493 Hamid, Sufi, Salafis, and Islamists, at 55. 
494 Richard J McGregor, ‘Grave visitation/worship’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition, edited 
by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson (Leiden: Brill Online). 
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recent historical momentum, it is worth considering that ‘after the Arab Spring, [the 
words] became more violent. The earlier war of words, both written and spoken, was 
transformed into a real one, during which many Ṣūfī zawiyas were destroyed’.495 
 
5.2.2 Category Two: The Recurring Use of Juridical–Ethical Terminologies 
Two grouping of texts and their supporting terminologies attempt to exert the frame of 
authority. They are the focus of analysis. While they are related to one another, if not, 
arguably, inseparable, nevertheless they are divided here for the sake of further parsing. 
They are 1) the ‘moral–legal’ terminologies of the ‘five norms’496 of Islamic sacred law 
(two of which are censuring), as well as terminologies that position an act or belief within 
or without the bounds of Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy—creedal terms and phrases 
associated with ʿaqīda (the codification of essential beliefs and creeds of Islam); and 2) 
the communal terminologies that seek to claim authority over the orthodoxy question or 
the contest over what is the proper manhaj of Islam, as discussed previously. 
 
5.2.2.1 Juridical-based Terminologies 
These can be divided into ḥarām or ‘prohibited’—that is, a forbidden act considered 
sinful, and for which the perpetrator would be ultimately answerable to God and/or 
society—and makrūh or ‘reprehensible’,497 indicating an act to be disliked but which is 
not necessarily sinful. The creedal terminologies fall into the following groups: 
Bidʿa or ‘heretical innovation’:498 a practice accused of being introduced into 
Muslim devotional life without proof in scripture or precedent, such as a syncretic 
custom derived from another faith and appropriated by Muslims. 
                                               
495 Zajac, 6. 
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497 ‘Makruh’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman et al. (Brill Online, 2012). 
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Shirk or ‘polytheism’ or idolatry:499 a deed that is not only sinful but a violation of 
an inviolable tenet of the religion: namely, an unalloyed belief in the oneness of 
God; thus, as it is viewed, it is problematic to venerate the Prophet Muḥammad to a 
degree that is due only to God and not man, not even the Prophet of God. 
Kufr or disbelief:500 the most serious accusation a Muslim can level against 
another Muslim, for it suggests that the person is no longer within the theological 
confines of the religion or part of the ummah, the larger community of the faithful. 
 
These terms appear in Arabic (transliterated, a phonetic rendition of the Arabic 
into English). They are often translated as well. Although there are several ways in which 
to translate these words, for the most part, they are easily recognizable. A speaker 
declaring an act to be a ‘deviant innovation’ is, in fact, referring to bidʿa. Other terms 
appear that imply or point to a category of conduct. 
The application of these terms seems simple enough on the surface. However, they 
are words packed with legal implications and historical meaning and, as such, are 
expected, as it were, to include a stringent process whereby rulings are derived (ijtihād). 
This traditionally required a thorough understanding of Islamic law (fiqh) and the legal 
theory of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), which is ‘concerned with the sources of the law and 
the methodology for extrapolating rules from revelation’.501 A scholar in law, as defined 
in classical Islamic intellectual history, must master ‘a bundle of disciplines (or literary 
genres) which constitute the academic articulation of Islam’.502 It was these scholars 
(ʿulamā’’) who had the gravitas to issue edicts and debate them, for ‘they are regarded as 
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the guardians, transmitters and interpreters of religious knowledge, of Islamic doctrine 
and law’.503 
Other words commonly used in the podcasts mentioned without a stated Arabic 
equivalent include: deviation, evil, dark forces, and despicable, as will be presented in the 
next chapter. 
 
5.2.2.2 Terminologies of Communal Orthodoxy 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa is a phrase commonly used in modern Muslim parlance, and it 
frequently appears in the podcasts, although its roots go deep into Islamic intellectual 
history. The phrase translates as ‘People of the Way [of the Prophet Muḥammad] and the 
community [of believers]’. This suggests a descriptor of delineation between those who 
follow the normative behaviour of the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions and early 
salaf, as it is understood by those employing the phrase, versus those who have fallen 
outside this community. It may be applied as a pretext to declare individuals or groups as 
outside this designation, which may either permit or incite harmful reactions. 
Manhaj refers to the proper methodology for deriving guidance and rulings from 
sacred texts, and, for Salafism, it relates to a strict interpretation of the sacred past—that 
is, the known acts and intentions of the Prophetic period and generations of al-Salaf al-
Ṣāliḥ. As such, it speaks to orthodoxy and orthopraxy and thus otherizes what is deemed 
heretical, blasphemous, and impious. The usage of manhaj in the podcasts arguably aims 
to convince listeners that Salafism possesses the original and valid methodology that has 
the capacity of restoring ‘real’ Islam, as it has been suggested.504   
Daʿwa literally means ‘the call’. In a derived and contextual sense, it is commonly 
used in Salafī discourse to refer to the need to call Muslims (mainly) to return to the 
proper path or way of Islam, as originally revealed and lived by in the formative 
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generations of Islam. Embedded in the use of this term is the claim that, after the 
generations of the pious ancestors, impure beliefs and practices were inserted into Islam. 
Thus, daʿwa is an important term of Salafī discourse that seeks to reclaim authority in 
determining (and calling people to) pure Islam. 
The significant terminologies in this study, as found in the texts under 
examination, are removed from their original or linguistic connotations and have acquired 
meanings that are associated with contemporary Salafī activism. In this context, the Salafī 
methodology is described as ‘scriptural literalism and revolves around a set of binary 
opposites: tawhid (oneness of God) and opposition shirk (all forms of divine association-
ism)’505 Another binary is cleaving to what is considered the normative practice of Islam 
(preserved by Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa) as envisaged by the early pious generations 
(al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ) or indulging in bidʿa (heretical innovation). Implicit in the daʿwa is a 
call to take restorative measures that lead to true Islam, which includes the rejection of 
having loyalty to one of the four canonical schools of Islamic law, which developed after 
al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ.506 
  About the researcher: In order to position the researcher in terms of this study, 
he has had extensive extra-institutional experience in Islamic studies, mainly acquired 
through translation projects. He has translated or has been part of team efforts to translate 
texts from such influential figures as Muḥammad Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), 
who historically has been closely associated with Sufism, as well as Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya (1292–1352), who is one of the most famed students of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–
1328), the principal inspiration of modern Salafism. Al-Jawziyya is also claimed as an 
inspiration to Salafism and, in fact, is mentioned in the Salafī texts presented in this study. 
The researcher has a postgraduate degree (MS) in journalism and media, and he has 
worked in the fields professionally as well academically for decades. He believes his 
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experiences in media and in translation work of Islamic texts complement one another. He 
was born in Chicago of immigrant parents and was raised in the Chicago area. He trusts 
that he maintains critical distance with the subjects of this study. After teaching at the 
university in the United States, he has been teaching at Northwestern University in Qatar 
for almost 11 years, essentially immersing himself in a critical region of the Muslim 
world. He teaches courses in ‘Media and Religion’ and ‘Islam, America, and Media 
Narratives’, as well journalism classes.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DATA COLLECTION: SALAFĪ DIGITAL CONTENT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data collection, synopses, and individual analyses of online 
content, addressing the research questions and framework of this study. It is organized 
according to the multi-platform content production of UK-based Salafi Publications, a 
significant producer of purist ideological Salafī content.507 The case studies presented are 
from a variety of forms of digital content (primarily podcasts, followed by articles posted 
on a website, an e-book, and social media posts that serve primarily as ‘feeders’ to content 
(podcasts and articles). The expansions of Salafī content and platforms represent what 
Bunt has observed as an increasing use of digital media for propagation and community 
building. For some Salafī-influenced authors of the past, there was a conscious awareness 
to avoid using the words ‘Salafism’ or ‘Wahhabism’ as a point of identity. Rather, they 
insist that their views represent Islam itself, the terms were to be avoided.508 In the UK, 
organizations associated with Salafism would post content without a Salafī identifier. 509 
However, that has changed in this regard. The current study, the emphasis and 
focus is on Salafi Sounds, a platform of Salafi Publications that represents a wider trend 
of religion podcasting, which expands the notion of digital mobility from screen-based to 
auditory content, as discussed below. In addition, an e-book is briefly examined to 
emphasize the cross-platform consistency of the Salafī contestations, themes, and 
vocabulary representing loci of disagreement and the strategies that Salafī proponents 
mobilize in their contestations with Sufism in digital space. 
 
                                               
507 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists, at 46, 61. 
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509 Bunt, ‘From Mosque to YouTube: UK Muslims Go Online’, in Postcolonial Media Culture in 
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6.2 Salafi Publications Case Study 
This study selected Salafi Sounds, an online project of Salafi Publications, for the 
following reasons: 1) the value of institutional, self-described Salafism and its content 
production, as opposed to individuals claimed to be Salafi thought leaders; 2) background 
and history of the founding organization; and 3) the strategic decision of the organization 
to pursue a growing trend in digital production, namely, podcasts.   
 In pursuing the substrate ideology of Salafism in digital space, it is consistent with 
the methodology of qualitative ideological textual analysis to focus on the texts 
themselves rather than high profile individuals who are purported to represent 
contemporary Salafism. Textual analysis draws appropriate attention to the promulgation 
of ideological arguments with a focus on texts in new digital media spaces. The ‘unit of 
analysis’510 is represented by textual discourses, that is, documents that have been 
accessed in this study and kept for permanent recording. The choice of institutional 
content is of greater value to this study than individual Salafists, who are not invulnerable 
to shifts in ideology and advocacy, as well as controversy. Bilal Philips, for example, is a 
well-known personality and is considered among the ‘representatives’ of contemporary 
Salafism in the English language,511 but whose positions have become part of an intra-
Salafi scrutiny and, moreover, for controversial views that ostensibly have made him 
banned in several countries.512 His part in an internal Salafi dispute adds little value to a 
large study of Salafism as an ideology and its growing presence in digital space. 
 Also, it is helpful to consider Salafists like Umar Lee, an American convert to 
Islam and once a vocal advocate of Salafism in America, but who underwent a period of 
disillusionment with Salafism and wrote a self-published memoir and his critique of 
                                               
510 Altheide, David L., and Christopher J. Schneider. Qualitative media analysis (London: Sage 
Publications, 2013), at 39. 
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Salafism in America.513 While analyses of Lee and his personal experience with Salafism 
in America, as well Phillips and his shifting positions over the decades, have their place in 
ethnographic academic papers on Salafism’s personalities in the West, however they 
contribute less substantial textual evidence of Salafism’s substrate ideology mediatised in 
digital space. A such, in the view of this research, it is more analytically valuable to give 
preference to texts that are produced by an organization that describes itself and its 
content as Salafī, and whose content have greater potential to shine light on ideology over 
personality, that is, individuals who have been celebrified as so-called ‘super-Salafis’. 514 
While well-known individuals, such as Phillips, Naik, and Lee, would be interesting to 
study; however, examination of their public performances and publications would need to 
be reframed and become the focus of an academic paper, rather than a dissertation. 
Also, the study of texts presented with emerging media technologies pertains to 
the larger thesis of this study, which seeks to contribute to the study of Islam in digital 
space and, more broadly, add to the growing corpus of academic literature in the field 
media and religion studies. Institutional Salafism, particularly of an organization that has 
consistently produced purist Salafist texts for decades and now has decidedly focused on 
podcasts lends itself to seminal analytical analyses of Salafism on a highly-mediated 
scale. 
 As for background information, Salafi Publications has been a consistent voice of 
purist Salafism in the UK and other English-speaking Muslim communities for more than 
two decades. Though it started as a producer of print books and booklets, Salafi 
Publications now ‘comprises a bookstore, publishing house, primary and secondary 
schools (both fee-paying), and two mosques in Birmingham’, and has affiliations with 
centres throughout England.515 However, it has also actively embraced digital platforms 
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as an extension of its daʿwa (or proselytizing mission). Its online presences thus include 
Salafi Sounds, the Salafi Publications website (currently static, as discussed below), the 
website AbuKhadeejah.com,516 electronic and downloadable books, and social media. 
 Since 1995, the website Salafipublications.com has posted content in the form of 
articles by various Salafī scholars, some of whom have also produced content posted on 
Salafi Sounds. Salafipublications.com also contains excerpted translations from books and 
lectures of Salafī scholars of the Middle East and south-east Asia,517 thus providing 
content originally produced in Arabic and other languages of Muslim-majority countries. 
However, the website’s direction changed in the post-9/11 age. In addition to older 
content explaining or defending purist Salafī ideas, the website has become engaged in 
confronting extremist violence. The various articles of its previous mission have not been 
updated in the past nine years, as the website’s mission has been altered, and the website’s 
list of ‘50 latest additions’—that is, the latest articles posted—shows that only one article 
was posted in all of 2018 (May 31), and none since.518 The original objective of the 
website, as a repository of texts advocating Salafī ideals, has seemingly been abandoned 
as it pertains to maintaining the site with new material, and it has transitioned to focus on 
the condemnation of transnational jihadi organizations, most notably Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
The anti-violence stand of the Salafi Publications website has essentially become the main 
purpose of the site. The top bar of the website’s home page contains a link that takes the 
visitor to a website dedicated to anti-jihadi groups: Islamagainstextremism.com (a Salafi 
Publications product: see Figure 1), which contains several downloadable publications 
that condemn jihadi violence, terrorism, and advocacy—content which essentially rebukes 
extremist organizations and individuals reported to be associated with Salafī proponents 
and ideologies in the UK.519 
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The repurposed mission of the site may serve also to distance Salafi Publications 
from extremist groups and individuals. While Salafi Publications has received negative 
coverage in the news media when known extremists apparently attended conferences 
organized by Salafi Publications,520 purist Salafīs, such as the leaders of Salafi 
Publications, have long stood in opposition to jihādī groups and individual extremists, 
which they consider to be an anathema to Islam and the Salafī ideology and methodology 
and to operate in counter-distinction to Islamic principles and beliefs. While the 
transformed bearing of the Salafi Publications website can be viewed from a strategic 
point of view, it is consistent with purist Salafism ideology, which reproaches not only 
violent groups but any participation in the political arena of any kind—peaceful or 
violent—for they ‘view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy’.521 As such, the 
website’s altered aim is not within the purview of this study, which focuses more on 
Salafī contestations with Sufism and the ideological implications of the contestations. 
However, it is important to mention the anti-extremist positions of Salafi Publications’ 
leadership because, by taking those positions, it preserves the ‘ideological’ positions of 
purist Salafism unencumbered by accusations of violence and thus is free from the 
pressure to refute claims of associating purist Salafī thought with violent groups. The 
original mission of Salafipublications.com—as an advocate of Salafī purist ideology—has 
been assumed by AbuKhadeejah.com, a newer Salafi Publications online source. 
The analysis of the content of this website focuses on the ideological substrate of 
purist Salafism, demonstrating a consistent reliance on common arguments, themes of 
contestation (vis-à-vis Sufism mainly), and vocabulary—all of which serve to promote the 
purist Salafī ideology, as presented and argued here. 
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6.3 Salafi Sounds 
The case study focuses on the Salafi Sounds website, which presents podcasts of lectures 
and sermons. It connects with the @SalafiPubs Twitter account, which serves mainly as a 
feeder to Salafi Sounds; that is, the overwhelming majority of tweets from this account 
contain links intended to send followers to the Salafi Sounds website (see appendix). 
When compared with the older model and entity of the Salafi Publications website, Salafi 
Sounds represents a trend in auditory content in digital space. It has recently received 
more input from the producers of the site than has the Salafi Publications website, as 
described later in this chapter. In fact, the @SalafiPubs Twitter account provides only one 
link in its Twitter identification column, namely, a link to Salafi Sounds. 
 
Figure 1. Screengrab of @SalafiPubs Twitter account  
Upon examination of the content selected through a purposive sampling method, 
as detailed below, important thematic arguments and terminologies emerge as strategies 
in Salafī online contestations and exclusivist truth-claims. To assist in presenting and 
analysing the texts, the content is further organized as follows: 1) detailed linear 
synopses and brief analyses of select podcasts that represent the larger trend in the 
online content of the website and in Salafī discourse, followed by summarized synopses 
of the remaining podcasts of interest, for the purposes of concision and the avoidance of 
unnecessary repetition; 2) the collection of data relating to key themes and terminologies 
that engage with the framework of the study and the research questions it pursues. 
A fuller and contextualized analysis of the themes and terminologies found in the 
texts of the case studies will be presented in the next chapter. This chapter attempts to 
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determine the main thematic claims of Salafism against Sufism, and it seeks to draw out 
related religious thoughts and Salafī assertions of its exclusivist claim to the pure form of 
Islam. These claims amount to severe creedal and juristic decrees regarding ‘other’ views 
and schools of thought within Islam, and delimit the boundaries of orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy in Islam. They are supported by the consistent evocation of key pre-modern 
phrases that have deep roots and hermeneutical resonance in Islamic intellectual history, 
but are essentially presented and interpreted in a manner that seeks to arbitrate in 
determining what is a valid part or practice of Islam (orthodoxy) and what are invalid 
creeds or syncretic practices (heterodoxy). The themes and nomenclature collected from 
the podcasts of formal lectures or sermons are presented as outlined below. 
First, detailed synopses are given of select podcasts that are broadly 
representative of the content of Salafi Sounds. They are presented in a linear or 
chronological manner. The detailed synopses are lengthy, to allow a faithful 
representation of each podcast. The purpose is to preserve the order and process of 
argument-making of a given speaker and to contextualize the themes and vocabulary on 
which the arguments rely. Thereafter, summarized synopses of other relevant podcasts 
are presented with the aim of achieving concision without sacrificing facts or literal 
transmission, or subtracting from the observable reliance on the themes and vocabulary of 
Salafī contestations. 
Thematic contestations are collated, that is, themes of dispute presented in the 
podcasts, such as Salafī contestations over the validity of celebrating the Mawlid. The 
texts that pertain to that dispute—that is, the loci of Salafī disputations. They are 
considered themes, since they regularly occur and their argumentations are spread 
throughout many of the podcasts. 
Key terminologies reference Salafī contestations that rely on nomenclatures that 
this study argues are vested with the significance of ‘authority’, such as juridical 
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authority, listed by Lawrence as a node of authority in Islam.522 These terms are 
essentially intended to cast formal aspersions at competing ideologies. For example, to 
claim that a certain practice (such as grave visitations) is an act of ‘shirk’ (idolatry) is a 
formidable assertion to make, for the charge of idolatry calls into question the very right 
of a person to call him- or herself a Muslim. The terminologies are found throughout the 
case studies. Thus, this study concentrates on the analytical value of these terms in 
accordance with their ‘ideological’ import as ‘established modes of thought residing in 
the language use’523 of purist Salafism. 
Salafi Sounds podcasts as a case study and emerging trend in digital media 
production: The voice is the oldest form of mediated transmission of information or 
storytelling, with oral transmissions of religious knowledge and scriptural texts being the 
main source of knowledge instruction at one time. In the pre-modern context, the direct 
voice sufficed in teaching, not requiring technology per se. In 1877, the voice itself was 
first subject to external mediation. Thomas Edison is credited with inventing the 
phonograph, which allowed the first replay-enabled recording of the human voice.524 It 
was the advent of ‘schizochronic’ sound, splitting the voice away from the time it was 
actually uttered.525 But, since then, the distribution of the human voice has expanded. 
With the help of contemporary media technologies in our highly media-inflected age, the 
distribution of the spoken voice is on the rise in the form of ‘podcasts’. Collectively, the 
rise of podcasts—in academic and popular circles—is representative of a non-visual 
digital disruption. Podcasting emerged as a digital product with ‘unexpected rapidity’ in 
2005 and has since then increased markedly in popularity.526  
                                               
522 Lawrence, ‘Allah on-Line’, at 237–39 
523 Lindberg, at 88. 
524 Andre Millard, America on Record: A History of Recorded Sound (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), at 26. 
525 Virginia Madsen and John Potts. ‘Voice-Cast: The Distribution of the Voice Via Podcasting’ 
(Cambridge, Massachussets: MIT Press, 2010), at 41. 
526 Madsen and Potts, at 35. 
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There are three reasons for the popularity, two of which relate to convenience, 
while the third takes into consideration an unprecedented expanded sphere of the voice. 
The two benefits related to convenience are time-shifting and mobility.527 One can listen 
to a podcast at any moment and anywhere, while, for example, ‘listening to scripture 
readings is possible while jogging or at work’.528 For scholars such as Madsen, podcasts 
represent not just a ‘new distribution of the voice’ but ‘a new and extended sphere for the 
performance of the essentially acousmatic voice’ [Madsen’s emphasis].529 Podcasts 
permit ‘voiceless bodies’ to transcend time and to transport their voices (including the 
content and authority they carry) into an ‘extended auditory space’.530 When listening to a 
podcast, listeners hear a voice connected to a body, a person, who in religious contexts 
represents an authority.531 
Within the institutional frameworks of academia and the media industry, the 
trends of digital media usage studies have largely centred on a ‘screen metric’: that is, 
measuring which screen is used more commonly by users of digital media: streaming 
television, laptops, tablets, smartphones, or wearables (such as the Apple Watch and 
Virtual Reality headsets).532 However, the emergence of podcasts represents an extension 
of the concept of mobility unbound to the screen metric of most digital productions. The 
media ‘experience’ is ‘secondary’; but not in the sense that visual engagement is 
considered more important. Rather it is secondary because it does not require a visual 
commitment, which tends to restrict media mobility and consumption.533 
                                               
527 Ibid., at 41. 
528 Heidi Campbell and Paul Teusner, ‘Internet and social networking’, in John C. Lyden and Eric 
Michael Mazur (eds), The Routledge Companion to Religion and Popular Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2015), at 164. 
529 Madsen and Potts, at 33. 
530 Ibid. Among the first usages of podcasts for formal religious purposes are purported to be those 
produced by GodCast Network. 
531 Ibid. 
532 The longitudinal study of media usage in the Middle East, conducted by Northwestern University in 
Qatar for several years, monitors ‘media use patterns’ (including screen technologies) for accessing 
news and entertainment in the region. It also surveys people living in the region on the matters of 
censorship, media trust, and media freedom. Accessed at: http://mideastmedia.org/. 
533 Based on a conversation with Prof. John Pavlik of Rutgers University (New Jersey, USA), who is a 
well-known researcher of new media. John Pavlik, interview by Ibrahim Abusharif, 26 July 2018. 
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The growth of sound as a tool of Islamic entertainment and teachings (including 
daʿwa, proselytizing) has attracted academic attention in recent years. This area of study, 
often referred to as ‘Islamic sonic practices’, traces its roots to the oral transmission of the 
Qur’ān in the Prophetic period, and, in recent iterations, the studies examine the use of 
loudspeakers in mosques and, at present, the digital transmission of sound. The trend 
towards transcending the limits of a text-based paradigm to provide a ‘sensorial 
experience’ is an important development,534 particularly now in digital space. 
Podcasts are now among the forms in communicated ‘Islamic ideas of the 
sacred’.535 In a ‘competitive internet knowledge economy’ the availability of multimedia 
products such as podcasts represents a ‘marketing strategy, as well as a contemporary 
approach to religious propagation’.536   
According to Hamid, online Muslim environments have appropriated post-9/11 
trends in technology to offer ‘structured educational courses, faith-sensitive services, 
multimedia tools, CDs, DVDs, MP3s and podcasts’537; these digital media have become 
the ‘most popular means of accessing religious information, and pre-recorded or live 
programmes can now be broadcast from community radio stations or widely viewed on 
satellite stations and watched or listened to on their corresponding websites’.538 
As a growing digital phenomenon, the auditory content in the case study below 
represents the most recent significant product of Salafi Publications (in the form of Salafi 
Sounds), thus expanding the multi-modal approach to digital proselytization: after written 
texts, now a rich corpus of podcasts of lectures and Friday sermons. 
 
                                               
534 Jeanette S. Jouili and Annelies Moors. ‘Introduction: Islamic Sounds and the Politics of Listening’, 
Anthropological Quarterly 87, no. 4 (2014): 980. 
535 Bunt. ‘#Islam, Social Networking and the Cloud’, 180. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists, 46, 115. 
538 Ibid. 
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6.4 Salafi Sounds Podcast  
The Salafi Sounds website, a self-described Salafī producer of auditory content in the 
form of lectures and sermons, was founded by preacher Abu Khadeejah and Dawud 
Burbank in Birmingham, UK.539 Its director is Abu Khadeeja Abdul-Wahid, who heads 
Masjid al-Salafī in Birmingham. The registrant and administrative contact is Waheed 
Alam, with the address 472 Coventry Road, Birmingham, UK540—the address of the 
Salafī Mosque, as posted on its website.541 Salafisounds.com was registered on 29 
December 2013 and, since then, has consistently added content, avoiding the common 
tendency of online sites to post a plethora of content initially, only to recede, as it were. 
Even at five years old and in a broad digital field of Salafī online content, Salafi Sounds is 
a significant producer of auditory content that promotes Salafī positions and reproaches 
non-Salafī groups (such as Ṣūfīs) and other self-described Salafīs who have diverged from 
strict purist Salafism. As a result, the purists—including those who produce and manage 
Salafi Sounds—have been accused of pursuing a ‘theological McCarthyism’.542 Together 
with a group of other Salafī preachers, Salafi Sounds’s founders were considered by these 
preachers as a ‘rival group’ of pietistic or quietist Salafīs who opposed Salafī groups who 
advocated greater involvement in political processes—something shunned by purists.543 
The lectures and sermons posted on the Salafi Sounds website are usually 
recorded in a physical institution located in Birmingham. Thus, the ‘location’ of Salafi 
Sounds occupies two spaces: one is a physical mosque or centre, but the other is digital 
space, the focus of this study. In the digital space, Salafi Sounds offers an auditory 
platform to pursue a post-textual strategy involving the making of truth-claims as so-
called ‘Super Salafis’, who go to perhaps extreme lengths to draw two lines of identity 
                                               
539 Innes Bowen, Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent: Inside British Islam (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), at 65. 
540 <https://www.whois.com/whois/salafisounds.com>. 
541 <http://www.salafimasjid.com/>. 
542 Ibid., 62. 
543 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists, 46, 61. 
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construction. One is drawn between ‘true’ Salafīs and those Salafīs who are untrustworthy 
or are judged to be ‘deviant’, in which case the strategy is part of a ‘policy of boycotting’ 
other Salafis’, using vituperative language to undermine their legitimacy. The second line 
of demarcation is between Salafism, the defenders of Islam’s proper manhaj 
(methodology), and non-Salafī groups. In a majority of the podcasts the speakers point to 
Salafism as the ideology that uniquely maintains and advocates fidelity to a pure Islam of 
the past, and, in the process, the content is highly critical and intolerant of Muslim 
ideological differences. Pertaining to this study, Ṣūfīs and Sufism are paramount among 
the ‘deviant’ groups and as a consequence are reproached. Because of their inflexible and 
strident reproach of rival Salafīs and non-Salafī groups, the Salafī preachers of Salafi 
Sounds have acquired from other Salafīs and Islamic activists a number of labels in 
addition to ‘Super Salafis’: ‘Saudi Salafis’, or ‘Madkhalis’.544 The organizers and 
presenters of the podcasts are thus well-known Salafī personalities in the UK and have 
attracted research internationally.545 
The choice of Salafi Sounds, then, offers two significant constituent aspects for 
study. One is the media form itself, which, as alluded to previously, is connected to a 
trend of auditory content production, a ‘sensorial turn’ in digital media.546 Second, the 
producers and speakers of the podcasts are well-known voices in a Salafī discourse that 
represents a purist Salafism that apparently wishes to sharply distinguish itself from what 
are perceived to be compromised Salafīs and, of course, non-Salafī groups (such as Sufis). 
A relatively new and well-kept site for Salafī discourse, the content it provides connects 
with broader matters of academic concern, as shown here. It should also be noted that the 
use of the term ‘Salafī’ in the products of Salafi Publications represents a significant 
                                               
544 Ibid. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Jouili and Moors, 980. 
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choice ‘to propagate openly under the Salafī banner’, a choice endorsed by the Salafi 
Publications leadership, including Abu Khadeejah.547 
 
6.4.1 Data Collection Methodology 
In this study podcasts that concern Sufism were located using the search function of the 
website Salafi Sounds. A significant challenge in searching for key words or phrases in 
online texts is the possibility that Arabic vocabularies may be phonetically reproduced in 
English script in a variety of ways. Additionally, podcasts are not searchable in the way 
that written texts are; however, and fortunately, Salafi Sounds presents searchable ‘key 
words’ posted alongside the graphics of the podcasts in the website. Given this, the 
likelihood of achieving consistency in tagging key words and in transliteration is greater, 
though should not be presumed. One should anticipate that inconsistent transliteration 
patterns in the key words and the titles of the podcasts may represent a complication. The 
gathering of the appropriate podcasts involved the following searches for words and 
concepts associated with the research questions: 
• For podcasts regarding Sufism, the search terms included: [Sufi], [Sufism], 
[Soofy], [Soofi], [Sufiya], [Sufiyya], [taṣawwuf], [tasawuf], and others. 
• For the celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday, the search included: 
[birthday], [Prophet Muhammad birthday (with various renditions of 
‘Muhammad’ such as ‘Mohamed’)], [Mawlid], [Maulid], [Mawlad], [Eid al-
Mawlid], [Mawlid-e-nabi], and others.  
• For the Saved Sect claim, the search terms included: [saved sect], [saved group], 
[firqa Najiya], [al-firqa al-Najiya], [firqa Naajiyya], [firqa], [salvation], and 
others. 
• For the exclusive claim to Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, the search terms were 
simplified because of the length of the phrase and the greater possibility of error 
and of missing relevant podcasts. Thus, the search included broad terms that 
would produce sweeping results that were subsequently culled for relevance. The 
phrases searched were: [Ahl al-Sunna], [Ahl], [Jamaa], [Jama’a], [Jamaa’a], and 
others. Academic styles of transliteration were not followed by the content 
                                               
547 Inge, 30. 
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producers or managers of the site. 
• For the practices associated with grave visitation and intercession, the terms 
included: [grave], [grave worship], [quburiyya], [quburiya], [qubuuriya], 
[tawassul], [tawasul], [tauwasul], and others. 
• For the creedal claims of heterodoxy, the majority of the terms found within the 
podcasts were generated by the above searches, since the creedal claims on which 
this study focuses concern Sufism and would be located in the same content as 
those found via the other searches done. 
The search terms were successful in gathering podcasts that focused on the arguments, 
creedal themes, and key terminologies related to the research questions. The researcher 
listened intently to each of the relevant podcasts multiple times, with headphones. The 
purpose of the first pass was to ensure that the researcher heard the entirety of the podcast 
without interruption and without the distraction of stopping, rewinding, noting, and 
preparing analyses—from the opening benediction (invariably in Arabic) to the closing 
prayer (also in Arabic). It should be noted that the researcher is fluent in Arabic and is a 
native English speaker, having been born and raised in the United States. 
This first pass, therefore, minimized errors in interpreting the speaker’s intent and 
strategy by inadvertently disconnecting the flow of an argument made early in the 
podcast, for example, which gained more nuance (or became contradictory) near the end. 
In addition, it helped the researcher avoid arriving at premature inferences and 
conclusions. All the podcasts examined here were full presentations—that is, not 
excerpted from or partially represented on the Salafi Sounds website. 
During the following passes, the researcher closely observed patterns of 
vocabulary usage and themes of contestations, frequently stopping in the course of the 
podcast to rewind and carefully note the key themes, using a timestamp so that the reader 
can locate for him- or herself the texts of the podcasts. Because of the uninterrupted first 
pass, the passages in which the key themes and terms were introduced by the speaker 
were contextualized in accordance with the full presentation during the second pass. 
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6.4.2 Content Overview 
Salafi Sounds is a website that offers content originally produced as lectures and sermons, 
later converted into podcasts. The recordings showcase several speakers who take on a 
wide range of topics typical of religious content and preaching: patience, sin, penitence, 
stories of the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad, family concerns, and more. 
However, the podcasts also contain a significant amount of content stressing the 
importance and validity of Salafism itself and problematizing and reproaching what 
opposes it. Overall, as will be expanded upon in the next chapter, the content and its 
message defend Salafism as representing nothing less than the true manhaj: that is, the 
way of Islam or the true way of guidance and interpretation of the scriptural sources of 
Islam as understood in the texts themselves or according to the understanding of the 
immediate generations of the pious forebears (Al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ). In the course of listening 
to the podcasts, the core themes and vocabulary that speak to religious authority were 
collated. 
 
6.4.2.1 Types of Content 
The two main forms of content in the podcasts were originally Friday Khuṭub (sermons) 
(singular Khuṭbah) and lectures before an audience. It is important to discuss the 
significance of the Friday sermon and its relationship with media technology. The Friday 
Khuṭbah and congregational prayer are obligatory rites that adult Muslims must attend 
when not travelling. The practice goes back to the time of the Prophet Muḥammad and his 
Khuṭbah in the mosque in Madina. The basic positioning of the institution involves a 
‘one-way communication through which the religious authority tells the audiences what to 
think and what to believe’.548 The preaching has two discursive purposes. One offers ‘the 
audiences a specific position as a righteous Muslim’ and the other offers ‘rhetorical re-
descriptions of Muslim history and events, present[ing] them as social and religious 
                                               
548 Ehab Galal. ‘Friday Khutba without Borders: Constructing a Muslim Audience’, in Political Islam 
and Global Media, ed. Noha Mellor and Khalil Rinnawi (New York: Routledge, 2016), at 91. 
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icons’.549 However, when the Friday Khuṭbah proliferated through satellite media 
technology, as Galal notes, the ‘universalizing of the Muslim Ummah’ was among the 
potentialities of the media effects.550 Most relevant to this study is Galal’s findings that 
those sermons that addressed intra-Islamic ‘conflicts’—however ‘abstract or concrete’—
seemed to have demanded that the audience ‘not only […] identify themselves as a 
universalized category of Muslim, but also […] take a position against other Muslims’.551 
The Friday prayer and sermon ‘has a fixed place in Islamic ritual’552 and is 
representative of the authority of the Prophet’s mantle and legacy. The Friday sermon, in 
other words—form and forum—has, in itself, dimensions of authority. For this reason, 
great care and thoughtfulness are expected when delivering content. The form of the 
Friday Khuṭbah is recognizable, even through a podcast; hallmarks are the opening 
benediction, the momentary respite when the preacher sits for some seconds before 
resuming the sermon, and the closing communal supplication. 
 This study proceeds by offering several detailed synopses of the podcasts that 
give accurate and detailed descriptions of the content, the flow and logic of the arguments 
the speakers make, and the language and themes their arguments rely on. Thereafter, the 
summarized synopses present a concise summary of other the podcasts (with the main 
themes and arguments parsed), though each of the podcasts presented here (whether they 
are given in detailed or summary form) were examined with the same data-gathering 
methodology involving intense, multiple passes and notetaking examination.  
 A final note, it has become a caution observed by researchers of internet content 
that texts (voice, image, or textual) may be taken down or otherwise disappear from given 
websites. Thus far, the texts this study pursues have largely remained accessible online on 
                                               
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid., at 92. 
551 Ibid., at 99. 
552 A.J. Wensinck. ‘Khutba’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. P. Bearman et al. (Brill 
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the Salafi Sounds website. Still, to ensure that reviewers and future researchers will have 
access to the podcasts, this researcher has downloaded the podcasts and has made them 
available on portable storage flash drive.  
 
6.5 Detailed Synopses of Select Podcasts 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: Shaikh Fawzan’s Insight – The Battle of Truth Against Falsehood 
Until the Era of Imam Muhammad ‘Abdul-Wahhab553 
Narrator:  Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid 
Posted:  19 September 2017 
Length:  45:29 
Setting:  Lecture before an audience 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
Prominent British Muslim Salafī preacher Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid narrates a series 
of podcasts in which he delivers lectures based on a book written by Shaykh Ṣāliḥ ibn 
Fawzān ibn ʿAbdullah Al-Fawzān (b. 1943), a well-known Saudi cleric and senior 
member of the Saudi Islamic counsel responsible for formal religious edits (fatāwā). The 
book is entitled Sharḥ Kitāb Al-Tawḥīd Lil Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb,554 
which is an explication of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s most well-known book, Kitāb 
al-Tawḥīd (Book of the Oneness of God). The speaker expands upon Shaykh Fawzān’s 
book on the life and mission of Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the namesake of the 
Wahhābī movement. But, throughout the course of the lecture, it is not always possible to 
distinguish the speaker’s own commentary from the actual content of the book the speaker 
is basing his speech on. 
                                               
553 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/2-shaikh-fawzans-insight-the-battle-
of-truth-against-falsehood-until-the-era-of-imam-muhammad-abdul-wahhab/ 
554 This is a two-volume work published by Dar al-Jawzi (Saudi Arabia), no date available. 
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In this podcast, Abu Khadeejah offers a biographical treatment of Ibn ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb (1703–1792), based on Shaykh Al-Fawzān’s book. The narrator’s tone and 
changes in volume, vocabulary, and tenor indicates that he is an advocate of arguments 
and hagiography of Shaykh Al- Fawzān’s book. The presentation lacks the temperament 
and logical argument-making of an academic who speaks with critical distance and is 
generally dispassionate in his or her tone. Abu Khadeejah’s tone, for example, is often 
histrionic and surges in volume when emphasizing the sins, evils, and heresies of Muslim 
groups, including Sufism—heretical sects who flourished in the ‘dark’ phases of Muslim 
history. 
After the opening benediction in Arabic, in which the speaker praises God and 
makes prayers of peace and blessings upon the Prophet Muḥammad (a common opening 
of formal Muslim discourse), Abu Khadeejah narrates that, after the generations of the 
pious ancestors, there ‘came an era in which Muslims were living … in a period of 
darkness’. One of the main markers of this age of darkness was the rise of ideological 
groups that represented heretical points of view, such as ‘Jahmiyya,555 Qubūriya, Sūfiyya 
[Sufism], the Muʿtazila,556 the Shīʿa’—groups that had gained ascendancy in the Muslim 
world until the time of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, as Abu Khadeejah narrates. The 
inclusion of Ṣūfīs in a list of heretical groupings is discussed below. 
The narrator continues by stating that ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ‘revived the dīn [the 
religion], sunna [normative practice of the Prophet Muḥammad], and ʿaqīda [creed of 
Islam]’, restoring these key areas of religion as they were once constituted in the first 
                                               
555 The Jahmiyya represents a school of theology that essentially denies that God has attributes or 
‘names’, since having them would suggest that God is human-like, which is an anathema to the very 
essence of God and His oneness, which is the core tenet of Islam. However, the attributes of God are 
unequivocally alluded to in the Qur’ān and in the statements of the Prophet Muḥammad. Other schools 
of theological thought have variant views on what the attributes or names of God truly mean, but they 
do not deny them, for to deny their very existence is considered heretical. Watt, Montgomery, 
‘D̲j̲ahmiyya, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 05 January 2019: 
http://dx.doi.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0176 
556 This references a school of thought that was short-lived but which privileged the role of reason in 
the determination of legal rulings, a role that was perhaps equal to or overrode scriptural sources. 
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three centuries (4:09). The speaker’s narration on the cycles of decline and ascendance 
repeatedly includes Sufism as part of the decline narrative, or ‘darkness’ before revivalists 
rose to expose and criticize dissenting opinions and views. There was a ‘tremendous 
revival’ in with such scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and his student Ibn al-
Qayyim (1292–1350), who successfully waged intellectual battle against ahl al-bidʿa 
(people of heretical innovation) and cleansed the religion of them. But this period did not 
last long: ‘… after them came another era of decline’, reintroduced by the ‘thoughts and 
forces’ of heretical innovations, among them the Ashʿarites, Jahmiyya, and Ṣūfī orders, 
who worshipped graves, according to the narrator. [5:50]557 
The narrator’s historical treatment passes over centuries of history of intellectual 
achievements to reach what appears to be the main point of the presentation: that is, the 
time in which the ‘days became darker and darker’ continued until the providential 
coming of Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. The narrator claims that among the signs of 
darkness was the reappearance of heresy, with ‘the people [of the age] nearly all of them 
[living] on the ways of Ṣūfiyya [Sufism], Qubūriyya’. Other groups are categorized 
among censured factions of heresies mentioned by the narrator: namely, ‘magicians, 
fortune-tellers, and soothsayers’; they had gained ascendency at the time and, in fact, 
were given status and privilege in society by the Ottomans, the speaker asserts. Abu 
Khadeejah next states that Muslims were in the custom of visiting graves to gain blessings 
and of wearing amulets, as Ṣūfīs are known to do, and, as a result, people forsook the 
revealed authority or scriptural sources of Islam—namely, the Qur’ān and Sunna—and 
reverted to tribal norms and authority—a claim of ‘jāhiliyya’, pre-Islamic norms of 
‘ignorance’ and ‘idolatry’. However, ‘It was in this time that Allah raised and made 
apparent Shaykh al-Islām,558 Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’. [7:32] 
                                               
557 The bracketed numbers represent the timestamp in the recording. 
558 This is a title given to those who are recognized for their pre-eminence in knowledge and authority. 
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The narrator proceeds to laud the qualities of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and attributing 
divine grace for his coming, for ‘Allah endowed upon him intelligence and insight that 
gave him realization of what the people were upon’: that is, the calumny and misguidance 
of the age. The speaker then repeated that ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was in possession of 
intellectual and inspired qualities endowed by God, as evinced by the narrator’s 
hagiographic account that are replete with references to sacred intervention. The narrator 
extolls ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s main intellectual or ideological influences, which were 
primarily the works and teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and his student Ibn al-Qayyim, as 
well as ‘other books of the Salafiyya’. [9:03] According to the narration, ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb’s reform was motivated by the fact that he ‘was saddened and grieved’ by 
heretical practices and beliefs that he had seen in his town in Eastern Arabia—beliefs that 
‘opposed’ the creed of Islam and the way of the pious forebears. [11:30] 
 After migrating, then returning to his town of birth (ʿUyayna559), ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
was at first well received by the tribal ruler, ʿUthmān ibn Muʿammar. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb 
‘gave daʿwa’ (preached) to the tribal leader—that is, he called upon him to consider the 
principles of purifying the faith of Islam from foreign or heretical practices and beliefs of 
his times. The narrator then describes how ʿAbd al-Wahhāb began to rectify the ‘evil’ that 
had claimed the land. He ordered, for example, the demolition of ‘the dome’ over the 
tomb of the grave of Zayd Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who was an admired and respected companion 
of the Prophet Muḥammad. [13:11] It was not Zayd or any of his qualities that inspired 
the demolition, but the fact that there was a dome over the grave, which attracted visitors. 
Grave visitation is among the chief loci of dispute that Salafī ideology emphasizes in its 
contestations with Sufism. 
 Interestingly, the narrator boasts of and praises ʿAbd al-Wahhāb for the 
resumption of the punishment for illicit sexual relations—namely, the ‘stoning to death 
                                               
559 An oasis town 33 km northwest from the present-day city of Riyadh. 
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[for] adultery’. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb also ceased and prevented what the narrator called the 
worshipping of the graves. [15:30] However, currents of the times had shifted. Under 
pressure from the residents of ʿUyayna, Ibn Muʿammar was pressured to no longer permit 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb to preach freely, at which point ʿAbd al-Wahhāb travelled again, but this 
time to the town of al-Dirʿiyya, approximately 65 km from ʿUyayna. This led, as the 
narration proceeds, to the critical meeting between ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Muḥammad Ibn 
Saʿūd (1710–1765), the forebear and eponym of the Saudi Family. 
This historically significant meeting would lead to the now well-known 
relationship between the Family of Saʿūd (and later Saudi Arabia) and Wahhabism. 
[21:29] The narrator speaks of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb preaching to Ibn Saʿūd and convincing 
him of the ‘daʿwa of tawḥīd’ (proselytizing the restoration of belief in the oneness of 
God). The meeting also led to an alliance that eventually produced ‘an army to wage 
jihād’—that is, an armed confrontation under the banner of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s view of 
tawḥīd—under the standard of orthodoxy, in other words, to battle against heresies and to 
battle ‘people who were living under darkness’ and in the state of ‘ignorance’ (jāhiliyya). 
[25:00] The family of Ibn Saʿūd was able to consolidate power in al-Najd (in central 
Arabia) and sought to cleanse the land of a population who, in the main, as the speaker 
argues, ‘were worshipping graves’ and ‘wearing amulets’. [26:30] Implicit in mentioning 
these two aspects is the reproach of Ṣūfīs, for many of whom amulets of Quranic verses 
and visiting graves are not problematized. 
The narrator’s historical account continues by mentioning that the establishment 
of the Family of Saʿūd allied with ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s religious views was challenged and 
destroyed twice by the Ottomans, who were ‘enemies who didn’t want to see’ the oneness 
of God established and ‘didn’t like the fact that people worshipped Allah alone and […] 
stopped worshipping the graves’. In fact, the narrator makes serious claims that the 
Ottomans (who were Muslims) rejected not only the creed of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb but the 
creed of the Prophet of Islam himself and the way of the pious generations. The 
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‘Ottomans were treacherous’ in lining up and killing innocent people, and had a further 
moral failing, according to the narrator—one that seems strangely out of place in a 
narration focused on creedal matters—‘They came with dancing women and musicians’. 
[27:33] 
The armies of Ibn Saʿūd were re-established and prevailed in the ‘path of Allah’ 
during a ‘period of the innovators and evil-doers’ who sought to ‘deceive people’ and 
‘started to spread rumours’ slandering ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, although the whole of his book 
(Kitāb al-Tawḥīd) is based entirely ‘on Qur’ān and Ḥadīth’, the scriptural sources of 
Islam, as the speaker asserts. It was in this manner and timeline that the mission of ʿAbd 
al-Wahhāb established itself. [29:40] The narrator stresses repeatedly that ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb’s book is based on ‘nothing other than the words’ of God and words of the 
messenger of God. ‘That is the beauty of [ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s] book’. Essentially, the 
narrative claims that ʿAbd al-Wahhāb revived the books and teachings of Ibn Taymiyya 
and their application and veneration. [37:25] The speaker narrates that the books of Ibn 
Taymiyya were neglected, remaining unstudied and even unknown ‘because of the 
deceptions of people of innovation’. The narration then repeats itself, reiterating the great 
revival of Ibn Taymiyya’s works by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb; thereafter the speaker states, 
seemingly sardonically, that the people of innovation did a ‘good job in trying to bury Ibn 
Taymiyya and his writings’. [39:30] However, by God’s providence, as the speaker 
concludes, the books were rediscovered and studied anew upon the coming of ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Themes and Terminologies 
The nodes of religious authority alluded to here include creedal claims of the heterodoxy 
of Sufism in which its practices are considered as heretical innovation (bidʿa). The use of 
vituperations against such contested factions has the effect of ‘otherizing’ the traditional 
practices of Sufism. A cyclical view of Islamic creedal history—narratives of the rise, 
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decline, and recovery of an imagined, pure Islam—is a central theme of the Salafī 
argument. With regard to Sufism, the speaker alludes to the significance, if not the 
greatness, of the salaf (the early generations), which were followed by ‘an era in which 
Muslims were living … in a period of darkness’. The ‘darkness’ of the era, he states, was 
caused by or marked by the rise of heterodox sects and ideologies, notably Sufism, and 
was a departure from the ways of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, the normative teachings of 
Prophet Muḥammad and the community of true believers. 
 Through hagiographic historical narratives of ideological figures, such as 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the style of narration speaks to Salafism’s project of 
restoring pure Islam through a quasi-historical interpretation that disparages Muslim 
groups in manifest terms. Consider, for example, the account that after the generations of 
the pious ancestors ‘darkness’ and ‘heretical innovation’ (bidʿa), notably that of Sufism, 
overtook Muslims in their creed and practices. The notion of the purity of the faith was 
restored by Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), only to decline once more into another historical 
moment of ‘darkness’ and ‘evil’ (sharr), until the rise and mission of Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. The language of the presentation speaks to two nodes of religious 
authority: creedal, as mentioned above, and scriptural, since the speaker mentions that the 
opposition Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb faced represented an opposition to the 
teachings of the Prophet Muḥammad himself, thus straying from the Qur’ān. 
It should also be noted that the inclusion of Ṣūfīs in a list of heretical groupings 
relies on guilt by association. While Ṣūfīs (like many other Sunnī schools of thought) are 
critical of the Jahmiyya, the narrator makes no distinction in his heresiology by including 
Sufism with the Jahmiyya, doing so without defending his inclusion. In other words, 
although these ideological/spiritual groupings are distinct from one another, Abu 
Khadeeja mentions Sufism in the sentence string of groups that are generally viewed as 
heretical in Sunni Islam, creating what can be viewed as a false equivalence. 
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 In addition, the content of this podcast is seemingly influenced by the works of 
and commentary about ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, as proffered by Saudi clerics. This is significant, 
as it lends authority to the contention that contemporary Salafism is closely identified 
with Wahhabism and its present-day scholars, especially in Saudi Arabia. The substrate of 
their ideology is similar: they consider that, after the generations of the pious forebears, 
Islam had been infiltrated by impure beliefs and practices, syncretic beliefs originating in 
non-Muslim sources and religions, such as Hellenistic philosophies and Hindu and 
Christian practices, and the overwrought conjectures of speculative theology (kalām). 
 Finally, the speaker alludes to the rise of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as a seemingly divine 
advent, for God had chosen ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as a reformer and had endowed upon him 
the necessary intellect and purity of heart, as described above. To imply that the advent of 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was a product of divine providence evokes authority, since objecting to 
this sacred interpretation of history would be tantamount to objecting to a selection that 
God Himself had made in the course of history. 
 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: The Reality of Sufi Shaikhs560 
Narrator:  Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid 
Posted:  17 May 2016 
Length:  25:55 
Setting:   Friday Sermon (Khuṭbah) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
In this podcast the speaker, Abu Khadeejah Abdul-Waahid, claims in a broad way that 
Ṣūfīs of today are ‘people of deviation’. The speaker notes that those Ṣūfīs ‘who ascribe 
                                               
560 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/the-reality-of-sufi-shaikhs-by-abu-
khadeejah/ 
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themselves to the manhaj [methodology] and to the ʿaqīda [creed] of taṣawwuf [Sufism]’ 
are deviants. [1:29] The speaker rejects unequivocally the claim that Sufism is an integral 
part of Islam and, in fact, the spiritual energy of the ‘Sunna’ of Islam—that is, integral to 
the normative practice and creed of the religion. He says that it is an ‘oxymoron’ and a 
‘contradiction in terms’ for anyone to claim that he or she is both a Ṣūfī and a Sunnī 
Muslim. In other words, to be a Ṣūfī and to be an observant Muslim who follows 
normative or orthodox Islam are mutually exclusive states and, therefore, it is impossible 
for them to coexist in one person. Stressing his point, he states that ‘the people of Sufism 
in our times … are the furthest from the Sunnah of Allah’s Messenger’.561 He contends 
that Ṣūfīs are most remote from the centre of normative Islam. This contention is 
unsourced. 
At times, the speaker appears to qualify which Ṣūfīs he is referring to. For 
example, he speaks of those Ṣūfīs who follow Shaikh’s blindly and show them deference 
to an extent that is excessive or outside the bounds of what is permissible in the 
religion.562 He says that ‘some of the deviated Sufis’ follow their Shaikh’s to the point 
that they believe that their Shaikh’s ‘will intercede for them in the grave’, as well as on 
the Day of Judgement. He offers no textual support or examples of such a claim, however. 
The speaker then mentions an anecdote relating a student posing a question to the late 
Saudi cleric Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz bin Bāz about Ṣūfīs, specifically, the permissibility of 
showing reverence and deference to their spiritual guides. 
So then Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz bin Bāz as in accordance to the madhhab of the salaf and 
to the daʿwa of salafiya and in the path of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, he responds so the 
questioner mentions that there are shaykhs in their land and with them that are followed 
and whomsoever that does not follow a Shaykh, then he is a loser, and that he is from the 
khāsirīn [the losers]—that he is from those who is [sic] lost in this life and in the 
                                               
561 Ibid. 
562 Through his rebuke of what he sees as Ṣūfīs’ extreme deference to their shaykhs, he admonishes 
those among the ‘Salafiyya’ who have fallen into taqlīd, the blind following of clerics. In other words, 
after condemning Ṣūfīs, he moves toward a critique of some Salafīs who do the same, though again we 
are not given sources. 
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Hereafter. And they claim that if the Shaykh is not obeyed, then indeed, that he is one 
who is destroyed. 
The response of the Saudi cleric, as narrated by Abu Khadeeja, draws a sharp 
contrast between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The way or madhhab of the salaf, as the 
speaker states, is the way of the pious forebears, implying that Sufism is exterior to the 
proper way of Islam (heterodox). Continuing, the speaker accuses Ṣūfīs of making 
exclusive claims to salvation: that is, claiming that only Ṣūfīs will attain salvation, safety 
from Hell. He makes the assertions, however, without proof or sourcing, and the listener 
does not know which Ṣūfī iteration, if any, makes such a claim: ‘some of the people [of 
Sufism] … claim that whoever does not follow’ their path, then ‘he is a loser in this life 
and a loser in the hereafter’. He censures such a position in language that is both sweeping 
and absolute. It is, as noted, impossible to know how the speaker arrived at this point. 
The speaker next rejects the assertion that Ṣūfīs genuinely follow the known 
canonical schools of sacred law in Sunnī Islam, stating that Ṣūfīs wear the ‘garment of 
claiming’ that they cling to the schools of Islamic law, but this is essentially pretence or 
prevarication on their part for the purpose of creating the appearance of orthodoxy, which 
masks reality and dissuades others from a proper interrogation of the true beliefs of 
Sufism ‘beneath the surface’, as it were. He states that ‘all of this is merely a veil for their 
corruption and their deviation’. [7:36]  
He then proceeds to levy the most severe judgement one can pass upon a Muslim: 
that is, one of outright disbelief: ‘… you will find that their practices, indeed many of 
them, if not most of them, that they contain shirk [idolatry] and kufr [disbelief]’ with 
regard to the singular right of God to be worshipped. Moreover, he states that Ṣūfīs 
‘disbelieve in Allah in much of that which they propagate’, such as ‘claiming knowledge 
of the unseen or claiming that the dead ones in their grave can aid them or claiming that 
they are the ones who have knowledge of the hidden affairs or they claim that you can call 
upon them even though they are absent from you’. And the dead will ‘hear’ and 
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‘respond’, the speaker says of Ṣūfī beliefs. He accuses Ṣūfīs of corruption and deviation, 
before culminating in commenting that Ṣūfīs’ ‘ways’ or ‘affairs’ are ‘most sickening’, and 
that they hold the ‘most abominable of beliefs’ because, he states, Ṣūfīs assert the 
idolatrous beliefs that there are ‘others besides Allah … who can bring them benefit and 
who can ward off harm’. [8:07] 
Next, the speaker unexpectedly takes his sermon in a different direction. Instead of 
continuing with his criticism of Ṣūfīs and the status of their spiritual guides, the speaker 
turns his attention to ‘Salafī youth’, who show a zeal toward their Salafī scholars that is 
comparable with that shown by Ṣūfīs toward theirs. However, his language with regard to 
the Salafī zeal is softened, and he does not claim a departure from normative practices of 
Islam or orthodoxy. He says that ‘there are individuals among them who will race towards 
making the taqlīd [blind following]’ of a given scholar or charismatic leader among the 
Salafīs. And, with regard to this behaviour, the narrator claims that ‘this is not the way of 
the people of Sunnah’, drawing finer lines of division within Salafism [12:44]. 
The ideological grounding of this position regarding the devotion to religious 
leaders or shaykhs connects with Salafī rejection of finding guidance beyond the pages, 
words, or narrations of Islam’s scriptural sources, as interpreted by scholars of the salaf. 
As mentioned in the chapter on Salafism,563 the main Salafi claim of proselytizing or 
advocating for the return to the ways of the pious ancestors is tantamount to claiming a 
certain, rigid, form of epistemology and hermeneutics regarding knowledge acquisition 
and scriptural interpretation. The call for purifying Muslim thought includes the severing 
of what is considered a zealous attachment to scholarly and charismatic figures of the 
religion, as mentioned above. In a broader context, this implies an interpretation of the 
scriptural texts and the voluminous exegetical and juridical works of post-salaf Islamic 
intellectual history as unspoiled by traditional scholars. As some may argue, this has led 
                                               
563 See chapter three. 
  176 
to egregious interpretations of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth—disconnected from and unguided 
by the balance of scholarly methodologies that have developed over the centuries—a 
position that ignores intellectual legacies and, it can be argued, undergirds interpretations 
that inspire contemporary extremism. 
The speaker continues to argue that the original state of affairs in Islamic 
methodology was to take ‘evidence’ exclusively from ‘the Book of Allah and from the 
Sunnah’s of Allah’s Messenger’ and the pious forebears. In saying this, the speaker tacitly 
negates the intellectual accomplishments and contributions of the scholarly class 
(ʿulamā’) during the long centuries of Muslim intellectual history after the generations of 
the pious forebears. 
The speaker next criticizes taqlīd, which is translated as the blind following of pre-
formulated positions in religious teachings or law made in the post-salaf past. There is 
extensive discussion on taqlīd in past and contemporary scholarship, too voluminous for 
this present study, but its wide-ranging meanings include—relevant in this context—an 
attachment to the four well-known canonical schools of law that took shape in the third 
Islamic century and thereafter. For Salafism, it is problematic to have loyalty to one 
particular school of law as a guide for one’s affairs in life, whether it regards ritual 
performances, family law, business transactions, and larger social issues. Loyalty to 
schools of law that were codified and developed after the generations of the pious 
forebears is a core critique put forward by Salafist manhaj (methodology). 
Abu Khadeejah next reproaches those who attack Salafism, presumably from 
within (Salafīs) and from without (Ṣūfīs or other Muslims who themselves are subject to 
Salafī censure, such as the Muslim Brotherhood). His response to these attacks is 
noteworthy. First, he does not address specifically what the attacks are, the arguments that 
are applied, or the reasoning behind them. Thus, he has made it difficult, perhaps 
deliberately so, to independently weigh the accusations or arguments against Salafī 
thought in contemporary Islam. But in the process of responding to these vague attacks, 
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the speaker expresses his umbrage through a common trope of Salafism: namely, 
demanding evidence for the criticisms. In other words, the response to accusations is the 
demand for evidentiary material based on textual proofs. The evidence that is asked for 
must come from the scriptural sources. As such, one cannot make an expository critique 
of Salafism. Second, the speaker uses two words in defence of Salafism. Each is symbolic 
in its own way. One is the ‘manhaj’ of Salafism: that is, the methodology used in 
interpreting the scriptural foundations of Islam and the reliance on the unalloyed 
scholarship of the generations of the pious forebears. The other word, which he uses 
interchangeably with the first, is the ‘madhhab’ of Salafism, which is the ‘school of 
thought’ of Salafism. Both of these terms will be discussed in the following chapter, as 
they represent the culmination of the effort of uphold the central conceit of Salafism, 
namely, it best represents the works and intentions of the pious generations, and its 
methodology of scriptural interpretation is authorized by the pious generations. As such, 
any critique of Salafism, the speaker claims next, must be supported by direct scriptural 
sources, verses from the Qur’ān and narrations of the Prophet Muḥammad. The speaker 
contends that ‘those who attack the salafiyyūn … [should] to come forward and stand up 
like men, and bring the evidence, then what is their response?’ Such critics will attempt a 
response by citing their learned scholars, but without textual support, the narrator says. 
But Salafī methodology dictates that criticisms should not come from scholars; the 
critiques must be exclusively based on revealed sources: ‘Bring your evidences from the 
Book and the Sunnah that we have opposed the manhaj and the madhhab of the salaf 
[pious forebears]’. [15:00]  
 The speaker recounts a question posed to the well-known Saudi cleric Shaykh al-
Fawzān about the qualifications of an authority in Islam: should he or she be a graduate of 
an ‘Islamic university’ or have received authority by way of a certificate? The response of 
the Shaykh, according to the narrator, is that one cannot rely on university credentials as 
proof of one’s knowledge and authority, for it is possible that diploma-bearers of a 
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university, even an ‘Islamic university’, may not be in possession of an understanding of 
the religion. Credentials conferred by universities are sufficient proof of knowledge, the 
narrator states. ‘The waving of certificates from Islamic universities is not the 
distinguishing factor between right and between wrong. The distinguishing factor between 
ḥaqq [truth] and bāṭil [falsehood] is the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of Allah’s 
Messenger]. [15:45] 
The narrator calls those who criticize Salafīs but who do not come forward with 
proofs as ‘cowardly individuals’ who ‘don’t have the manliness to stand before us and 
then substantiate their accusations with evidence’. Confirming modern Salafī approaches 
to criticism, the speaker challenges the credentials of critics, which, the listeners are told, 
are of no use in challenging the truth. Then he suggests that they should produce evidence 
and counsel from ahl al-ʿilm (people of knowledge), many of whom are renowned Salafī 
scholars, as he lists below. [18:00] The phrase ahl al-ʿilm is noteworthy. It is part of the 
nomenclature used to draw boundaries around the proper manhaj of Islam, but it goes 
beyond that, suggesting that it is not only the scriptural sources that evince the true 
confines of orthodoxy; the demarcations also include individuals (scholars and preachers) 
whom the Salafīs claim to be the bearers of true knowledge, if not the exclusive bearers of 
such knowledge in contemporary Muslim milieus. The speaker names them in the 
following manner: 
Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Bāz; Ibn ʿUthaymīn; Al-Albanī; Rabīʿ bin Hādī; Muqbil 
bin Hādī; ʿUbayd al-Jābirī; Shaykh al-Islām Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb; and 
his sons and his grandsons; Imam ash-Shawkānī; Ibn Taymiyyah; Ibn al-Qayyim; 
ibn Qudāma; Barbahārī; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal; Mālik ibn Anas. 
The narrator notes that these scholars did not demand from their students that they learn 
only from them, which, he states, is unlike the Ṣūfī scholars, which, again, he claims 
without specificity. Thus, he returns to the original thesis of this podcast: namely, the 
over-reliance of Ṣūfīs on their shaykhs. While it may be a genuine source of consternation 
among Salafī scholars and preachers, like Abu Khadeeja, the topic, it seems, does revolve 
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around a core Salafī principle of sourcing orthodoxy from the scriptural foundations of 
Islam. However, it does not stop there. The scholars of the present age and the past that 
one may rely on are either restricted or appropriated according to the Salafī paradigm. 
 As for the ‘affair of the people of Sufism’, the narrator criticizes Ṣūfīs for placing 
the ‘whole affair’ of religion in the hands of their shaykhs. Without sources, the speaker 
claims that Sufis must follow their Shaykh in all matters, and anyone who dissents ‘is 
destroyed’, according to Sufism. He observes that this ‘is not the way’ of Salafism: ‘This 
is not our way, and it has never been our way’. And, beyond that, he states that such 
attachment, ‘without knowledge and insight’, is not permitted ‘according to all of the’ 
scholars. In fact, as a statement of delineating orthodoxy such attachments are rejected by 
scholars and by Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa (the people of the normative or orthodox 
practice of the Prophet Muḥammad and the plurality of the earlier followers). As ‘those 
Sufis, who have evil and deviated’ creeds, make claims that are not corroborated by the 
teachings of the scholars of Islam, then it is ‘obligatory to rebut’ them because, the 
narrator concludes in a direct manner, Sufism ‘opposes the truth’, and truth is ‘the 
distinguishing mark … of the people of the Sunnah, and the people of the al-Jamāʿa’. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
This podcast demonstrates the use of the status of a Friday sermon to criticize Sufism and 
the relationship between Ṣūfīs and their spiritual leaders. The sermon relies on the 
repeated use of words and phrases that represent nodes of creedal and juridical religious 
authority, explicitly claiming that Ṣūfī practices are forms of idolatry and disbelief. The 
relationship between Ṣūfīs (‘people of deviation’) and their shaykhs (scholars and 
spiritual guides) is presented as an over-zealous bond between a Muslim and his or her 
spiritual guide, rendering this bond more important than one’s attachment to the scriptural 
sources of Islam, as the narrator suggests. This rhetorical approach makes an apparent 
exaggeration—the construction of an unsourced argument—to give emphasis to a 
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common Salafī conceit: namely, that Muslims should not over-rely on human agencies for 
their guidance; rather, they need to return to the Qur’ān and the normative practice of the 
Prophet Muḥammad—a method of interpretation that intentionally ignores centuries of 
pre-modern scholarship and warnings of errant interpretations. Finding guidance in the 
Qur’ān and statements and practices of the Prophet Muḥammad ‘is common for all 
Muslim groups’. However, the ‘Salafis are distinct from more traditional Muslims in 
denying any validity to other sources for knowledge’ including ‘the exercise of reason’.564 
The key words are bidʿa (heretical innovation), shirk (idolatry), kufr (disbelief), manhaj 
(the proper methodology of Salafism), and Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa (the people of the 
normative teachings of Islam). Finally, daʿwa al-salafiyya—that is, the proselytizing or 
missions of the pious forebears—are paramount, and those who oppose them are losers 
(khāsirīn), a significant word the speaker evokes, as it is found in the Qur’ān to refute 
those Makkans who were belligerent in their opposition to the Qur’ān and the Prophet 
Muḥammad. They are ‘losers’ in this life and the next, as the speaker states. Using the 
word khāsirīn to describe a Muslim is provocative, if not problematic, in that its usages in 
the scriptural sources of Islam were not applied to Muslims but to the polytheists of the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: Tawassul: Seeking A Means of Nearness To Allaah565 
Narrator:  Abu Iyaad Amjad Rafiq 
Posted:  22 January 2014 
Length:  1:09:55 
Setting:   Lecture 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
                                               
564 Lloyd Ridgeon (2015), Sufis and Salafis in the Contemporary Age, at 3. 
565 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/tawassul-seeking-a-means-of-
nearness-to-allaah-by-abu-iyaad/ 
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The speaker, Abu Iyaad Amjad Rafiq, devotes this lecture to one of the key areas of 
difference between Salafism and Sufism. It is important to note that not all Ṣūfīs perform 
tawassul, the act of seeking intercession at the graveside of a Ṣūfī saint. But many, if not 
most, do. The speaker begins by defining tawassul, which, he says, relates to the issue of 
‘intermediaries between Allah and His creation’—namely, seeking ‘nearness’ to God or 
intercession from ‘creation’, which essentially means seeking help or intercession from 
anything that is not God per se—for God is God, and everything else (‘creation’) is not. 
Abu Iyaad immediately frames what he believes are the high stakes inherent in the 
practice: it ‘has great connection’ with the core tenet of Islam, the oneness of God 
(tawḥīd), and its antithesis, idolatry (shirk) or disbelief (kufr). For this reason, his strategy 
in making his address begins with a definition of tawḥīd: the inviolable belief that there is 
no one worthy of worship except God. Throughout the sermon, the speaker makes 
repeated mentions of idolatry (shirk) and its derivative mushrikīn (people of idolatry or 
those who ascribe partners or deities to Allah or who ascribe God-like attributes to human 
beings). It references the creedal foundation of Islam, the very identity-marker of a 
Muslim, saying both directly and by implication that tawassul connects with the very 
identity of what a Muslim is. 
 The narrator reveals the main sources he relies upon when speaking of this 
sensitive, creedal topic. They merit mention here because they are religious figures both 
of the historical past—Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), as well recent and contemporary 
scholars, such as the late Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn (1929–2001) and Saleh As-Saleh (d. 
2008)—leading scholars of contemporary Salafism. 
In the course of his introduction, the narrator mentions the important differences 
between belief and idolatry—specifically, as they pertain to those ‘innovators’ who 
‘disguise’ their practice of seeking means of intercession ‘as [a] legitimate’ forms of 
worship despite its being shirk (idolatry), one of the key words related to the evocation of 
authority. He outlines his strategy in the sermon, beginning by defining the terms of 
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engagement: namely, tawḥīd (the oneness of God), al-ʿibāda (worship), duʿā’ 
(supplication), and shirk (idolatry), how ‘it is the greatest oppression’. The speaker’s 
focus on tawḥīd (the core tenet of belief in one God) begins by citing Muḥammad ibn 
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. [7:21] In essence, he says that tawḥīd is to ‘single out’ God for worship. 
It is the first of the testimonies of Islam—‘there is no God, but God’—that ‘we all make 
as Muslims and on account to which we enter into Islam’. However, Abu Iyaad takes 
issue with how the testimony of faith (lā ilāha illa Allāh)—which he translates as ‘There 
is nothing which is worshipped in truth except Allah’—is commonly translated (‘there is 
no God but God’), claiming that the translation is problematic, or, as he says, ‘false’ or 
‘bāṭil’, since it evokes the notion of waḥdat al-wujūd, the unity of all existence—a 
common expression of Sufism. [8:14] He explains that this is a false translation or 
formulation of the testimony because it implies that ‘everything which is worshipped, 
which anyone takes as a God’ is God. The purpose of this synopsis is not to contest the 
ideas of the speakers, but it should be said here that the common translation of ‘there is no 
God but God’ in fact does not necessarily imply his interpretation. He continues this line 
of argument by mentioning the practices of worship of Christianity and Judaism, arguing 
that the translation ‘there is no God but God’ can thus mean only ‘that everything which 
is worshipped by anybody in the creation, all of that is God’. 
The speaker then jumps to a topic that seems out of place, quoting Shaykh 
Fawzan’s refutation of the late Muḥammad Quṭb, the brother of Sayyid Quṭb (1906–
1966), one of the most prominent leaders of the Muslim brotherhood in the 1950s and 
1960s. It is not clear what aspect of Muḥammad Quṭb’s teachings or books the speaker is 
refuting, but nonetheless he contends that Quṭb’s teachings were refuted because what he 
advocated was the ‘same as the belief of the Ṣūfīs, those who believe that Allah is 
everything and in everything’. The speaker offers no evidence for this view. 
The narrator next recites several verses from the Qur’ān that address worship and 
supplication in order to stress not only that only God is worthy of worship but also that to 
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call upon anything apart from him is idolatry. In setting up the terms of his lecture—
worship and supplication (and their Arabic originals)—as a preface to his treatment of 
tawassul, he seeks to add scholarly credence to his translation of the passages of the 
Qur’ān and his defence of it by citing the most commonly mentioned figures of Salafism, 
Ibn Taymiyya and Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, and their modern-day interlocutors: 
namely, Shaykh Fawzān and ‘the ʿulamā’ [scholars] of Saudi Arabia’. To stress the 
authenticity of the knowledge of Ibn Taymiyya and his definition of worship, the speaker 
veers into an elegy: reading Ibn Taymiyya’s definition, it ‘is as if this definition is literally 
being read from the Book of Allah’. The speaker is assured of this, for he says that since 
the term ʿibāda (worship) finds expression in the speech of the heart and the tongue, and 
embracing the deeds of limbs and the performance of rites, Ibn Taymiyya’s definition, as 
the scholars he cites conclude, is complete. The speaker’s attachment to the scholars of 
Salafism as sources of orthodoxy (ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, one of the key terms meant 
to establish orthodoxy) is unambiguous and seems to resemble the kind of attachment 
Salafīs are wont to criticize with regard to Ṣūfīs and their bonds with their spiritual 
guides. 
The speaker next talks on supplication: its various types, its valid form, and its 
purposes. He suggests that supplication and its forms as established and formulated during 
the generations of the pious forebears represents the only valid form of supplication and 
worship. Departures from these forms represent a departure from the claims of 
monotheism, or tawhid. Having completed his treatment on the meanings of worship and 
supplication, he takes up the issue of shirk (idolatry), speaking of shirk and the 
chastisements that await idolaters in the Hereafter. Any worship or supplication with 
regard to anyone or anything but God is shirk. There are two kinds of shirk, which the 
speaker expands upon. First is al-shirk al-akbar (greater or manifest idolatry), which 
denies—implicitly and explicitly—belief in the oneness of God and therefore ‘expels’ one 
from Islam, as he states. Among these deeds is calling upon anyone or anything, dead or 
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alive, other than God. Secondly, lesser or more subtle forms of idolatry are related to 
committing major sins and unknowingly attributing powers to anything other than God. 
He quotes ʿAbd al-Wahhāb as saying that if anyone directs worship, in any form (of the 
tongue, practice, or heart), away from God to something else, then he is a kāfir, an 
outright disbeliever, the most grievous accusation one can make about a Muslim. It 
nullifies any good that a Muslim has done, which is ‘completely wasted’. [25:40–32:50] 
The speaker spends considerable time on the story of the people of Noah, as 
related in the Qur’ān, and their idolatry, which involved worshipping people of the past 
the names of whom are mentioned in the Qur’ān. These were people who were at one 
time people of considerable piety and good character. After their passing, the pious men 
became so revered over the generations that Noah’s people eventually sought their 
benefactions through intercession and so venerated them they became objects of worship 
and supplication.566 [42:40] Having related the characteristics of shirk, the speaker then 
addresses tawassul, equating it as an act of worship meant not for God but for an 
intermediary. Quoting Ibn Taymiyya, the speaker asserts that this is the most severe 
idolatry. In other words, if tawassul is concerned with seeking benefit or protection, or 
seeking provision from an intermediary, then this is the precise reason that the idolaters of 
Makkah in pre-Islam times were declared as kuffār (disbelievers). In direct terms, 
tawassul, as he contends, is an act of disbelief, which God does ‘not forgive’. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
This podcast is an example of a lecture presented in order to criticize the practice known as 
tawassul, seeking spiritual benefit or intercession from interred pious individuals at a grave 
of a Ṣūfī saint or at a shrine or zāwiya (see above). Tawassul is one of the main loci of 
dispute between Salafism and Sufism that is identified, defined, and analysed here. In 
otherizing those who practice tawassul, the speaker makes numerous references to idolatry 
                                               
566 The story of Noah and the names of the gods of his people are found in the Qur’ān, 71:1–28. 
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(shirk), disbelief (kufr), and the ways of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, one of the key terms 
used to evoke and define Islamic orthodoxy and religious authority. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: The Reality of Sufism: It’s [sic] Beginnings and Rise in the Muslim 
Ummah567 
Narrator:  Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid 
Posted:  17 July 2018 
Length:  42:02 
Setting:   Lecture 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
The speaker, Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid, bases this lecture once more on a book by 
Shaykh Ṣāliḥ Fawzān (b. 1933), a leading scholar of Saudi Arabia, whose works are often 
cited by Salafist speakers and quoted in their books. Abu Khadeejah speaks of the six 
principles of worship in Islam, on which he bases his reproach of Sufism. Among the 
principles are: worship can only be known through the revelation given to the Prophet 
Muḥammad and must be ‘done sincerely and purely’ for God and ‘be free from the 
pollution of shirk and idolatry’; and the exemplar of worship is only the Prophet 
Muḥammad, as conveyed by his companions. [4:23] 
The speaker thereafter addresses the central theme of the lecture, Sufism. His 
reproach of Sufism begins by challenging the origins of the name itself: ‘Sufism’ or 
‘taṣawwuf’. Neither name was known in the time of the Prophet, the speaker states. As 
such, it was ‘something that the Muslims invented after the time of revelation’, after the 
time of the companions of the Prophet. It therefore lacks roots in the scriptural sources of 
Islam and ‘is an incursion’ ‘introduced by other nations’ (of religious legacies) who were 
                                               
567 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/the-reality-of-sufism-its-beginnings-
and-rise-in-the-muslim-ummah-lessons-in-aqidah-and-dawah-of-shaikh-salih-al-fawzan-lecture-by-
abu-khadeejah/ 
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not Muslims (6:01). Sufism, he repeats, was not well known during the time of the three 
generations of Islam, the term becoming widespread only thereafter. [8:15] The speaker 
offers a lengthy discussion of the invalidity of the word, according to Ibn Taymiyya 
(1263–1328), the authority cited, who refutes linguistically and historically the contention 
that taṣawwuf has early Islamic roots. [9:03] The refutation of the origins of the name 
implies the refutation of the phenomenon itself. 
 At this juncture in the podcast, the speaker offers a commentary on Sufism and its 
origins in the ‘excesses’ and ‘extremism’ of ascetic practices found among people living 
in or near Basra (in present-day Iraq). [14:30] He then returns, without giving a reason, to 
the relation between the term Sufism and the wearing of wool (ṣuf in Arabic) as among 
the extreme ascetics in emulation of Jesus, although, the speaker contends, the model of 
the Prophet Muḥammad is worthier of emulation, as the Prophet ‘used to wear cotton’ and 
other materials. In essence, the speaker unevenly attempts to make a refutation of claims 
that the word Ṣufiyya traces its roots to the pious generations. Rather, he argues, the word 
relates to contexts and practices representing extreme ascetic practices (zuhd) introduced 
from other faith traditions. 
 The speaker next describes how Sufism broke into a plethora of ‘sects’ and 
‘divided’ into various types. He notes derisively, ‘How many different sects of Sufism 
there are in the world today, each of them having their own particular ideas and ideologies 
and shaykhs that they worship [researcher’s emphasis] and follow and devote themselves 
to’. [16:55] Each of the Ṣūfī sects, he contends, as their own litanies of prayers. 
Immediately thereafter, however, he asserts, with no textual proof or reference, that 
‘Some of them [Ṣūfīs] smoke hashish’ and indulge in ‘different types of intoxication’, 
thus appealing to Islam’s juridical prohibition of intoxicants, including alcohol. [17:55] 
Citing and paraphrasing Ibn Taymiyya, the speaker contends that ‘Sufism 
infiltrated the lands of the Muslims by way of other religions, such as Hinduism and 
Christian monasticism.’ (He repeats this near the end of the lecture, but with the addition 
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of Jewish mysticism as the source of Sufism.) As such, he argues, Sufism’s syncretic 
aspects, such as the way that ‘they gather around their shrines who they are say are their 
saints’—although the Prophet dispraised the practice of turning such graves into places of 
worship—are rooted in religions other than Islam (besides Hellenistic thought). [19:01] 
 The heresies of Sufism, the speaker states, are evinced by the fact that Ṣūfī 
practices are not based on the revelatory sources of Islam (the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth). There 
is nothing in the scriptural sources of Islam, he asserts, that permits the smoking of 
‘hashish’ or ‘dancing in circles’, which the speaker believes are practices among Ṣūfīs. 
Again, he offers no proof or concrete example thereof. According to the speaker, ‘they 
[Ṣūfīs] are the foremost in shirk [idolatry]’, for they go to the graves seeking intercession 
(tawassul), which is ‘major shirk’ (al-shirk al-akbar), a significant act of idolatry. There 
is nothing in Ṣūfī worship practices, he contends, that conforms with established Islam: 
‘all of their ʿibāda (worship) has nothing to do with the Sunna’—the normative practice 
of the Prophet Muḥammad. This includes, he says, ritual visiting of the graves and ‘their 
celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad’. [24:55] He later censures the Ṣūfī 
practice of wearing amulets. [29:00] 
The speaker ends his lecture with an anecdote offered as a cautionary tale 
concerning an unnamed Ṣūfī man who seemingly would forsake the dawn prayer (the first 
of the five-daily obliged ritual prayers), despite being known to be pious and saintly. 
When queried about why such a person would forsake an obligation, his family explained 
that his soul was taken in the liminal realm at dawn to Makkah, where he would perform 
his prayer before returning to his home in Pakistan. The speaker attempts to ridicule 
Sufism with this tale, claiming without equivocation and in a broad-brush manner: ‘This 
is taṣawwuf [sufism]’. The speaker warns of the spreading of Ṣūfī ‘sects’ of modern 
times, before ending with another fantastical story of Deobandi Sufism and metaphysical 
feats meant to demonstrate the extremism found in Sufism and characteristic of Sufism as 
a whole. [31:17]  
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Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
This podcast demonstrates all three of the Salafī contestations with Sufism examined 
here: Mawlid, grave visitation, and seeking intercession through tawassul. The various 
categories of strategic argument are presented: attributing Sufism to extra-Islamic origins 
and excessiveness; condemning Sufism through the direct use of creedal–theological 
language—that is, shirk (idolatry); and inferring juridical connotations—namely, the 
illicit use of drugs (hashish) to promote trance-like states. By stating that this is Sufism, 
without providing supporting evidence, the speaker makes a straw-man argument. In 
addition, the speaker narrates fantastical stories in order to cast aspersions on the entirety 
of Sufism and to lead his audience to general conclusions about Sufism and its distance 
from normative, orthodox Islam. Key nomenclature used include shirk (idolatry) and shirk 
al-akbar (major idolatry); Ṣūfīs are ‘foremost in shirk’. Key ideological themes include 
Sufism and syncretic practices; Ṣūfīs ‘worshipping’ their spiritual leaders. The loci of 
contestations are, as mentioned, Mawlid, grave visitations, and intercession. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: The Saved Sect [3rd lecture] The Meaning of Imān, Tawhīd and the 
Angels – The ‘Aqeedah [Creed] of Imām Muhammad ibn Abdil-
Wahhab568 
Narrator:  Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid 
Posted:  19 September 2017 
Length:  45:29 
Setting:   Lecture 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Detailed Synopsis 
In the podcast on ‘The Saved Sect’ the speaker, Abu Khadeejah, continues with his multi-
part series on the creed of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. In this podcast, the speaker offers 
                                               
568 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/the-saved-sect-the-meaning-of-iman-
tawhid-and-the-angels-the-aqidah-of-imam-muhammad-ibn-abdil-wahhab-by-abu-khadeejah/ 
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commentary on a letter written by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in response to those among his 
contemporaries who criticized him. The letter itself is explicated by a contemporary Saudi 
scholar, Shaykh al-Fawzān, on which the narrator of the podcasts relies. The title of the 
podcast, the content of the letter and Fawzān’s commentary are taken from a statement of 
the Prophet Muḥammad, who mentioned that 73 sects will emerge, but only one will be 
saved in the afterlife—that is, ‘saved’ from Hellfire. The speaker addresses the overt 
meaning of the Ḥadīth and how each deviant sect (with the noticeable exception of the 
saved one) with be ‘pleased’ with their sect, however misguided they may be. In the 
process of parsing the meaning of the Ḥadīth, the speaker lumps together an untenable 
grouping of disparate, anachronistic sects who have only one thing in common: namely, 
that they are unsaved. The grouping, according to the speaker, includes Ṣūfī orders (such 
as the Nakhshabandiyya), the Muʿtazila (the rationalist school of thought), and others. But 
then, quite remarkably, the speaker in the same rhetorical frame includes modern 
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, and al-Qaida (23:12). According to 
the speaker, all of the aforementioned groups are among the condemned or unsaved sects. 
This represents a rather unambiguous case of appropriating a source of Islamic law, 
Ḥadīth, to condemn a broad, highly disparate group of schools of thought, among them 
Sufism. The speaker states that the condemned sects have their ‘own books’ in which they 
record their creed and interpretation of the sources of Islam (the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth). 
However, the narrator insinuates that these ‘books’ of the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, and 
Jamāʿat al-Tablīgh are revered more than the Qur’ān and the interpretations of the pious 
generations. This insinuation is a strong condemnation of non-Salafist groups, for the 
condemnation represents more than dissent or disagreement. The implication is that the 
very identity of Muslims who give deference to ‘their own books’ over the scriptural 
sources of Islam is tantamount to blaspheme, if not apostasy.  
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The speaker mentions these sects and/or ideologies using their acquired names: 
‘Jahmiyya, Qubūriyya, Ṣufiyya, the Muʿtazila,569 the Shīʿa’. Both the mention of al-
Qubūriyya with Ṣufiyya (Sufism) reference practices associated with Ṣūfīs and Sufism 
itself. The former is a derogatory term that refers to those who visit graves for the purpose 
of seeking blessings and intercession from interred sages and saints. Here again, the term 
refers not to a formal historical ideological phenomenon but to the practice of grave 
visitation that is usually associated with Sufism. The word for grave in Arabic is qabr 
(singular) or qubūr (plural). The term ‘Jahmiyya’ refers to a school (or schools) of 
theological thought ostensibly originating with the theologian Jahm Ibn Ṣafwān (d. 745). 
As such, the Jahmiyya are said to represent a number of schools of thought that 
essentially deny the distinct reality of the names or attributes of God (which are explicitly 
mentioned in the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth collections). For such schools of thought, attributes 
that appear to be anthropomorphic—such as God having ‘hands’, a ‘face’, or ‘sight’ (or 
‘eyes’)—are merely metaphorical usages; these attributes should never be considered to 
be attributes of God per se, since they would attribute human physical qualities to God, if 
taken literally. ‘They denied that God had a distinct eternal attribute of knowledge, 
considering that his knowledge of temporal events followed the occurrence of the event. 
More generally they denied the distinct existence of all God’s attributes’.570 
The Salafīs (as most other Sunnīs) regard these positions as heresy, as it is obvious 
in the podcasts. This creedal position rejects the apparent or literal meaning of passages of 
the Qur’ān in favour of a highly figurative interpretation that essentially is at variance 
with what the revealed sources of Islam say about God’s attributes or names. Jahmiyya 
does necessarily comprise a single sectarian movement in the contemporary age, and it is 
certain that the ideas and views of the historic Jahmiyya have not survived to a significant 
                                               
569 See footnotes 533–35. 
570 Watt, Montgomery, ‘D̲j̲ahmiyya, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 05 
January 2019: http://dx.doi.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0176 
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degree today. Both past and contemporary Muslim authorities, even those who hold to a 
figurative interpretation of the physical attributes of God in order to avoid 
anthropomorphism, have commented that the historical views of the Jahmiyya were 
indeed outside Islamic orthodoxy in terms of the attributes of God. However, little 
attention is given to the ‘sect’, as Watt called them, and it seems that Jahmiyya is given 
prominence only through the auspices of those who decide to criticize them.571  
This raises interesting questions: why do the podcasts of Salafi Sounds 
consistently condemn the Jahmiyya? And how does this relate to Sufism? The figurative 
interpretation of the attributes of God is a theme in one of the primary creedal schools of 
Islam: that is, the Ashʿarites, which are also associated with many Ṣūfī thoughts and 
personages, such as Muḥammad Abu Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), who is closely 
associated with Sufism and the Asharite creedal school. To pass judgement against the 
Jahmiyya constructs an ideological foil to criticize the Ashʿarite theological school, which 
is one of the dominant schools of thought in contemporary Muslim milieus. 
In addition, in several podcasts (as will be shown below) Sufism is criticized 
through what can be described as guilt by association. The heterodoxy of the Jahmiyya 
and the Muʿtazilites, for example, is a heterodoxy that most Sunnī Muslims are likely to 
agree with, perhaps including Ṣūfīs. But in the process of trying to stressing the 
heterodoxy of the Jahmiyya the speaker mentions in a single breath Sufism and Ashʿarism 
as being outside the bounds of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, which is one of the key 
phrases that is used to demarcate Sunnī orthodoxy. 
This point of contestation is relevant to Salafī–Ṣūfī polemics for another reason. 
Mentioning these heterodox views is part of the historical narration found in the account 
of the rise of the rescuer of impure or syncretic Islamic phenomena: namely, the rise of 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Thus, the speaker mentions these ideologies as having 
                                               
571 Watt, Montgomery, ‘The Political Attitudes of the Mu’tazilah’. Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society, 95(1–2) (1963), 38–57. 
  192 
‘gained ascendancy’ in the Muslim world until the time of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the namesake 
of contemporary Wahhabism. ‘He revived’ the dīn [the religion], sunna [the normative 
practice of the Prophet Muḥammad], and ʿaqīda [the creed] as it was known in the early 
centuries of Islam. [4:09] This is the crescendo of the speaker’s account of this history, as 
it forms part of the strategy of contesting Sufism. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
This podcast demonstrates Salafī discourse as part of the ‘triangle of power, knowledge 
and subjectivity’, in that the use of ‘knowledge’ as a tool of ‘power’—in this case the use 
of the semblance of religious authority to declare contemporary Sufism as a foreign 
‘ideology’, one that is disharmonious with the way of the Salaf—is an attempt to otherize 
Sufism. 572 The anti-Ṣūfī contestations shown in the podcasts examined here rely on 
casting aspersions on Sufism in a general manner, without specificity (in addition to more 
pointed accusations made against such practices as grave visitations and seeking 
intercession (tawassul)). It is thus significant to note the strategy employed in attacking 
Sufism in an unparsed way. This method, ironically, amplifies Salafī polemics, 
distinguishing them from more individual criticisms. In other words, the general 
censuring of a wide and varied religious experience within Islam demonstrates an 
uncritical and sweeping approach to Sufism. For example, Sufism is referenced as being 
part of the ‘darkness’ that overwhelmed the Muslim world in the aftermath of the pious 
generations, the first three generations of Islam; often, too, it is caught in a wide net of 
invective meant to describe the impurities that had seeped into Muslim life, thought, and 
movements (some of them sectarian, as will be shown). This strategy also demonstrates 
claims of an exclusive or proprietary association with pure Islam and its proper and 
acceptable interpretation, and seeks religious authority by highlighting the prospects of 
being unsaved—that is, of suffering chastisement in the afterlife. This evokes an implicit 
                                               
572 Segal and von Stuckrad, 430–31. The entry quotes Johannes Angermuller. 
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usage of the third, juridical–ethical node of authority in the link asserted between the 
creed and the hereafter. 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: The Path of Those Who Attempt to Dilute the Salafī Manhaj573 
Narrator:  Abu Hakeem Bilaal Davis 
Posted:  8 August 2014 
Length:  27:51 
Setting:   Friday Sermon (Khuṭbah) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
In this Friday sermon the speaker, Abu Hakeem Bilaal Davis, begins with a warning 
concerning the affairs of religion in the present day. These are times of fitan (trials and 
tribulations) akin to the ‘portion of a dark night’. The speaker associates these trials with 
the affairs of faith: that is, the erosion thereof. A person, the speaker states, quoting the 
Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, will wake up in the morning as a believer and by the evening, as a 
result of the temptations of the material world, he is a disbeliever. He urges his listeners to 
‘learn’ the religion, which he specifies as learning the ‘methodology and this manhaj al-
salafī’, the Salafī method of interpretation and ideology—an ignorance of which, the 
speaker infers, is the main crisis in religion today [3:49]. 
 He quotes, as well, a companion of the Prophet Muḥammad and his well-known 
exhortation to ‘cling to knowledge’ of the original affairs of religion and ‘beware of 
innovation’. The speaker interprets this exhortation as a call to ‘cling to the manhaj al-
salafī’ and to return to the dīn, the religion. [5:08] The ‘true dīn’ is exemplified by the 
early believers, but their ‘methodology’ was ‘diluted by individuals who came later’; in 
contrast, the Salafīs are ‘ardent’ in preserving the manhaj from those who otherwise 
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would dilute it. [6:34] The speaker next warns of the usurpation of the manhaj of 
Salafiyya by such movements as the Muslim Brotherhood, who ‘climbed upon the 
methodology of the salaf, claimed it, and then spring-boarded [sic] off it into other’ extra-
Islamic methodologies. 
The speaker then seems to implicate former Salafīs or those who disagree with the 
purist Salafism of Salafi Publications as among those who dilute the Salafī manhaj. It is 
‘an issue that it is imperative that the people of Sunnah understand because surely but 
surely, we see our brothers being plucked off by those who call to this methodology’ 
although, in reality, they dilute it. The speaker exhorts that is ‘imperative’ ‘for the 
vanguard of this daʿwa to remain firm upon it’. [8:50] This includes the role of vanguard 
against those who ‘wage war’ against the Salafī manhaj. [9:40] 
Next, quoting a scholar, the speaker denies the accusation that there is harshness 
among Salafīs or that they face difficulty today that compares to what the Salaf of the past 
had to confront, and follows up his previous contention that the ‘people of innovation’ 
dilute the Salafī manhaj, stressing again an exhortation to be aware of those who alter the 
manhaj, yet offering no details as to what that might entail. However, he likens the plots 
concocted by contemporary people of misguidance and ‘innovation’ with the plots and 
trials of the prophet period—that is, those disbelievers who ‘plotted and schemed’ against 
the Prophet Muḥammad. It seems that the speaker is likening contemporary dissidents to 
disbelievers among the pre-Islam Arabs and allied nations who plotted against the Prophet 
Muḥammad. In fact, the speaker infers that the Prophet foretold that this would happen in 
later generations. [14:56] 
 The speaker then draws a provocative analogy comparing those today who spread 
lies about and imputations against ‘the sunna’, the Salafī manhaj, with the ‘hypocrites’ of 
Madina in the Prophetic era, who showed love and reverence to the Sunna by day, but at 
night mocked it and plotted against it (citing a verse of the Qur’ān). The contemporary 
dissenters against Salafism (or ‘the Sunna’), he asserts, pattern their criticisms after the 
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hypocrites of the Prophetic period. They lie and take statements out of context to portray a 
false representation of the ‘people of the Sunna’. [16:25] The speaker continues by 
repeating his descriptions of the attacks against those whom he calls consistently ‘the 
people of the Sunna’, characterising such attacks as fabrications and other intentional 
misrepresentations. 
 Next the speaker claims that among the methodologies the malcontents use to 
attack ‘the people of the Sunna’ is secrecy. They gather, he says, for the purposes of 
‘secretly conspiring’ and ‘secretly mentioning’ lies. He quotes from a prophetic tradition 
that essentially states that Satan, having given up on trying to persuade the people of the 
Arabian Peninsula to worship him, turns to tempting people by sowing dispute and 
division; and the speaker infers that the divisions regarding ‘the people of Sunna’ are thus 
inspired by demonic forces. Some of the dissenters, he claims, intentionally align 
themselves with the Salafiyya in order to split with them subsequently, so as to sow 
discord. [20:14] 
 He closes his sermon with a warning and exhortation for people to keep proper 
company with those who cling to the manhaj and to be aware of those who hold 
apparently reasonable values—such as balanced views and open-mindedness—but who in 
reality oppose the Sunna and the manhaj. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
In this Friday sermon, the speaker took the opportunity to speak of what can be described 
as the politics and contentions of intra-Salafī dynamics, although Friday sermons 
traditionally offer inspirational exhortations. In terms of the key nomenclatures, the 
speaker frequently mentions the exclusivity of Islam’s manhaj to Salafists, particularly 
those who shunned the temptation to adapt to what he claims to be a diluted version 
thereof. He calls upon the audience to appreciate the ‘imperative’ of being in the 
‘vanguard of this daʿwa’, another key term that expresses the mission of Salafism to 
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maintain its standards despite the encroachments from within Salafism and from 
without—an indistinct reference to ‘people of [heretical] innovation’, including the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Key ideological themes apparent include the exclusivity of Islam’s 
pure methodology, reflecting an embattled posturing of the preservers of ‘the Sunna of 
Islam’ from those who would wish to detach it from the righteous forebears and, through 
conspiracy and otherwise, would seek to alter the purity of the manhaj. Again, it is 
important to note that taking the authority vested in the minbar (the place in a mosque 
where a preacher stands to deliver the khuṭba) to cast aspersions on other Muslims has 
particular symbolic value and adds emphasis to the claims of authority over Islam’s 
interpretative methodology or manhaj. The speaker makes liberal, provocative 
comparisons with well-known episodes and aspects of prophetic biography (sīra) and the 
contemporary climate of intra-Salafī dynamics in a strategic use of the authority of the 
past to make gains in the present. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: The Origins of The Mawlid574 
Narrator:  Abu Hakeem Bilaal Davis 
Posted:  30 December 2015 
Length:  32:54 
Setting:   Friday Sermon (Khuṭbah) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
As the title indicates, this podcast contains the main arguments against the validity of the 
celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad that are regularly found in Salafī 
                                               
574 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/the-origins-of-the-mawlid-eid-milad-
an-nabi-by-abu-hakeem/ 
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refutations of this act: 1) the lack of precedent in early Islamic history; 2) it represents an 
over-praising of the Prophet Muḥammad, and thus may be idolatrous, as praise is reserved 
for God alone, not any human; and 3) it represents a syncretic addition with Christian, 
Jewish, and/or even pagan origins. In the course of the speaker’s presentation he makes 
these arguments in a non-linear fashion. 
The practice of celebrating the Mawlid is not exclusively a Ṣūfī practice, but is 
often closely associated with Sufism and is a point of contestation in the Salafī–Ṣūfī 
divide, as described previously. The speaker establishes the premise of his argument (and 
the larger Salafī argument) by pronouncing that ‘we follow what [the prophet] 
commanded us’, with the further elucidation that ‘God is not worshiped except by that 
which He has prescribed’ [2:50]. 
The celebration of the Mawlid, then, is an act of veneration unsanctioned by the 
scriptural sources of Islam (or revealed authority): namely, the Qur’ān and Sunna (the 
statements and normative practices of the Prophet Muḥammad). In addition, the 
celebration is not a recorded practice of the generations of the pious forebears, the Salaf. 
As such, those who claim that the Mawlid is a celebration that is intended to strengthen 
one’s love of the Prophet and, by extension, is an act of worship of God, are confronted 
with the argument represented by the speaker here, who makes the sweeping, unequivocal 
statement that Muslims are proscribed from engaging in any acts of worship that are not 
known to have been a practice of the Prophet Muḥammad or of the generations of the 
Salaf. 
He also quotes a ḥadīth in which the Prophet is said to have related: ‘Do not go in 
‘excesses’ in ‘praising me’. [4:09] On this basis, the speaker suggests that the Mawlid in 
fact resembles the Christian veneration of Jesus and the status they attribute to him. (It 
should be noted that the sermon was delivered on Christmas Day ( December 25) 2015 
and posted days later.) 
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The speaker turns for a moment from his line of argument against the Mawlid per 
se and interrogates the Christian celebration of Jesus’s birthday. [4:45] Although the 
sermon is about the Mawlid, his use of Christmas follows two threads common in Salafī 
literature: first, Christmas Day is not the actual day of Jesus’s birth and, therefore, is not 
valid even for Christians; and second, Muslims are emulating Christians in celebrating the 
birthday of prophets, although Christians appropriated the practice from pre-Christian 
sources. The speaker pursues the main challenges of the accuracy of December 25 as the 
day of Jesus’s birth, stating that ‘Christians have gone beyond bounds’ in celebrating 
Jesus’s birthday, because ‘in reality they have no knowledge’ of the actual day of his 
birth. The likening of the Mawlid with the Christian celebration of Christmas is an 
argument that seems compelling on the surface. The creedal differences between Islam 
and Christianity, such as the salvation narratives of the sacrifice of the Son of God, are 
well known and seemingly irreconcilable theologically, so the case against the Mawlid—
without explicit authority in Islam to claim that it is absolutely heretical—is often 
buttressed by citations of creedal and sacramental differences between Islam and 
Christianity. In other words, it is a strategic tangent of the speaker’s presentation that 
perhaps compensates for the absence of revealed texts that explicitly state that Mawlid 
celebrations are unequivocally proscribed. 
The speaker then continues and circles back to the confrontation on Christmas and 
cites the New Testament as saying that Jesus was born in the season of the harvest, which 
he says does not fall in December. It was a ‘festivity imported [into Christianity] from the 
pagans’ of the Roman Empire; their celebrations of the ‘new sun’ was taken on by 
Christianity when the religion began to spread. [5:43] This sets up the emulation 
argument more distinctly. The speaker cites the Prophet Muḥammad as stating that, some 
day, Muslims will follow the steps of previous religious communities, ‘footstep by 
footstep, handspan by handspan’, to the point that if they go into a ‘lizard’s hole’ Muslims 
will follow them. He then states: ‘We see likewise the celebration of the Mawlid’ of the 
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Prophet Muḥammad, which is a celebration emulating ‘the example of the Christians and 
the Jews’. The speaker’s contempt is further evinced with this tone, which, quite frankly, 
adds to the bellicosity of his position not merely with Christian holidays per se, but with 
the Mawlid celebration among Muslims. 
The speaker next delves into the origins of the Mawlid in Muslim history. Here, 
instead of citing Christian creedal conventions, he turns towards the Shiites. First, he 
states that none of the earlier generations of Islam practised Mawlid celebrations. So how 
did the Mawlid come into being in Islam? It was started in the fourth century of the 
Muslim calendar, he states, ‘not by the people of Sunna and Ḥadīth, but by the Fāṭimids, 
the Shiites’. The Fāṭimids, who were Ismāʿīlī Shiites, established a state in Egypt that 
spread across North Africa, as the speaker explains, and the leader of the Fāṭimids needed 
to curry favour with the surrounding Sunnī world; because Ṣūfīs, he says, were ‘on the 
rise at the time’ and the Fāṭimid leadership sought out a religious practice that would 
attract a celebratory veneration of the Prophet Muḥammad and thus attract Ṣūfīs. (The 
purpose of the insertion of the rise of Sufism in this narrative is not clear, but it seems to 
be a method intended to add value to the speaker’s overall rebuttal.)575  So, the leader of 
the Fāṭimids (who is unnamed in the podcast) ‘brought’ about the celebration of Mawlid. 
[11:41] None of the history he recounts here is substantiated or supported by anything 
other than the authority of the minbar (the raised platform from which a sermon is given 
in a mosque). However, in other works that will be examined in this study—particularly a 
freely downloadable e-book—the Shiite origins of the Mawlid are drawn out. 
Continuing, the speaker deconstructs the rationales often employed in favour of 
the Mawlid, addressing and seeking to rebut the claim that the celebrations are an 
expression of the love of the Prophet. Celebrants of the Mawlid cite a verse of the Qur’ān 
                                               
575 Further description of the Fāṭimids is beyond the purview of this study. See Marius Canard, 
'Fāṭimids', in P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Enclyopaedia of Islam (Second Edition edn.; Leiden: Brill 
Online, 2012). 
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in which people are encouraged to rejoice at the ‘mercy’ sent by God, which, the speaker 
points out, is often interpreted as the Prophet Muḥammad. He rejects this interpretation in 
two ways. First, he states that the verse speaks of rejoicing, not celebration—not ‘parties’, 
as he states. And the word ‘mercy’ in the verse, he claims, refers not to the Prophet 
Muḥammad but to the revelation of the Qur’ān itself. While there are differences of 
opinion about the meaning of ‘mercy’ in the verse, the speaker quotes the exegesis of Ibn 
Kathīr (1301–1373), a well-known Qur’ān scholar who lived in Damascus and was 
influenced by Ibn Taymiyya’s works. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
The narration exemplifies Salafī contestations regarding the celebration of the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s birthday and the strategies of refutation used: 1) Intra-Islamic syncretism, 
through Shi’ism; 2) extra-Islamic syncretism from Christian sources; 3) a lack of 
precedent in the early generations of Islam; and 4) a denial of the presence of any 
reverence for the Prophet Muḥammad or other spiritual value in the practice. The speaker 
deconstructs the textual proofs of the proponents of the Mawlid by calling their proofs 
‘shubahāt’, or insertions of doubt or unfounded speculation, the anathema of certitude in 
faith. In deconstructing the validity of the Mawlid, the speaker implies a more general 
Salafī concern to define the limits not only of the manhaj of Islam in legal matters, but 
also with regard to supererogatory acts or devotions. Also, the aggressive handling of the 
Fatimids in Egypt is not uncommon in Salafist discourse, and it is employed here to stress 
the heterodoxy of birthday celebrating by associating celebration to Fāṭimid Ismāʿīlī 
Muslims and their leadership.576 
                                               
576 In the Salafi Publications e-book on the Mawlid, the author describes the founder of al-Azhar 
University in Cairo as: ‘He was a vile, cursed Bāṭinī Ismāʿīlī Shiʿite and these celebrations were a 
means to entice people away from the legislated actions of the Sharīʿah and towards innovations 
leading to a superficial attachment to Islām which eventually revolved around veneration of graves and 
saints as a means of easy salvation’. See Abū ʿIyaaḍ Amjad Rafīq Rafīq, Concerning Celebration of 
the Mawlid, (Birmingham: Salalfi Publications, 2014), at 35. 
  201 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title:  Iman in the presence of Sins & Iman in the presence of Unbelief577 
Narrator:  Abu Iyaad Amjad Rafiq 
Posted:  12 December 2016 
Length:  1:09:55 
Setting:  Lecture 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Detailed Synopsis 
In this podcast, the speaker offers a critique of various ‘sects’, as he calls them, and 
interestingly includes among them the Ḥanafi school of law, the most popular school of 
law in the Muslim world. He cites defects in their creeds, pivoting beyond the Salafī 
critiques regarding the names or attributes of God, which are taken to be figurative rather 
than literal in the named sects. But also, he references the notions of faith (īmān) held by 
the ‘sects’. [2:35–3:42] These sects, the speaker asserts, view īmān to be static, that is, 
reserved for the realm of the heart, disassociated from deeds. A lengthy discussion 
follows on the differences between a Muslim weak in faith but without idolatry in his or 
her heart and those ‘Muslims’ observant of the pillars of Islam but with idolatry, such as 
‘worshipping’ at graves, in their hearts. The former will enter hellfire but eventually will 
be saved and sent to heaven, while those who had done many good deeds but had shirk in 
their hearts would be in hell forever. This, the speaker says, is the position of Ahl al-
Sunna— taking a position between the khawārij and its opposing theology known as 
marji’a, meaning those who believe that faith is entirely a matter of the heart and that 
there is no increase or decrease in faith on account of deeds done; and those who believe 
that Muslims who commit major sins are kāfirs, outright disbelievers who should be 
punished in this life and in the next. The modern-day version of the khawārij are those—
                                               
577 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/iman-in-the-presence-of-sins-iman-
in-the-presence-of-unbelief-the-aqidah-of-imam-muhammad-ibn-abdil-wahhab-by-abu-khadeejah/ 
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presumably ISIS—who pass judgements on Muslims for their sins and visit violent 
retribution upon them, says the speaker. [38:00] In the question and answer session of the 
event recorded in the podcast, one audience member asked if a person joins Jamāʿat al-
Tablīgh in their gatherings that makes him an innovator. The speakers says that if he joins 
them and is aware of their innovative ways, then he too is an innovator, adding, directly, 
that people of innovation are Jamāʿat al-Tablīgh and al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (the Muslim 
Brotherhood): these are ahl al-bidʿa, or people of innovation. [41:00–42:00] 
The speaker addresses following a Prayer leader in worship. One of the ‘pillars’ 
(canonical practices of the faith) of Islam is the Prayer Ritual or Ṣalāt. As the speaker 
mentions, it is best to perform the Prayer in congregation, in which case there is a Prayer 
leader (an imām) who stands in front of the worshippers to lead them in the recitation and 
postures of the Prayer Ritual. The worshippers behind the imām follow his/her lead in the 
moves (bends and bows) that are established parts of the Muslim prayer. A question 
arises, however, as to the qualifications of the one who leads, and this includes the creedal 
beliefs of the imām. In this podcast, the validity of praying behind an imam who follows a 
creed that significantly differs from the Salafī point of view is questioned, meaning that 
Salafīs are cautioned to perform the Prayer Ritual behind an imām whose creedal beliefs 
are deemed heretical, even if the imām performs the prayer impeccably. Here we have an 
example of a real-life issue of ‘performance’ associated with creedal thought. As 
mentioned previously, the modes of dispute that relate to actual performance when 
determining the foundation of Salafī–Ṣūfī contestations and Salafī polemics are a focus of 
this study. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
This podcast extends the realm of heresy or heretical innovation to include how faith itself 
operates in the Salafī creedal view. The speaker reproaches the Ḥanafi school of law 
along with other groups or ‘sects’ with regard to the dynamic or static nature of faith or 
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īmān, the center of Muslim piety. Does faith increase or decrease in connection with the 
deeds of worshippers? What animates this discussion is the implied assumption that 
practices (deeds, in essence) do indeed affect the level of faith and creedal beliefs of 
Muslim worshippers. This view adds significant authority or power to Salafī strategies in 
their critiques of Sufi extra-canonical practices and associating them with the centrality of 
faith. Also, the podcasts demonstrate an example of a real-life issue of ‘performance’ 
ritual and the validity of participating in it based on the unseen creeds held by the prayer 
leader. As mentioned previously, the modes of dispute that relate to actual performance 
when determining the foundation of Salafī–Ṣūfī contestations and Salafī polemics are a 
focus of this study.   
 
6.6 Summarized Synopses of Select Podcasts 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: Praying In Jamaah & Praying Behinf [sic] Innovators578 
Narrator:  Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid 
Length:  24:49 
Posted:  15 December 2017 
Setting:   Lecture  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Summarized Synopsis 
The speaker begins by declaring that if one prays any of the five daily ritual prayers 
behind an imam and it turns out he is a jahamī then the prayer should be repeated, as 
praying behind an imam who is a jahamī is not valid [1:20–3:00] because a jahamī prayer 
leader ‘denies the names and attributes of Allah in totality’ [2:26]. If imam happens to be 
the ruler of the land, then one does not repeat the prayer. The purpose of this distinction 
between prayers behind an imām and prayers behind a ruler who simply leads the prayer 
is to keep people united, especially during the Friday worship, the speaker states. 
                                               
578 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/praying-in-jamaah-praying-behind-
innovators-sharhus-sunnah-al-barbahari-lesson-by-abu-khadeejah/ 
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The main contention is formulated by the speaker as follows: Because of the 
spread of Asharism today, most of the mosques in the world are led by imāms of such 
creedal thought. So, if people have no choice then they should pray behind such imāms in 
order to keep the congregational prayer alive. However, if people find imāms who are of 
Ahl al-Sunna then one should pray behind them, rather than imāms of heretical creedal 
persuasion. In discussing this well-known, detailed and carefully thought-out thread of 
Islam sacred law relating to the qualities of a prayer leader and his qualifications, with 
some variation in opinions and such, the contemporary polemic adds a distinction: that is, 
castigating the Ashʿarīs and Māturīdīs as outside the community of Ahl al-Sunna.  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: Types of Bid’ah’ (part 1) Types of Bid’ah (part 2) 
Narrator:  Abu Khadeejah Abdul Waahid 
Posted:  25 Ramadan 1436 (25 July 2015) 
Length:  27:05 
Setting:   Lecture in Ramadan 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Summarized Synopsis 
Part One: In this part, the narrator methodically presents the various types and 
definitions of bidʿa (heretical innovation) in Islam. He bases his talk mainly on a book by 
Imām al-Shāṭibī, a well-known scholar, and quotes from other scholars occasionally. In 
brief, the two main types of bidʿa are, first, those that are innovations in the religion with 
no basis in Islam’s chief sources of law, the Qur’ān, the Sunna, and the Consensus of 
Muslim scholars; and, second, those that have a partial or apparent basis in the scriptural 
sources of Islam, but feature additions that do not have such a basis. The former is fully 
recognizable. The latter gives the appearance of acceptability, but upon closer review is 
pernicious—in essence, these innovations are ‘evil’ (sharr). The speaker attributes the 
introduction of illicit innovations into Islam to demonic sources, Satan especially. In 
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doing so, he assigns a non-textual, unseen cause to the growth of heretical innovation. 
Next, he mentions Ṣūfīs, whom he claims hold their shaykhs as infallible, although he 
produces no evidence for this. He mentions several of the major Ṣūfī orders (ṭuruq) that, 
he claims, consider their leaders infallible. Subsequently he says that the reserving the 
night of the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday for special prayers and festivities—a major 
locus of contestation—is bidʿa, and that taking one of the names of God and repeating it 
over and again—a common practice among Ṣūfīs, though not exclusive to them—is a 
heretical innovation. The group chanting of the name of God is thus bidʿa, but ‘[t]his is 
what they do, those Sufis’. He also makes mention of the practice of dancing around 
graves as a manifest demonstration of heretical innovation, though the speaker offers no 
specific example of this practice. 
 
Part Two: Here the narrator summarizes the previous principles mentioned in Part One of 
this podcast, and adds that any act declared to be an act of worship but that is not a 
practice of the Prophet Muḥammad is considered bidʿa. He then provides examples of 
such innovation, some repeated from the previous part. Innovation is also implied in 
excessiveness in worship, such as monasticism and extreme asceticism. The speaker 
offers detailed examples that illustrate the main point of the speech: that all worship must 
have precedent in the deeds and normative practice of the Prophet Muḥammad (the 
Sunna). He lists six principles that comprise a valid act of worship and gives examples of 
what, therefore, invalidates certain acts. One of them is the Mawlid, the celebration of the 
birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad. Celebrants may praise the Prophet, make prayers of 
blessings upon him—even if the form of the prayer is acceptable—but to do so because of 
the birthday means that the act is not acceptable (by God), because it has no precedent—
one of the six principles. The celebrants, in fact, become sinful. 
The speaker is strident in denouncing Sufism and those who have fallen from the 
path of the Ahl al-Sunna, likening the growth of the ‘deviation’ of Sufism to the spread of 
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‘rabies’. To reinforce his undisguised dislike of Sufism, because of its separation from the 
norms and practices of Salafism, he flippantly mentions ‘those Sufis’ who ‘bang their 
heads around’ and speaks sarcastically of the American scholar Yasir Qadhi, who 
seemingly praised Ṣūfīs because he found that being around them inspires him: in a 
surprising retort, the speaker says that Satan was in great company (before his fall) in 
Paradise among a better company that Yasir Qadhi experienced, but then Satan went 
astray. This sharp refutation parallels with his general censuring of Ṣūfīs and those who 
praise them. Yasir Qadhi is often identified as a Salafī himself, but has been accused in 
the podcast of straying from proper Salafism for praising Ṣūfīs. The speaker considers 
him ‘deceived’ and a ‘deceiver as well’. This entire episode is an unexpected diversion in 
a talk that commenced with a methodical and textual approach. However, the vehemence 
of the speaker’s language in describing Qadhi is telling: ‘This deviant who removed 
himself of salafiyya anyway. We did not remove him, he removed himself, al-hamdulillah 
[praise God]. Good riddance’. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies: 
The speaker lectures on the definitions of bidʿa as explained in the book of Imam 
al-Shāṭibī (1320–1388), an Andalusian (Granadan) Sunnī scholar of law, particularly the 
Maliki School of Law [madhhab]. The narration tends to be in the style of a methodical 
summary, including the kinds and definitions of bidʿa in Islamic law. But, at key points, 
the speaker mentions the pernicious nature of bidʿa among Ṣūfīs. Key words in this 
podcast are bidʿa and practices that are ‘Satanic’. In Part Two, the celebration of the 
Prophet’s birthday is described as a heretical innovation that is ‘not accepted’ by God. 
The speaker becomes acerbic in his sardonic discussion of Ṣūfī practices and he becomes 
vituperative in his tone when strongly condemning the American scholar Yasir Qadhi for 
his comments seeming to praise Ṣūfīs. As such, this is a prime example of a Salafī 
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scholar, as Qadhi has been described, who is censured for demonstrating a degree of 
empathy toward Sufism.  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: ‘The Salafis are Ahlus-Sunnah, Ahlul-Hadīth, Ahul-Athar, The 
Aided Group & The Saved Sect’579 
Narrator:  Abu Mu’aadh Taqweem Aslam 
Posted:  12 August 2016 
Length:  1:03:06 
Setting:   Conference Lecture 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Summarized Synopsis 
The speaker discourses at length on the important discussion regarding the lines of 
demarcation between those who are part of and those who are outside the Ahl al-Sunna 
wa al-Jamāʿa (those who are counted as among those Muslims who are safely within the 
bounds of normative Islam). Those who cleave to normative Islam (the Sunna) are part of 
this society. Those who are not include the people of ‘innovation’, also called the 
rāfiḍa—those who literally reject the Sunna. The term also refers derogatorily to Shiites. 
First, however, he cites Ṣūfīs as contradicting or transgressing the norms and practices of 
Ahl al-Sunna. Quoting Ibn Taymiyya, he then goes on to list others who fall outside the 
normative Islam frame, such as those who deny the attributes of God (Jahmiyya), a school 
of thought that essentially no longer exists. He lists the qualities of those who are part of 
the Ahl al-Sunna, and he distills the definition thus: If one is Ahl al-Sunna, then he is 
‘Salafī’. 
He then discusses those who use the phrase as a point of identity, though they are 
not in reality not among the Ahl al-Sunna; the speaker claims that Ṣūfīs seek to define 
themselves with the phrase, even though they are not from the Ahl al-Sunna. Innovations 
                                               
579 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/the-salafis-are-ahlus-sunnah-ahlul-
hadith-ahul-athar-the-aided-group-the-saved-sect-by-abu-muadh/ 
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and misguidance arose in Islam after the pious generation and heretical groups emerged 
and proliferated. Without parsing or citation, the speaker states that ‘the Sufis do this’; 
that is, they make claims to be followers of the sunna, but are heretical in their practices 
and creeds because they do not follow the methodology (manhaj) of the Salaf. In essence, 
as the speaker points out, the phrase Ahl al-Sunna is meant to distinguish the people of 
‘the truth’ from the ‘deviants who emerged’, such as those who are ‘the deviated Sufis’. 
The ‘saved sect’ are those who follow the Salafī manhaj. 
 
Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
The speaker relies on the abundant usage of various key terminologies that bolster claims 
of the exclusivity of the Salafī ‘methdology’ (manhaj) and teachings as the true paradigm 
of pure Islam, to which he also brings eschatological connotations. Thus, among the 
abundant strategic uses of the key terminologies employed in many of the podcasts and 
other online Salafī discourses examined in this study, the speaker, without equivocation, 
adds an afterlife category. Those who follow the true manhaj of the Salaf are collectively 
al-Firqa al-Najiya (the Saved Sect), a phrase which references salvation in the Hereafter. 
These phrases associated with the salvation narrative are expanded upon in following 
chapter, as they have significance as a declamatory approach to the gaining of authority. 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Podcast Title: From the Methodology of the Salaf—Defending and Guarding the 
Manhaj580 
Narrator:  Abu Hakeem Bilaal Davis 
Posted:  25 November 2016 
Length:  27:05 
Setting:   Friday Sermon (Khuṭbah) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                               
580 Accessed at (20 January 2019): https://www.salafisounds.com/from-the-methodology-of-the-salaf-
defending-and-guarding-the-manhaj-khutbah-by-abu-hakeem/ 
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Summarized Synopsis 
Like previous podcasts from Salafi Sounds, this sermon begins by establishing the 
foundation of the ‘methodology of Ahl al-Sunnah’ or the manhaj thereof. The approach 
the speaker takes in this podcast involves a staging of an attack on the manhaj by non-
Salafīs, thus requiring the faithful to come to its defence; in fact, it is a religious 
‘responsibility’ to serve in the ‘vanguards’ to protect the manhaj from innovations and 
accretions. He implies that the central tenet of Islam’s creed—that is, the belief in one 
God or tawḥīd— is threatened: the introductions of innovations are a gateway religious 
phenomenon that leads to idolatry and the very ‘downfall’ or ‘destruction of tawḥīd’. 
Muslims who introduce innovation are, in fact, paving ‘a path of destruction’ for the 
nation of Islam to follow. More specifically, it is the phenomenon of ḥizbiyya 
(partisanship toward an ideology or a leader) that invites such destruction. The speaker 
instils a mistrust of those people who sound like they are part of the ahl al-Sunna, while 
in reality they are not. He makes glancing references to nameless Muslims of notoriety 
who gain a following, write their ideas in ‘magazines’ and ‘books’, and pursue projects 
for people to support. Some of them, he contends, are ‘extreme ṣūfiyya’ (Ṣūfīs) who raise 
their leaders and ‘saints’ above the station of the Prophet Muḥammad. 
 Finally, the speaker returns to popular Muslim figures who, he says, attract 
followers numbering 10,000 or even 30,000 at events. The gathering of numbers, the 
speaker contends, is not the hallmark of truth. Truth is known and clear, and it is in the 
possession of ahl al-Sunna. These unnamed persons seek ‘to attract as many people to 
their misguidance as possible’, so the speaker cautions against being deceived by such 
followers and events, and advises his listeners to measure the value of a person of 
notoriety against the manhaj of Islam, the manhaj of the Salaf. He then quotes from the 
Qur’ān to support his claim that, frequently, the majority will misguide and deceive. 
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Brief Analysis: Significance and Key Ideological Themes and Terminologies 
In this podcast, the speaker builds an argument about the exclusivity of the Salafī 
interpretation of Islam by applying key creedal terminologies, including manhaj and Ahl 
al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a, and urges the necessity of defending the ‘methodology’ from 
syncretic incursions into Islam, including Sufism. He makes a straw-man argument that 
Ṣūfīs ‘raise their saints and their peer and their leaders to a station that is above the station 
of the Prophet’—one of the significant loci of Salafī contestations with regard to 
Sufism—and devotes a significant amount of time to cautioning people against being 
deceived by popularity or a cult following. The admonition is vague, and is thus 
applicable to anyone, any group, or any Muslim institution that differs in their beliefs and 
practices from Islam’s manhaj as defined and defended in much of the content under 
review. In addition, the speaker seeks to instill a generalized mistrust of people who, 
although they appear to be part of the ahl al-Sunna, in reality are not. 
 
Concluding Analytical Comments of the Podcasts 
The next chapter contains the analyses of the strategies and nomenclature of the Salafī 
texts and their contestations with, most prominently, Sufism. It would be appropriate, 
however, to outline key and perhaps more immediate observations regarding the podcasts 
at this juncture, as it pertains to 1) Saudi influence, 2) tonality, and 3) populist rhetoric 
that the researcher perceived in the process of data gathering.  
Several of the podcasts examined in this study were lectures based on the works of 
Saudi religious figures and scholars, most notably Shaykh Ṣāliḥ ibn Fawzān ibn 
ʿAbdullah Al-Fawzān (b. 1943), a senior member of the Saudi religious elite and a senior 
member of the counsel responsible for formal religious edits (fatāwā) in the Kingdom. A 
series of podcasts, in fact, are structured according to Shaykh al-Fawzān’s writings on 
creedal matters (ʿaqīda), such as the nature of the attributes of God, and Shaykh al-
Fawzān’s hagiographic biography of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, the eponym of 
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Wahhabism. The works of Shaykh al-Fawzān were interwoven within the lectures. 
However, in each case, it became problematic if not impossible for a listener to 
distinguish between the embellishments, commentary, and vehemence of the podcast 
presenters and the actual texts and arguments of Shaykh al-Fawzān himself. It is possible, 
if not likely, that this style of presentation created an unintended disservice to Shaykh al-
Fawzān, whose actual prose could be more tempered and methodical than the podcast 
presenters’ approaches.  
Thus, the tone and strident language of the speakers, at times, dominated the 
overall timbre of the podcasts, which can cause an uncritical listener to accept the shift in 
language and tenor of a given presentation and suppose that the variations in modality and 
temperament reflected the deportment of a scholarly figure, like Shaykh al-Fawzān, and 
his publications. But more importantly, it is interesting to note that while Salafists have an 
aversion to being described as Wahhābīs,581 the texts of Salafi Sounds frequently 
reference Saudi-Wahhābī scholars in general. The significant presence of Saudi clerics in 
Salafi Sounds texts can be said to legitimate or affirm contemporary research that 
associates the modern history of Saudi scholars with external, transnational advocacy of 
purist Salafism globally. It is also possible to consider that the combative tone of the 
speakers in fact resemble the works of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, which is said to 
be ‘combative in tone: those who did not share his vision of the doctrine of tawhid were 
dismissed as unbelievers’.582  
Historically, the definition of Salafism was not entirely settled until the 1970s in 
which it was ‘no longer up for grabs’ or when the definition and ‘its basic interpretation 
was less likely to shift’.583 In consideration of the growing authority of the Saudi-
Wahhabism category, starting in the pre-digital age, and in consideration of the influence 
                                               
581 Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, at 235.  
582 Richard Gauvain, 'Salafism in Modern Egypt: Panacea or Pest?', Political Theology, 11/6 (2010), 
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and the reach of petrol funding, Saudi Arabia became Salafism’s de facto and ‘main 
intellectual center of gravity’ and framers of the concept of ‘Islamic purism’.584  To stress 
this point, Shaykh al-Fawzān wrote a noteworthy opinion in one of his books of formal 
legal edicts (fatāwā) in which he stated that to consider Salafism as simply one movement 
that ‘resembles any other Islamic movements is wrong’.585 In his view, Salafism 
singularly and exclusively represents the proper methodology (manhaj) of Islam which 
must be followed by Muslims. ‘Therefore, Muslims are not permitted to follow any other 
movement, since all others are straying movements’.586 As such, transnational voices of 
Salafism ‘defer to and constantly reference the senior scholars of Saudi Arabia’, 
ostensibly ‘to bolster their claims of authenticity and silence those with an inferior 
command of scholastic frames of reference’.587 The most mentioned figures of Saudi 
Arabia (by birth or influence) include, in order of prominence, Shaykh al-Fawzān, ʿAbd 
al-ʿAzīz bin Bāz (1910-1999); the latter of whom served as the supreme religious figure 
(grand muftī) in Saudi Arabia for decades, upon his passing. Also mentioned is 
Muḥammad ibn al-ʿUthaymīn (1925-2001), a prominent cleric whose views and works 
remain influential in contemporary Salafism.588 
 It thus follows that the Salafi Sounds podcasts reviewed here—their style and 
references—demonstrate explicitly what researchers have inferred about Salafī 
epistemology or approach to knowledge acquisition. The scholars and advocates of 
Salafism ‘resist the possibility of subjective knowledge, textual ambiguity and metaphor 
and dismiss the validity of interpretations of the Qur’an and Hadith outside of a narrow 
cluster of Salafi scholars’, many of whom are Saudi or Saudi trained.589 They tend to rely 
                                               
584 Ibid., at 200–01. 
585 As quoted in: Muhammad Al-Atawneh, 'Wahhabi Self-Examination Post-9/11: Rethinking the 
‘Other’,‘Otherness’ and Tolerance', Middle Eastern Studies, 47/2 (2011), 255–71, at 256. 
586 As quoted in: ibid. 
587 Sadek Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism 
(London: IB Tauris, 2016), at 54. 
588 Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God (London: Routledge, 2012) at 173. 
589 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists, at 54. 
  213 
on a literalist approach in interpreting Islam’s sacred texts and thus strictly avoid 
‘theological, philosophical and speculative meanings of the Qur’an and attributes of God. 
In essence, Salafism disregards almost all of Muslim intellectual history’.590  
As such, what also became distinctive about the podcasts, the disembodied 
conveyance of the human voice, is the populist quality of the lectures that do not sound 
like scholarly or academic presentations. It is populist in the simplicity of the vocabulary, 
in argument construction, and in purposively producing apprehension about being within 
or without Islamic orthopraxy. It must be stated that the speakers demonstrate a high 
degree of aptitude and oratory facility with quoting verses of the Qur’ān and statements of 
the Prophet Muḥammad—often with an unambiguous vehemence of tonality—all of 
which indicate a level certitude that listeners may accept without critical scrutiny.  
As Sadek points out, populist discourses affect the ‘framing process’ through 
which two critical areas of activism are constituted. First, the framing influences what 
‘Muslim activists should be thinking and talking about’ in their communal and personal 
lives. Second, the framing affects ‘what target audiences should be doing’ or should 
accept in their creedal and performative aspects of their lives.591 Populist discourses, as 
such, find most resonance with non-academic audiences, who, as it were, are more prone 
to be influenced by the appeal and simplification of Salafī discourse. ‘These framings are 
most potent and likely to be accepted when they resonate with a person's life 
circumstances and work best when they correlate with an individual's personal values, 
experiences, and viewpoints’.592  
Among the significant findings and observations of the voice-texts examined 
herein relate to the tenor and populist qualities of the podcasts in another dimension, 
namely, these qualities significantly inform the overall oppositionality of contemporary 
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Salafism with non- Salafī thought. For the purpose of analogy, contemporary populist 
rhetoric in significant political debates and global discourses of today rely on 
oppositionality but in the form of anti-immigrant, anti-terror, or, ironically, anti-Islam (or 
‘dialetic Islamophobia’) security frames as part of electoral strategies.593 As a result, 
identity politics informed by fear-rousing and demonizing of the other takes precedence 
over critical assessment of political promises and policies. The tonal demeanors of the 
podcasts thus rely on unparsed declarations of oppositionality employing severe 
accusatory language, such as ‘deviance’ (and ‘deviants’) and ‘evil’ (or ‘most evil’) and 
‘devils’, as well as references to such imagery as ‘rabid dogs’ when speaking of Sufism 
and wayward Salafism.  
It is also important to consider the revisionist or hagiographic accounts of the 
proto-development of the Saudi-Wahhabi nation-state. The historical treatments in several 
of the podcasts examined herein may also be referred to ‘Salafi historiography’, as it has 
been used to describe Wahhabi interpretations of not only the past, but the larger and 
contested category of ‘Islamic heritage’.594 The interpretations and Salafi historiography, 
ideologically influenced recounting and interpretation of the past, are employed toward 
bolstering the legitimacy of Salafī oppositionality and the attainment of popular creedal 
authority. The podcasts, as cited above, for example, present what appears to be an 
indiscriminate or weakly sourced good-evil binary in the narration of the Wahhabi-
Ottoman 19th-century historical conflicts in the Arabian Peninsula, in which the 
virtuousness of the former is juxtaposed to the heterodoxy and even licentiousness of the 
Ottomans with their promotion of grave worship and ‘singing girls’ (as mentioned above). 
As demonstrated in the historiography presented in the podcasts, the Wahhabi/proto-Saudi 
                                               
593 Khaled A Beydoun, 'Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework', Columbia Law 
Review Online, 116 (2016), 108–25, at 119–20. 
594 Ömer Can Aksoy, ‘Framing the Primordial: Islamic Heritage and Saudi Arabia’, in Trinidad Rico 
(ed.), The Making of Islamic Heritage: Muslim Pasts and Heritage Presents (Singapore: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2017), 67–88, at 68. 
  215 
‘struggle with the Ottoman Empire was framed as a struggle between believers and non-
believers’.595  
 Moreover, it is valuable to mention that in the voice-texts examined herein, the 
speakers advance their comments and advocacy with noteworthy facility in citing and 
reciting verses of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth of the Prophet Muḥammad, as one can perceive 
more immediately while listening rather than reading a text. However, citations of 
scholars of theology of Muslim intellectual history are conspicuously absent or, very 
rarely, mentioned for the purpose of criticism. The scholarly traditions that the podcasts 
reference are mainly of Ibn Taymiyya, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, and modern Saudi clerics, such 
as those named above. The reproach of Sufism employs a system of referencing—
elaborated upon in the next chapter—that is categorical and essentialist in nature. It 
should be noted here that such an approach to censure other Muslims who are deemed 
heterodox affirms the epistemological bearing of contemporary Salafism. The literalist 
and historically restrictive epistemology is referred to as the Salafī manhaj, the ‘Arabic 
term that best encapsulates this process of ideologization’ of contemporary Salafism.596 
 Finally, the podcasts are English-language productions. As expected, Arabic (the 
authoritative language of Islam and its scriptural sources) is frequently used when citing 
verses of the Qur’ān. But Arabic is also used when describing affirmatively the orthodoxy 
of Salafism, such as in the important framing effects of phrases as Ahl al-Sunna wa al-
Jamāʿa, which is mentioned both in Arabic and liberally and ideologically rendered into 
English as, for example, ‘true Islam’ or ‘the way’ of the Prophet Muḥammad and his 
Companions; as well as other English equivalent terms suggesting rectitude and 
orthodoxy. The key terms of Salafism’s methodology are also mentioned in Arabic. For 
example, manhaj is mentioned in Arabic and referenced in English with a modifier of 
commendation, such as ‘the proper methodology’ of Islam. The next chapter elaborates 
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on the strategies and vocabulary that the Salafī texts depend upon in their contestations. 
The purpose of this section’s analysis is to draw intention to the audible properties and 
potential effects of the podcasts.   
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Chapter 7 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSES 
 
7.0  Introduction 
In this section, the study turns toward a comprehensive presentation of the findings of the 
study based on the aggregate analyses of the various texts examined in the previous 
section. Concise and specific analyses presented in the preceding chapter represent 
examinations of individual texts, key words, tonality, and arguments of Salafism, and they 
present a linear and summarized synopsis from which patterns of anti-Ṣūfī positions have 
been shaped in and by emerging digital technologies, particularly podcasts. The Salafist 
positions rely on and make regular uses of critical juridical-ethical and creedal (ʿaqīda) 
themes and vocabularies in their anti-Ṣūfī pronouncements. However, they are 
promulgated and amplified by digital media and their disruptions, with particular 
emphasis on podcasts as a single-sensory listening practice of religious content—an 
engagement that demands from the audience a greater participation of the imagination, 
according to McLuhan’s cold-hot media theory convention, as opposed to television (or 
video), which invites a passive consumption.597 
The findings presented in this chapter are organized according to critical 
categories of analyses, grouped and constructed from the indications of the Salafī texts 
reviewed individually in the previous chapter. The purpose is to provide a contextualized 
and considered examination of the findings as they relate to the research questions of the 
study and to a broader academic discourse concerning religious authority and new media. 
It proceeds by examining the role of new media and their conveyance of pre-mediatised 
Salafī-Ṣūfī contestations. It next addresses the particular choice of podcast digital media 
and their populist inflections. And in presenting the main loci of disputes in Salafī 
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contestations, specific analyses are provided, in addition to the analyses provided for each 
podcast presented in the previous chapter.  
With regard to established contestations and new media, it is important to stress 
that while the loci of disputes between Salafī and Ṣūfī thoughts are not new, digital 
mediatisation of longstanding disputations does represent something new: mainly new 
‘territories’ of mediated space and their effects,598 as well as developments that Campbell 
calls the ‘evolution of religious practices’.599 And ‘practice’ in this context is not limited 
to rituals; rather it is inclusive of digital knowledge production and conveyance. 
It is hardly necessary for contemporary ideological activism—as supported by 
new media technologies—to rely mainly on new arguments per se. Just as the viewpoints 
of the Reformation predated Martin Luther’s protestations, it was the invention of the 
printing press that altered the media economy of the day in such a way that the invention 
led to ‘alternative centres of power based on ideological argument’ conveyed beyond the 
traditional confines of ecclesiastical authority.600 The press facilitated the church’s revolt 
in unparalleled ways, as discussed previously.601 Likewise, just as the advocacy of 
decentralized church teachings predated modern televangelism, the advent of religious 
broadcast television in the 1970s accelerated the reach and amplification of evangelical 
Christianity’s teachings and the ‘commodification’ of preaching and, eventually, mega-
churches.602 As such, digital media platforms and outlets for ‘preachers today have 
proliferated at an unfathomable rate as digital technologies have expanded to every corner 
of the nation and the far reaches of the planet’.603  
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Power structures and digital media have likewise emphasised the role of social 
media populism in political processes. A notable example is the 2016 American electoral 
events, in which questions arose about the survival of democracy in space of the 
internet.604 The differences and disputed policies of American political parties, however, 
relied on policies and advocacies that were not new per se. Political authority, like its 
religious counterpart, has seen changes and challenges that pivot on media technology 
disruptions that have fundamentally surpassed, for example, the value of relatively 
inexpensive newsprint and seeming outdated broadcast television. Digital platforms, such 
as Facebook, ‘have a dramatically different structure than previous media technologies. 
Content can be relayed among users with no significant third party filtering, fact-
checking, or editorial judgment’.605 In other words, the disruptions of digital media have 
expanded the capacities of once media-restricted populist ideologies, such that digital 
populism represents a significant challenge to the democratic elections of powerful 
democracies, exposing media-inflected vulnerabilities of manipulation by foreign 
(transnational) actors through new media.606  
While this thesis does not relate to democratic politics and populism—even when 
considering the aggressive role of American Evangelicals in American politics—it does 
emphasize that new media have altered the landscapes of power, whether religious or 
political—not necessarily with new arguments per se, but with new capacities of 
mediation and the distribution of content.  
Now, the connections between new media spaces and established Salafī 
ideological arguments have altered the strategies and reach of such accustomed 
arguments, especially as far as digital mobility is concerned and the rhetoric of Salafī 
contestations, in which old terms and established arguments have become new powerful 
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idioms that are at the vanguard of Salafī conceits of purifying Islam from heterodox 
rituals and syncretic practices borrowed from other faiths and philosophies. The pre-
mediatisation of established Ṣūfī reproaches add gravitas to Salafī contestations and its 
ideology construction.  
As this chapter discusses the loci of Salafī contestations with Sufism rely almost 
entirely on previously constructed arguments. This is significant because it demonstrates 
that mediatisation within contemporary Salafī exclusive claims of Islamic orthodoxy does 
not rely on nor require novel ideas or new constructs. The loci of contestations that were 
once theological and juridical in their origins have become ideological constructions 
proctored via new media forms. As such, among the effects of ‘technologised’ texts—that 
is, conveying texts in electronic form—is the ‘capacity to “naturalise” ideologies’, such 
that the texts received through digital means result in ‘greater acceptance’ because they 
are viewed to be natural-sounding ‘common sense’ texts, rather than ideological 
advocacy.607 As this dissertation argues, the digitization of contestations—particularly 
voice-only texts produced by advocates who convey with words and tone their severe 
certitude—the common sense is translated as natural orthodoxy that not subject to debate 
or dissent.  
As an extension of the voice, podcast consumption relies on a listening practice 
that affords greater privacy and mobility. Since the advent of consumer-friendly digital 
media, research focused on disruptions to authority in terms of an offline-online binary. 
However, with podcasts, the technology represents a ‘new distribution of the voice’.608 
The digital product has come to denote an offline-online-offline evolution, in 
consideration of the fact that podcasts can be accessed offline once downloaded to a 
plethora of apps that cater to the technology. This reality expands on an early research 
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paradigm of digital mobility. With podcasts, however, one does not have to be connected 
to the internet to access the texts. 
 The manifest move of Salafi Publications from a static website to podcasts offers 
the content producers what voice-only texts extend to listeners. These claims of 
exclusivity possession of a ‘pure Islam’ can be read, of course, but the claims of the voice 
take advantage of distinctive fluctuations of tone and audible shifts in the volume of the 
voices of the speakers. In other words, it is not merely the substance of the audible texts 
that are employed to frame the semantics of oppositionality; rather the mode and tonality 
of the presentations support the strategy of creating strict and apparently semantically 
supported binaries between this interpretation of Salafism and other Islamic phenomena 
or movements, which, in this case, signifies important and consequential intra-Islamic 
contestations in the world today. The tonality of the podcasts, as such, demonstrates a 
meta-textual affirmation of Salafism’s resistance to the possibility of legitimate alterity 
within the confines of Islam.  
The reasons for the popularity of podcasts and perhaps a significant rationale why 
content producers, like Salafi Publications, would emphasise this digital product over 
static websites are as follows. Among the important benefits of voice-casts relate to time-
shifting and mobility.609 At any moment and in any place—public or private—podcasts 
can be consumed. Salafi Publications’ podcasts are, for all intents and purposes, an 
extended private sphere for the distribution of an authoritative voice making established 
arguments to stake new claims in drawing the boundaries of Islamic orthodoxy. 
To expand upon the comments in the previous chapter, podcasts have accelerated 
as a digital product in the last several years. However, beyond the product-narrative, the 
extension of the voice through digital media has likewise expanded the notion of mobility, 
podcasts have permitted digital content that expands tonality as part of the populist 
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function of digital activism. The voice requires a single sense, auditory, and … Digital 
media represents a ‘rapid transformation’ of digital activism.610  Moreover, ‘listening to 
podcasts on the go is becoming a common practice in urban centers’ and the practice 
‘raises many intriguing questions concerning a person’s subjective understanding of the 
world’. In other words, podcasts and the applications are ‘among the latest instantiations 
of mobile digital communication technology that represent further digital-based 
alterations to the phenomenological experience of everyday life’.611   
For Salafi Sounds, produced by an active, self-described Salafī organization in the 
UK, the transition from web- or text-based activism to mobile voice (podcasts) is an 
accelerated appropriation of new digital or emerging technologies to pursue their 
activism, namely, the purification of Islam. Salafi Sounds does so by relying on 
established arguments or loci of disputes with a major advancement in media mobility, as 
exemplified by the podcast trends. It is a technology that researchers say ‘fundamentally 
alter the meaning and import of certain kinds of content. Especially where clichés and 
generalities are regularly employed as a key feature of discourse (as in the cases of 
religious and political discourse)’.612 This observation is significant since the podcasts 
studied here rely on the repetition of ideological generalities and phrases that approximate 
powerful clichés. 
Contextualizing the Loci of Contestations 
The present research argues that the main loci of contestations of online Salafī 
texts, with regard to Sufism, revolve around the ritual celebration of the Prophet 
Muḥammad’s birthday and the practices associated with visiting graves of saints—
practices associated with Sufism. It is important to note that the Salafī contestations of 
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these ritual performances inform a strategic authority to define ‘true Islam’. The 
contestations, thus, have implications beyond targeted reproaches of certain practices or 
groups; they concern an important and consequential purist Salafī dialect today, which 
issues from Salafism more as an ideology than an epistemological and hermeneutic 
method, as scholars have noted.613 Collectively, the use of a given digital medium as a 
‘proselytizing tool’ of an ideology, as Bunt points out,614 is tantamount to ‘an activist 
worldview’ in which one party sees itself as ‘pure’ and the others in need of 
purification.615  
In essence, aspects of Salafism today represent an ‘Islamic project’ that is 
concerned with ‘creating legitimacy for certain kinds of authority and perceptions of 
authenticity’.616 Thus, in problematizing Ṣūfī emphases on the esoteric, certain religious 
performances, and the great (perhaps ‘extreme’) degrees of deference that Ṣūfīs are said 
to offer to their spiritual teachers or masters, the Salafī discourse serves to impute upon 
itself a certain kind or even brand of ‘theological purity’617 vis-à-vis other Muslims and 
their rituals that are deem heterodox or, more severe, acts of idolatry. Reformations of 
Islam, especially Salafī contemporary purification mission, are ‘no longer 
unselfconsciously traditional, sui generis, but rather, in an expanded world, oppositional 
in character, defining itself against popular custom of the Ṣūfī shrines’, as well as non-
Muslims.618 The expansion of Salafi Publications in digital space is perhaps impelled in 
part by the observation that ‘there is a widespread and still increasing interest in Ṣūfī ideas 
and Sufism as a more irenic alternative to Islamism and Salafism’.619 As such, Salafism’s 
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reproach of Sufism is an important area of study because the contestations would appear 
to have dual implications, one theological and the other strategic, framed as a contestation 
for religious authority. 
In order to contribute to the scholarship in this field, this study deconstructs the 
contestations according to key terminologies and themes of Salafī disputations linked to 
religious authority on two fields of examination: the ideological analyses of the texts and 
the ‘globalized’ nature of digital religious content, as notable scholars have explored.  
The section proceeds by addressing the following areas, in consonance with the 
research questions: 
1) The main loci of disputations of Salafī discourse with regard to Sufism and 
related practices (ritual performances); the main thematic or strategic bases of the 
disputations; and the connection between the loci of dispute to the question of the 
authority to declare Ṣūfī practices as exterior to Islam of the formative generations 
of al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ. 
 
2) Creedal themes: examination of the meanings, symbolic import, and religious 
authority significance of select terminologies that appear in the Salafī discourse 
that seek to establish or delimit the norms and confines of Islamic orthodoxy, 
essentially inserting category into contemporary Islam in accordance with the 
subjectivities of the substrate ideology of Salafism and its conveyance in new 
media space. The creedal themes are linked to key terminologies, particularly (a) 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa (people of normative or orthodox Islam), (b) Daʿwa 
(calling to the proper way of Islam or, more simply, proselytizing); (c) Al-Firqa 
al-Nājiya (the saved sect), and, perhaps most significant, (d) Manhaj (the 
methodology of accessing and interpreting Islam’s scriptural sources according to 
the precedent of the pious ancestors), and (e) descriptors indicating heterodoxy or 
heresy, such as bidʿa (heretical innovation), shirk (idolatry), and kufr (disbelief).  
 
4) Contextualization of Salafī discourses in major research paradigms, such as, 
globalization of Islam, modernity, and Islam’s ‘new interpreters’; as well as 
reflections on the connection between the present Salafī discourse and the public 
sphere.  
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7.1 Main Loci of Disputation  
The main loci of contestations of Salafī texts, particularly with Sufism—which 
purist Salafīs believe to among the ‘most dangerous’ religious innovations in Islam620—
are expanded upon below, each analyzed according to the themes of arguments and 
nomenclature found in the Salafī digital texts. The references the texts make to non-
Muslim religions—Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism—are almost exclusively 
presented when these faiths are imputed to be the sources of syncretic practices inserted 
into Islam, mainly through the auspices of Sufism, speculative theology, and certain 
creedal schools of thought. The background and roots of these contestations are presented 
below for the purpose of showing that the contestations relied upon in the podcasts have 
been replicated in a new media form and distributed through a significant digital platform. 
Also presented are analyses of how digital media have conveyed or globalised these 
arguments with unprecedented pace and portability. In order to present the analyses with 
concision, the roots of the contestations are discussed, followed by analyses. However, 
when appropriate, the loci that have common media effects are gathered before the 
analyses, as it will be clear below.  
 
7.1.1  Mawlid: the celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday. 
The Salafī arguments established in pre-digital (if not pre-modern) times have 
been carried over in digital media. The Salafī texts problematize the celebration of the 
Prophet Muḥammad’s birthday in the following ways, reflecting what are arguably 
‘strategies’ of disputes: a) The dubious or heterodoxical origins (from within Islamic 
realms) of the practice in history and lack of precedent in the generations of the pious 
ancestors (Al-Salaf al-Sāliḥ); b) syncretism of the practice (mainly Christian sources).  
                                               
620 Lauziere, The Making of Salafism at 165. 
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A) Intra-Islamic Origins: Salafī contestations of the Mawlid practices rely on the 
purported extra-Sunnī origins of Mawlid celebrations. The argument proceeds by 
presenting a quasi-historical sketch of how the Mawlid came to be institutionalized in 
Fāṭimid Egypt (909–1171), that is, the historical period in which Egypt was ruled by the 
Fāṭimids, an Ismāʿīlī sect of Shīʿite Islam that gained ascendancy in North Africa and 
beyond. Linking the origins of the Mawlid celebrations to Shīʿite Islam, however, serves a 
strategic prima facie accusation of the heterodoxy of the celebration through ‘guilt-by-
association’, which may appeal to many observant Sunnī audiences. The tone of the 
speakers, namely the tenor of reproach, forwards the argument with a singular 
presumption and logic: since Shīʿite Islam represents an historically and most well-known 
sectarian split in Islam, associating the origins of any practice with Shīʿite Islam casts 
doubt on the practice—particularly for many Sunnī Muslims, the main audience and 
sectarian frame from which Salafism emerges and which Salafism claims to vociferously 
defend. Often the language used to implicate the Mawlid practice as a Shīʿite insertion 
into Islam is strident. For example, ‘It is now firmly established by the historians that the 
first group to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet (H) were the Bāṭinī Ismāʿīlī Shīʿite 
disbelievers and enemies of Islām known’ (researcher’s italics for emphasis).621 Another 
pejorative term used in the Salafī texts for Shīʿites is rāfaḍiya (Anglicized as rafadites), 
literally those who ‘reject’ or ‘refuse to accept’ important creedal aspects of normative 
Islam.622 According to the speakers of the podcasts, the Shīʿites encouraged the Mawlid 
‘as a means of deceiving the Sunnī Muslims’.623  
The Salafī preachers rely deductively on an absence-argument that asserts that the 
Mawlid celebrations never took place in the Prophetic generation or the generations that 
                                               
621 Rafīq, ‘Concerning Celebration of the Mawlid’, at 6.  
622 Jacques Waardenburg, Official and Popular Religion as a Problem in Islamic Studies (New York: 
Mouton, 1979) at 360–61. As Waardenburg suggest, ‘normative’ Islam signifies an understanding of 
Islam or a claim thereof. 
623 Further description of Fāṭimids is beyond the purview of this study. Canard, 'Fāṭimids'. 
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followed. Their absence-contention concerns the Mawlid not only as a prohibited public 
practice or ritual; it also precludes the possibility of the Mawlid in personal, pre-ritualized 
or pre-communal religious affairs of the early generations. The burden of this spoken 
argument—conveyed with unassailable certitude—lies in accepting an argument of the 
unequivocal absence of an act. Epistemologically, Salafī preachers contend that the time-
range in which an acceptable Islamic practice to occur is limited to the pious generations. 
All religious practices that are claimed to have started or originated after the period of al-
Salaf al-Sāliḥ are summarily dismissed or considered heretical innovation based on a 
precedent-argument, a frame of argumentation that does not permit even supererogatory 
(nawāful) ceremonies that were, to a certain extent, legitimized in Sunnī Islam for 
centuries.  
As such, this aspect of anti-Mawlid arguments extends beyond the refutation of a 
practice and represents an assertion of constrained Salafī hermeneutics and literalism with 
regard to the scriptural sources of Islam and to an imagined past, in which the absence of 
a given act among in the early generations of Islam presupposes its proscription in later 
generations. Also, Salafist confidence that an act did not occur in the distant path 
proceeds without a decipherable methodology establishing the absence. 
As such the emphases in the podcasts—in terms of arguments, tone, and selective 
sourcing of the presenters—focus on an emotional appeal to Muslims, particularly young 
Muslims, who, in response to the arguments, are likely to experience fear of not only 
participating in heterodox practices, but engage in practices that have roots in Christianity 
or pagan philosophies. The populist appeal of such a threat becomes manifest in the 
course of the podcasts when the speakers imply through words and tones that this practice 
is a conspiratorial insertion into Islam, in which the ruin of Islam is advanced by the 
inclusion of non-Muslim practices. It is not only a matter of heterodoxy to celebrate the 
Mawlid; it is pronounced to be more severe, namely, one actually is complicit in the 
dilution of Islam by such practices.  
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While it may be an individual choice to celebrate the Mawlid or not—seemingly at 
one’s personal peril—the voice aesthetic stresses that a celebrant is also an active 
participant in the anti-Islam collusion. Herein now are the arguments against the Mawlid, 
framed with populist tones and language. 
 
B) Extra-Islamic Syncretism: In both the podcasts of Salafi Sounds and the e-
book, the Mawlid is said to have been inspired by the Christian practice of the celebration 
of the birth of Jesus, that is, Christmas. And since Islam and Christianity have theological 
differences (as well as commonalities), any practice that Muslims participate in that 
resembles Christian celebratory holidays is rejected in Salafī thought. In essence, the 
argument makes no distinction between a given practice and the theological differences of 
the faith community.  
Modern Salafism’s view toward the Mawlid is categorical and perhaps more rigid 
than one would expect, given the somewhat more flexible point of view of Ibn Taymiyah 
(1263–1328), who is often invoked as the pre-modern inspiration of modern Salafī 
thought. Ibn Taymiyah acknowledged that the early generations of Islam did not 
‘institute’ the Mawlid, and that the ‘absence of a precedent’ is tantamount to 
proscription.624 However, Ibn Taymiyah also acknowledged ‘that people observe the 
Mawlid for different reasons and should be recompensed [by God] according to their 
intentions’. For those who celebrate the Mawlid in order to emulate the Christian 
celebration of Christmas, the act is considered reprehensible or forbidden. However, Ibn 
Taymiyah also acknowledges that some Muslims celebrate the Mawlid ‘out of great love 
and reverence for the Prophet’, and, as such, their pious intentions are laudable, though 
their decision to do so remains misguided.625 It is outside the purpose and framework of 
                                               
624 See also Nico Kaptein, 'Mawlid', in P. Bearman et al. (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
Edition (Leiden: Brill Online, 2012). 
625 Raquel Margalit Ukeles, ‘Innovation or Deviation: Exploring the Boundaries of Islamic Devotional 
Law’, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2006), at 230. 
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this dissertation to consider the pre-modern debates on the Mawlid, but it is important to 
note that modern Salafī ideology, particularly the texts under examination in this study, 
takes a stand against the Mawlid in terms more severe than those used by one their 
leading scholarly inspirations. It can be argued, with a fair degree of confidence, that the 
inflexible and unalterable stands of Salafī discourses on certain practices associated with 
Sufism are more than positions on Islam’s devotional law or theoretical value, and quite 
possibly represent proxy wars in the larger attempt of gaining greater authority over the 
boundaries of deriving Islamic law and limits of orthodoxy of the religion itself.  
 
7.1.2  Revisionist history and Grave Visitations and Tawassul  
It is a common and encouraged practice in Islam to visit the graves of loved ones 
or of revered persons for the purpose of making supplications on their behalf and for the 
purpose being reminded of one’s own mortality. However, grave visitation, as reproached 
by Salafīs, involves an element of ritual, namely, seeking grave visitation for the express 
purpose of attaining blessings (tabarruk) by simply being in the presence of the interred 
scholar-saint. Often, the act involves invocations of intercession (tawassul) performed in 
two manners: first by supplicating God to grant one’s needs by means of the numinous 
presence of the interred, or second by asking the interred him- or herself to supplicate 
God on the visitor’s behalf. Both practices are reproached, the latter more severely.  
The practice of tawassul has been a subject of debate in pre-modern Muslim 
scholarship, with proponents and opponents in Sunnī intellectual circles engaged over the 
topic, with some scholars advancing proof from the Qur’ān for the validity of tawassul 
and others who proffer their own proofs.626 It’s untenable to deny the prerogative of Salafī 
scholars to opine on a controversial topic such as grave visitation. But it is critical to 
                                               
626 See for example. David Commins, ‘Wahhabis, Sufis and Salafis in Early Twentieth Century 
Damascus’, Guardians of Faith in Modern Times: ʿUlamaʾ in the Middle East (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 
231–46, at 236. 
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examine the word choice used in the Salafī podcasts, namely, the word qubūriya, which is 
used frequently to reproach the practice. Qubūriya is a derived term from qubūr (singular, 
qabr), the Arabic word for graves or gravesites—without any ritual implication in the 
linguistic origins of the word. However, the suffix in qubūriya alters the normative usage 
of the term—from ‘graves’ (qubūr) to a practice of so-called ‘grave worship’, which 
unambiguously imputes a critical meaning of heresy or idolatry as implied in the word 
itself.  
The terms are repeatedly used in the course of the podcasts without prevarication 
and without reference to a longstanding juridical debate about such practices, wherein one 
will find arguments rooted Islamic intellectual history that permit such practices.627 In 
pre-modern Muslim intellectual history, the juridical debate was not as rigid and 
unequivocal as intoned and implied in the podcasts and their populist strategies. In other 
words, the repetitions and certitude of the speakers—which are best suited for the voice 
aesthetic—in describing the practice, disconnected from intellectual deliberations of the 
past, introduce inflections that frame the matter as unequivocal and singularly sinful and 
idolatrous. The term is referenced in the contestations in Arabic, as well as its English 
translation of ‘grave worship’ or ‘grave worshippers’. The descriptor is pejorative, since 
people who practice visitation do not believe they are worshipping the interred. The word 
choice in Salafī contestations does not permit debate. On the contrary, it is a censuring of 
a practice whose name in and of itself implies a challenge to the central tenet of Islam: 
nothing is worthy of worship except God. As such, grave worship, unambiguously implied 
in the term qubūriya, suggests that those who participate in this ritual performance fail to 
keep the prime testament of Islam and pursues a larger Salafī argument over the 
heterodoxy of Sufism because they are accused of worshipping the interred by 
supplicating to them.  
                                               
627 See, for example, Necdeddin Guney, 'Visiting Graves, Tombs and Shrines in Islamic Law', 
Conflicts, Religion and Culture in Tourism,  (2017). 
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It is important to note as well that early Wahhābī/Salafī leaders in the Arabian 
Peninsula made a point of evoking qubūriya in the context of their military strife with 
Ottomans who ruled much of Arabia, even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
including the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah. The Wahhābī scholars of the peninsula 
relegated ‘the Ottomans in this category of polytheists, probably because of their 
allegedly strong connections to Sufism and to popular practices such as visiting graves’—
but in ‘the context of Saudi–Ottoman rivalry, added a new political dimension’.628 This is 
significant because the Salafi Sounds podcasts (as shown in the previous chapter) 
censured grave visitation as qubūriya but also in narrating the history of the life of 
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, whose initial victories over the Ottomans were 
interpreted by the narrator of the podcast with religious symbolism and sacred import. As 
such, the ‘believers’ defeated the Ottomans, restored true Islam, destroyed tombs that 
were once frequented as a ritual, and put an end to the ‘evil’ of qubūriya (of the 
Ottomans) in the land that holds Makkah and Madinah. The ‘invading armies’ of the 
Ottomans were interpreted to be more than a conflict over territory, but a conflict over the 
core tenant of Islam, that is, tawḥīd, the incorruptible belief in the oneness of God. The 
Ottoman incursion was not viewed by Salafī hagiography as a variant intra-Islamic 
position, rather it was depicted as an Ottoman attempt to aggress against the very creed of 
the oneness of God by instituting or supporting such practices as ritual grave 
visitations.629 
It should also be mentioned that the assertions made by speakers in the podcasts 
made unsourced, seemingly misrepresented claims that Ṣūfīs ‘bang their heads’ in 
worship, twirl until ‘they pass out’, ‘smoke hashish’, worship graves, burn ‘pepper’ in 
their supplications, and other inflammatory descriptions of Sufism without elaboration 
                                               
628 Joas Wagemakers, 'The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi 
Contestations of Al-Walāʾ Wa-L-Barāʾ', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 44/1 (2012), 
93–110 at 95. 
629 Ibid., at 99. 
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and citations that affirm or support that these practices are normative Sufism. For a 
written piece (print or online), a lack of sourcing would likely be more conspicuous. But 
with vocal aesthetics and the distribution of the voice,630 attribution and source flaws are 
less likely be noticed because the emphases in intonation and, at times, shrill exclamations 
draw attention to the certitude of the speakers and their perceived authority. Also, in a 
highly mobile and personalized space proffered by podcasts, the questions of attribution 
and proof are less urgent or perhaps less important. For an audience that may be 
vulnerable to simplistic depictions, the Sufism described in the Salafī discourse has the 
potential to be uncritically accepted as being essentialist Ṣūfī practices.  
Additionally, in terms of disruption analysis, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the acts of destruction directed toward Ṣūfī shrines have spread in recent years.631 Such 
destruction is motivated by the doctrinal arguments promulgated by violent or jihadi 
Salafī, as well as quietest Salafism. They share a common doctrinal outlook on shrines 
and the associated heterodox or idolatrous rites associated with such shrines. The spread 
of such destruction across continents in a rather narrow frame of time implicates the 
ubiquity and speed attributed to digital networks. They are, essentially, ‘socially mediated 
terrorism’ that are spread via social media.632 As mentioned previously, the Salafist 
material studied herein do not promote violence. But the podcast texts do echo the 
doctrinal contestations against shrines that resemble other forms of Salafism; additionally, 
they effectively stress and repeat key words and phrases, namely, ‘grave worship’ and, the 
Arabic equivalent, ‘qubūriya’, in the censuring of Ṣūfī practices associated with grave 
visitation. The repetition of these words in digital texts, particularly when they are voiced 
as adjudicated points of law (or fatāwa) results in unparsed and highly overly simplistic 
                                               
630 Virginia Madsen and John Potts, 'Voice-Cast: The Distribution of the Voice Via Podcasting',  
(2010). 
631 Emily Jane O’dell, 'Waging War on the Dead: The Necropolitics of Sufi Shrine Destruction in 
Mali', Archaeologies, 9/3 (2013), 506-25. 
632 Claire Smith et al., 'The Islamic State’s Symbolic War: Da'esh's Socially Mediated Terrorism as a 
Threat to Cultural Heritage', Journal of Social Archaeology, 16/2 (2016), 164-88. 
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blame-language that is not conveyed with scholarly deliberation. With regard to auditory-
only digital space, the content producers of such texts have the added advantage of tonal 
stress on these words. The combination of intonation and repetition produce an effect that 
correlates with digital branding.  
Attacking the practice of grave visitation has been a point of dispute for 
generations. However, in the digital age, one can argue that the resurgence of Salafist 
contestations has been advanced by the rapid, immediate, personalized, and inexpensive 
qualities of digital media. As such, the major differences between previous disruptions of 
previous media advances and the contemporary one is the degrees to which external 
upheaval instigated the eventual usage of media technologies versus the irresistible 
opportunities presented by new media forms themselves. In turn, new media presents 
‘new forms of religious communication’ which are ‘characterized by unstructured, open 
and non-hierarchical interaction’.633 
 
7.1.3 Digital Texts and Creedal Themes and Defining Orthodoxy  
 
An important point of discussion in the field of new media and religion focuses on 
the online potential of religious authority disruptions in connection to identity-making. 
Before discussing with more detail how creedal themes and terminologies are used in the 
Salafī texts examined in this study, it is valuable to introduce the discussion in 
consideration of Salafī texts and changes in religious authority and identity disruptions. 
The roots of the changes focus on redefining the limits of orthodoxy in digital space with 
pre-modern phrases and constructs.  
The key words and arguments of Salafī claims of belonging to proper Islam 
include terms that speak to one’s association or identity with salvation and the normative 
identity of Islam itself. The terminologies and what they refer to are examined below, and 
                                               
633 Lorne L. Dawson and Douglas E. Cowan, Religion Online: Finding Faith on the Internet (New 
York: Routledge, 2004). 
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they pivot on the ‘saved-sect’ dialect and a ‘community’ of the that represents normative 
teachings and path of the religion, Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, that is, the people of the 
normative practice of the Prophet Muḥammad and the larger community. Salafī 
Publications podcasts studied in this research take full advantage of ‘applying the internet 
to present their concepts of religious identity and understanding’ even with relying on 
established terminologies.634  Such media applications result in ‘a reconfiguration of 
understandings of models of religious authority and the dissemination of Islamic 
knowledge’. 635 In other words, new forms of mediation alter the signification and 
reception of well-known traditional phrases. 
Media theories have always concerned themselves with questions of religious 
identity and medium. One of the main claims of media theory, in fact, is that 
‘communication technologies correlate with different emphases within our conceptions of 
selfhood and identity’.636 While seeking narrative control over the meaning of Ahl al-
Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa predates digital media, one cannot ignore how the Salafī texts 
examined here relate to an exceptional and highly mediated, technologized consciousness 
of religious belonging.  
One element of the following treatment is descriptive, but the larger interpretative 
analyses deconstruct the contestations as a kind of primitivism, which, on one hand, 
accentuates the superiority of the early forbears in their piety and fidelity to the original 
understanding of Islam’s scriptural sources. But on the other hand, this impulse in 
contemporary Salafī discourse strives to deprecate most scholarship and hermeneutics that 
developed thereafter; and it informs a key aspect of a method Salafī proselyting, namely, 
the appropriation of pre-modern terminologies for the purpose of defining intra-Islamic 
religious phenomena according to their stance vis-à-vis true, pure, or normative Islam.637 
                                               
634 Bunt, Hashtag Islam, at 4. 
635 Ibid 
636 Ess, 619. 
637 Waardenburg, Official and Popular Religion as a Problem in Islamic Studies. 
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In other words, the terminologies used to define Islamic orthodoxy informs a rather 
‘muscular discourse that is directed at reforming other non-Salafī Muslims’, who are said 
to be ‘in need of purification in both belief and practice’.638 In practical terms, it may be 
viewed as a ‘hostile othering’ of non-Salafī Muslims.639 In regularly invoking important, 
if not powerful, terminologies in Islamic theology, authority, and identity, the overall 
objective appears to be in creating and then establishing power through a critical idiom in 
Islam’s discourse today. The idiom involves text—words and themes that resonate with 
authenticity—and a ‘globalization’ (that is, homogenization) through the new space of 
digital media. 
It is important to note that the usages of these terms in the Salafī discourses 
studied herein represent a ‘religious primitivism’ that oversimplifies complex topics for a 
digital audience. As such, in vehemently distinguishing themselves from ‘other Muslims’, 
Salafīs are known to ‘take an uncompromising position on these creedal matters and 
frequently condemn fellow believers for compromising tawhid’, the central creedal tenet 
of Islam, namely, belief in the oneness of God.640 As such, Salafism pursues a ‘rhetoric of 
“othering” to justify itself’ as it does in determining who belongs in the ‘category of true 
believers and who remains outside’ in a process coined as ‘othering theology’.641  The 
question remains, however: Which terminologies found in Salafī discourses seek to 
promote this stance? What follows are the key terminologies that appear frequently in the 
Salafī texts and their import.  
 
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa: This phrase represents perhaps the most dominant 
theme of Salafī discourse. The phrase has pre-modern roots and may be translated as ‘the 
people of the normative practice (Sunna) of Islam and the plurality (or the fidelity) of the 
                                               
638 Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, at 37. 
639 Ibid. 
640 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism, at 55. 
641 Naser Ghobadzdeh and Shahram Akbarzadeh (2015) Sectarianism and the prevalence of ‘othering’ 
in Islamic thought, Third World Quarterly, 36:4, at 691. 
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faithful’. More simply, it refers to ‘the community of orthodox Islamic beliefs’.642 In the 
discourse under examination here, the phrase has strategic value in seeking greater 
authority over the meaning of what is normative (orthodox Islam) versus heterodoxy. 
Essentially, it is a call that encapsulates the refrain of ‘returning to the Qur'an and 
Sunnah’ (also a common invocation of Salafism), which is the interpretive methodology 
that defines what is Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa (or Ahl al- Ḥadīth). The call to return to a 
primitivistic, highly literalistic approach to ‘the Quran and Sunna’ is ‘one of the most 
well-known of catchphrases in the linguistic repertoire of Salafis and indirectly hints at 
the impurity/ deficiency of non-Salafī Muslims’.643 The terminology attempts to uphold 
the overarching claim of Salafism ‘to be the sole custodians’ of the teachings of the pious 
ancestors (al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ).644 The phrase also seeks authority by claiming ‘a direct line 
to the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad’, which is ‘an affiliation that many Muslims 
would have’. It should also be noted that the phrase is used by Salafī/Wahhabi ideologues 
who promote violence as well, as Bunt relates. 645  
This phrase and its related wordings used in the Salafī texts (such as ahl al-
Ḥadīth) help to secure the main claim of exclusivity of pure Islam. The claim to 
‘theological purity’, thus, relies on key terminologies that reference a category of Islam, 
in this case, the true and proper Islam of Salafism. Thus, Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa 
(ASWJ) is essentially a call to action, a call for a return to a singularly defined and 
accepted understanding of ‘mainstream’ Islam by returning to the Qur’ān and Sunnah.646 
The returning to the two dominant sources of all of Islam is pursued by a ‘simple, 
seductive phrase’, as an act of resistance to ‘the possibility of subjective knowledge, 
textual ambiguity and metaphor’ and an act to deride extra-literal interpretations of 
                                               
642 Mustafa Kabha and Haggai Erlich, 'Al-Ahbash and Wahhabiyya: Interpretations of Islam', 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38/4 (2006), at 360. 
643 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism, at 54. 
644 Adis Duderija, 'Constructing the Religious Self and the Other: Neo-Traditional Salafi Manhaj', 
Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 21/1 (2010), 75–93, at 77. 
645 Bunt, iMuslims, at 220. 
646 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism, at 76. 
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Islamic scriptures.647 As such, the Salafī call of ‘returning to Qur’an and Sunna’ and, 
therefore, taking shelter in a narrower construct of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa, creates a 
strict and thin-lined binary between tawḥīd (belief in one God by way of testimony and 
practice) and shirk (idolatry) and bidʿa (heretical innovation). Subsumed under this 
heading are other cognate or related terms to similarly seek to define the limits of 
normative Islam and the methodology in defining it: ahl al-Ḥadīth (the people or way of 
Islam exemplified by traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad), a phrase that, by 
way of implication, denies speculative theology, metaphorical interpretations of Islam’s 
revealed sources (Qur’ān and Sunna), scholarly opinion (ra’y), contextualized 
interpretation, as well as juristic and esoteric hermeneutics. Human reason and other 
‘[a]pproaches that are guided by human logic’ are accused of being vulnerable to caprice 
and whim that serve personal interests over the pure affairs of religion.648 Shunning these 
approaches—which have significant standings in pre-modern Islamic intellectual 
history—promotes the casting of doubt, if not aspersions, on non-Salafī methodologies 
and perhaps discourage consumers of Salafī discourse to consider other interpretations at 
all or treat them with skepticism. A motto describing the difference between relying a 
literal interpretation of Hadith and contextualized interpretations or relying on reason is 
susceptible to whisperings of Satan.649 
The phrase Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a does not directly translate as ‘orthodoxy’. 
However, the word ‘orthodox’ occurs in the Salafī texts studied here in connection with 
the Ahl al-Sunna concept. And ‘orthodox’ does not seem to be offensive to the speakers 
of the podcasts to use a word whose origins are extra-Islamic and, in fact, are more 
associated with Christianity as a ‘loanword’.650 But it should be noted that Salafī claims to 
                                               
647 Ibid. 
648 Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salafi Movement’, at 210.  
649 As cited by Duderija, ‘Constructing the Religious Self and the Other: Neo-Traditional Salafi 
Manhaj’, at 77.  
650 Robert Langer and Udo Simon, 'The Dynamics of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. Dealing with 
Divergence in Muslim Discourses and Islamic Studies', Die Welt Des Islams, 48/3/4 (2008), 27–88, at 
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be the inheritors or protectors of the Ahl al-Sunna concept—as an implied or explicit 
reference to orthodoxy— does not have a theoretical value; that is, it does not engage a 
scholarly discourse on the nature and ‘location’ of Islamic orthodoxy in terms of 
essentialist or non-essentialist constructions of orthodox, that is, a universal orthodoxy or 
local ones. 651 It also does not acknowledge the contestations and debate over orthodoxy, 
as a term but also its various connotations. In Salafī discourse, it appears that the 
conception of orthodoxy is meant to underscore or serve as a standard or criterion from 
which Salafī discourse deploys imputations of heresy or heterodoxy against other 
Muslims, which again seems to ignore the debate concerning normative Islam and the 
contracted view of Islam as an entirely discursive tradition. However, the Salafī allusions 
(direct or indirect) to orthodoxy do not acknowledge the debate concerning Islam as a 
‘discursive tradition’ in which the question of Islamicate orthodoxy is pursued as a binary 
between ‘universal’ or ‘local’ orthodoxy.652  
Voice-distributing pronouncements of orthodoxy, conveyed through the podcasts, 
make serious claims and contentions regarding a Muslim’s status in the religion itself. 
Such challenges of orthodoxy are conducted in an alternative media spaces and in 
alternative intellectual ecologies that tend to ignore scholarly methodologies that have 
developed in Muslim intellectual history and the legacies of knowledge production. As 
such, this research suggests that these claims of exclusive orthodoxy as conveyed in 
voice-only digital space constitute a major shift in authority because they are distributed 
with the known features of digital media disruptions—ease, transnational reach, and 
inexpensive processes. And they are severed from a more centralised and credential-based 
production of knowledge. Thus, the podcasts represent a kind of cyber-activism that seeks 
a mediated space to ultimately seek to deliver people from heterodoxy and resituate them 
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an imagined ‘pure Islam’. This reality privileges cyber-activism of modernity over 
intellectual legacy and the terminologies developed therein. 
The Salafī usages of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa or Ahl al-Sunna or Ahl al- Ḥadīth 
or a clarion call ‘to return’ to the Qur’ān and Sunna are thus references to a kind of 
orthodoxy (unparsed and without explication), and collectively it is predicated on the 
notion of an orthodoxy in which ‘the primacy of the texts and the law derived from 
the texts’653 is stressed—an emphasis that leaves little room for a multiplicity of 
‘nodal points’ of meaning in Islam that have been considered in Sunni Islamic 
intellectual history.654  
The Saved Sect (and the Victorious Group): As is the case with the above terms, 
the phrase the saved sect (or al-Firqa al-Nājiya) appears in several of the Salafī texts 
presented here. Saved-Sect discourse implies an eschatological argument for the 
exclusivity of Salafī positions, namely, the claim to ‘salvation’ in the Hereafter.  The 
phrase is based on a well-known hadith of the Prophet Muḥammad in which one sign of 
the later times is the splitting of the Muslim community (ummah) into ’70 sects’, all of 
which will end up in Hell, with the exception of one of them. The quietist Salafī texts 
decidedly state that the saved sect among the 70 is that which is on the Salafī Manhaj 
(methodology or way of understanding Islam). The ‘Saved-Sect’ discourse implies an 
over-simplified eschatological argument for the exclusivity of Salafī positions, namely, 
the claim not just to ‘salvation’ in the Hereafter, but a select claim. In other words, 
‘Salafis believe that only they constitute “saved sect”’, the only one to enter paradise.655 
Salafī discourse also uses a closely allied term, namely, the ‘victorious group’ (al-Ṭā’ifa 
al-Manṣūra).  
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To claim one’s group to be the only saved Muslim group is on the surface an 
unusual conceit to make, since details of salvation are of God’s providence and hardly a 
trifle matter to claim, as widely understood in Islamic ethics. But through the lens of 
authority, the appeal of the phrase evokes a noteworthy strategic meaning. The evocation 
of belonging to the Saved Sect occurs in the process of criticizing practices and beliefs of 
non-Salafī Muslims. Though the speakers of the Salafi Sound texts do not state directly 
that Ṣūfīs and others who have creedal errors will suffer in Hellfire. The implication by 
deduction or a process of elimination certainly infers that conclusion. For audiences who 
turn to these texts for inspiration or knowledge, the Hereafter dialect is a powerful idiom 
to wield, for the limitation of this life and the eternity of the next one is among the 
fundamental tenets of Islam and thus a fundamental concern of observant Muslims or 
even curious Muslims. Thus, they may be persuaded to adopt the beliefs, manhaj, and 
ideological assertions of Salafism persuaded by a kind of demagoguery that appeals to 
fear and thus causing many to consider belonging to the ‘saved’ or ‘victorious’ sect and 
thus ‘enter paradise’.656  
The associating of Salafī thought with the saved-sect referenced in the hadith is 
related to the question orthodoxy, in a similar way to the phrase of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-
Jamāʿa. The usage of the saved-sect dialect is wielded by Salafist discourse to persuade 
audiences and it does not address the wider discussion on the phrase wither or not it ‘takes 
for granted orthodoxy’s temporal priority over heresy’.657  
The Saved Sect is not necessarily the plurality of Muslims or a generalized group, 
as the Salafī discourse herein seems to claim. In fact, it may be a select group of 
contemporary scholars who advocate Salafī/Wahhabi ideologies, the names of whom are 
repeated in the podcasts, such as Shaykh Ṣāliḥ ibn Fawzān ibn ʿAbdullah Al-Fawzān (b. 
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1943), Shaykh Rabīʿ al-Madkhalī (b. 1931), the late grand muftī of Saudi Arabia ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz bin Bāz (1910–1999), and others. However, associating contemporary personalities 
by name within the context of the ‘Saved Sect’ discussion represents a bold eschatological 
projection of individuals who are not only revered by purist Salafists, but who are claimed 
to be among (or the epitomizing) of the Saved Sect grouping, those who are thus saved in 
the Hereafter. In the ethos of Islam, it is generally discouraged to claim salvation (or 
damnation) with such specificity. However, for analytical purposes, the naming of 
individuals (most of whom are Saudi scholars) in association with the Saved Sect 
represents more than breach of adab (proper comportment) but reveals the degree to 
which the Saved Sect discourse figures in the identity-formation of Salafism. Religious 
ideologies, if not religion itself, ‘owes its legitimizing force to the fact that it draws its 
power to convince from its own roots. It is rooted, independently of politics, in notions of 
salvation and calamity (Heil und Unheil) and in corresponding practices of coping with 
redemptive and menacing forces’.658 Finally, it should be noted that the “Saved Sect” 
phrase also served as the name of a UK-based organization, known as a ‘The Saviour 
Sect’, who maintained a website in Gloucester originally then moved to an address in 
Birmingham, ‘apparently owned by Salafi Bookstore and Islamic Centre’. The group 
‘underwent a subtle change of name, replacing ‘‘Saviour’’ with ‘‘Saved”.’659 A banner of 
the site claimed it was owned ‘by followers of Ahl us-Sunnah wal-Jamaa’a … suggesting 
a direct line to the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad’. 660 
Daʿwa: The mission of apolitical, quietist Salafism shuns violence and 
discourages participation in political processes, such as those found in democracies and 
even autocratic states, with such participation considered prohibited by some.661 A 
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question is thus raised: how does quietist Salafism achieve its goal of seeking the 
purification of contemporary Islam from extra-Islamic influences and incursions? The 
method of its mission is thus through teaching, propagation, and persuasion. It is the 
means of choice through which it seeks to purify contemporary Muslim societies from 
syncretic practices and heretical beliefs (as well as a means to introduce Islam to non-
Muslims). Therefore, the mission relies on what is commonly invoked in Salafī texts as 
daʿwa, which literally means ‘calling’ or ‘inviting’ people, but in the context of religious 
messaging, it refers to calling people to return to the right path of Islam. The phrase, in 
and of itself, suggests that the invitation to invite people to true Islam is actually the 
calling to God the Qur’ān alludes to.662  
The word’s earliest connotations in Muslim scriptural sources and history thus 
reference preaching to Muslims so that they may become more observant and pious in 
their lives, ‘a means to inspire fellow Muslims’ toward this objective.663 This connotation 
remains extant. However, the politicization or modernization of the word is traced to the 
colonial period of the 19th century, when the semantic field of daʿwa expanded to include 
the mission to call Muslims to confront colonialism and the ideological threats of 
modernity and the spread of secularism.664 For Salafist and more generally Islamists of 
contemporary history, daʿwa is seen as part of the ‘solution’ to the problems of the 
Muslim world—including a solution to ‘westoxification’—namely to call upon fellow 
Muslims to go back to or ‘embrace’ what has become called ‘the true Islam’ as 
exemplified by al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ.665 
The phrase, as such, implies a positioning of rectitude from which one makes the 
call or invitation, and it implies that those who are being called are thus in need of 
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guidance and those who make the call (dāʿīs) are in position to do so. However, the word 
implies an activism—cyber-activism—invested into daʿwa that involves religious 
authority disrupted an important way. In most minority Muslim communities, particularly 
in the West, the practice of daʿwa is praised and, often, considered an obligation—the 
legitimizing of living outside the lands or Abode of Islam (Dār al-Islām). The authority 
question arises, though, over the fact that there are no ‘explicated agreed upon rules’ that 
addresses the qualifications threshold of one who is, in a sense, making the calling or 
invitation, the one reaching out, as it were. While this approach can exist in door-to-door 
proselytizing, it is extenuated and even normalized in digital spaces. A speaker of 
considerable rhetorical skills—and who is well-practiced in the citations of verses of the 
Quran—applies also intonational voice authority, in which the questions of rules or 
credentials become less important to listeners. As such, anyone may proclaim him- or 
herself to be a dāʿī, that is, a caller to Islam even if ‘without having the “right” 
authoritative position or any higher Islamic education’ to do so.666 The methodology of 
proselytizing does not assume or demand the rigor or sourcing of a more formal 
presentation about the faith. The teaching mission is to persuade and to guide through a 
style of address that is simplified but relies on repetition. These realities are amplified in a 
voice-only mediated environment. 
In the texts examined in this study, the phrase is often rendered simply as the 
daʿwa or modified as al-daʿwa al-Salafiyya or Salafī daʿwa —the call to return to the 
Islam of purer times, a retrotopia or ‘Utopian Kaleidoscope’, perhaps, an ‘historical 
version of the City of God’ of Medina in Western Arabia during the lifetime of the 
Prophet Muḥammad and immediately thereafter.667   
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The processes, credentials of content producers, and goals of daʿwa have an 
evangelizing purpose: it makes claims and also promises something to an audience.668 In 
fact, among the attractions to religious messaging is the promise of return, whether 
immediate or ultimate. With the Salafī texts examined here, the promise is to present a 
pure Islam free from the faults and heterodoxy of other Muslims, mainly. The tonality of 
the voice and populist language rely on casting aspersions on the practices and beliefs of 
other Muslims, particularly Ṣūfīs. The appeal is rarely intellectual and is mostly 
emotional, as is most populist arguments. While religious proselytizers occasionally 
pursue material gain, it must be said that the Salafī texts reviewed in the course of this 
dissertation, not one content producer pursued marketing for any material gain.  
The dynamic of the daʿwa purpose is ‘missionary’ in its outlook, a ‘mobilization’ 
to call or convert non-Salafī individuals into Salafī activists. In the view of this study, 
daʿwa, as a concept and practice, depends on an important supposition of religious 
authority—whose mission is predicated on the right and the need to correct perceived 
errant beliefs of fellow Muslims. The emphasis in the podcast is on the purification of 
one’s soul in seeking God’s salvation for believers, and, on a larger scale, to cleanse the 
faith of heterodoxy, as Salafism claims. As such, with no material purpose in mind, the 
extension of the voice in the podcasts represents a missionary platform that relies on 
repeated words and aggressive tones to evoke apprehensions of a Muslim about his or her 
heterodoxy; all of which is produced by a disembodied orality that asserts authority 
through voice. An authoritative voice of podcasting, a listening practice, can more readily 
convey messages without the type of immediate sourcing, other than practiced reliance on 
a handful of verses of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth and tonality. 
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Manhaj: In reviewing and analysing significant online Salafī content, a common 
rhetorical exhortation emerges, one that pivots on the term manhaj. It is tenable to assert 
that the broader dialect of modern Salafism relies on the simplified, minimalized concept 
of a proper manhaj (methodology), mainly both as an authoritative dais and as a strategy. 
Salafi Publications sites have been cited as asserting ‘proprietary rights over Salafī 
manhaj’.669 From this frame, casting aspersions on Ṣūfī practices cannot be accused of 
being a recasting of pre-modern critiques. Rather, the anti-Ṣūfī polemics of the 
contemporary age (and liberal usage of strawman arguments) produces a claim—through 
the mirror of what is errant with other Muslims—that the original intent and pure 
understanding of the words of God and His Messenger (the first two nodes of religious 
authority) are protected in Salafī hands—ensured by a process considered to be the proper 
manhaj. One may further assert that in order to examine the conceits and ideologies of 
modern Salafism and its claims of religious authority, it is essential to probe the Salafī 
usage of manhaj as the very substrate of its core arguments. 
Therefore, manhaj refers to a way of life of Islam, but its derived meaning in the 
realm of law and theology indicates the proper methodology in deriving guidance, 
verdicts, and rulings from the sacred texts, and a strict interpretation of the sacred past, 
that is, the known acts and intentions of the Prophetic period and generations of al-Salaf 
al-Ṣāliḥ. As such, it speaks to orthodoxy and orthopraxy and, thus conversely, it speaks to 
the criteria by which practices are deemed to be heretical, offensive, or impious. The 
reason for this is that if Salafism indeed seeks to be successful in persuading people 
(mainly Muslims) that it represents or is the only movement that can restore ‘real’ Islam, 
as it has been suggested,670 then it must rely on the claim that it represents the proper 
manhaj of the religion. 
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 It could be argued that the Salafī ‘overall claim to [be] the sole custodians’ of pure 
Islam—as exemplified by the pious forbears—is based on or perhaps contingent upon 
claiming to be the holders or revivers of Islam’s original manhaj, ‘the way in which the 
nature and the scope of the Qur’an and Sunna were understood and interpreted from the 
time of the Prophet until now’.671 To interpret the scriptural sources of Islam by way of 
reason, discursive discourses or ‘non-textual sources of knowledge’, a methodological 
feature of scholars of the established schools of Islamic law (established mainly after the 
generations of the pious ancestors), are judged to be external to the proper capacity of 
‘valid’ religious knowledge. 672 As such, rulings and practices that are derived from 
analogical reasoning, philosophical deliberations, local customs, and other non-textual 
means should not be trusted nor should they be considered authentically Islamic or 
authentic methodologies of interpretations. 
From this attitude of religious authority, Salafī discourses proceed to reproach 
practices and theological positions as sinful, forbidden, heretical, idolatrous, or even 
outright disbelief. Thus, the claim to be exclusively reviving, following, and/or preserving 
the proper manhaj of Islam animates, to a significant degree, the edifice of the 
contestations and polemics of Salafī texts in digital space.  
Haykel suggests that this usage of manhaj is a ‘modern development’ and a central 
argument Salafī discourse emerges that serves as the ideological substrate or basis of their 
objections and contestations to Ṣūfī practices or, as such, practices that are associated with 
Sufism. The loci of contestations are the branches, as it were, while the tree trunk is 
comprised of the Salafī ideological conceit to define the limits of what is properly 
evaluated as the valid manhaj in Islam, that is, the proper way of life and creed that 
requires a rather restrictive interpretation and narrow attachment to the prophetic period 
of Islam and the immediate generations thereafter, al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ (the pious forbears). 
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And what falls outside of those parameters is considered deviation. Thus, trying to take 
narrative control of what is the proper manhaj seems to be what rouses Salafī discourse 
online, which is certainly manifest with regard to contestations with Sufism. 
Therefore, the meaning and function embedded in the term manhaj as used in 
Salafī discourse and as evinced its repeated usage in the present case studies are 
significant, particularly as a governing principle in the method of Salafī hermeneutics. As 
mentioned previously, the interpretation of the scriptural sources of Islam tends to be 
literal or based only the immediate generations after the Prophet Muḥammad. The 
interpretations of the scholarly class after the Salaf al-Salah are not entirely dismissed, but 
they if appear to conflict with the literal meaning of a verse of the Quran or statement of 
the Prophet Muḥammad, then the literal meanings take precedence over the 
methodologies of the ʿulamā’ (scholarly class) of classical Muslim intellectual history. 
The metaphorical or situational or rational meanings (and rulings of Sharīʿa based on 
them) of the scriptures of the Islam are dismissed because they are perceived to be 
influenced by intellectual currents rooted in, for example, Hellenistic thought or other 
extra-Islamic perspectives. The insistence of this method of hermeneutics is, as the Salafīs 
tend to claim, is the proper manhaj of Islam itself.  
The manhaj discourse plays a significant role in ‘iterating their conceptual and 
methodological separateness’.673 While the evocation of ‘manhaj’ (‘our manhaj’, ‘the 
manhaj of the Salaf’, etc) was frequent, the burden of listener was to accept the conceit 
without a rigorous defence of the word’s usage or application to Salafism. The power of 
the word is vested with certitude that it is indeed upheld by a higher authority. The 
articulation of the manhaj was reproduced in a publication made by UK Salafīs, in which 
the ‘theological and methodological framework of British Salafī thought’ that is marked 
by bare references to the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad and 
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contemporary and past Salafī scholars.674 While that articulation of the Salafī manhaj was 
produced in 1993 and is stamped with ‘British’ contexts, the manhaj described decades 
ago seems to be the foundation of Salafī thought in a digital ‘space’ that is ‘de-
territorialized’, that is, unassociated with geography and produced in digital means that 
proffer a timelessness and nationless, features of digital media and transnational 
mediation effects. 
The contestation over manhaj is so critical to Salafī thought examined in this 
study, it eventually turned on other Salafī organisations as well. Though it is beyond the 
purview of this particularl study, it should be noted that the manhaj dialect became 
essentially a ‘sort of purist inquisition’ not only for Ṣūfīs and other groups but a process 
‘that began to label other Salafi Muslims as religious innovators’.675 This demonstrates 
the centrality in the authority framework of claiming exclusive ownership of the proper 
manhaj. 
Also, scholars interpret the Salafī delimitation of the orthodoxy of Islam and its 
constituted community as part of a political discourse pivoting on the phrase al-Wala’ wa 
al-Bara’, that is, ‘loyalty to Islam, Muslims, and God and disavowal of everything 
else’.676 While Wagemaker’s study examines the usage of this terminology as a means of 
setting apart Saudi/Wahhābī ideals, he asserts that this declaration of determining Islamic 
orthodoxy is, in fact, part of the Salafī literature. As such, while quietist Salafism shuns 
political involvement, the restriction of Islam’s normative and accepted practice (or 
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orthodoxy) as determined by their ‘Manhaj’ or methodology evokes a political ideology 
rather than hermeneutics.  
Analyses of the repeated usage of the term Manhaj in the Salafī discourses studied 
is consonance with the findings in contemporary scholarship of the ‘important role in 
understanding Salafism’ through ‘concept of manhaj’, which raises questions about 
Salafism concerning both politics and methodology.677  The renewal of the term in Salafī 
texts is linked to the teachings of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–1999), a prominent Salafī 
thinker and hadith commentary, who is of Albanian ancestry but who lived most of his 
life in Jordan. A native Arabic speaker, al-Albānī’s re-definition implies an activism in 
the word that calls for Muslims ‘to shun all affiliation and participation with any formal 
group, be it a political party (ḥizb) or civic association (jamʿiyya) and therefore to eschew, 
on principle, all organised forms of political life’. 678 Thus, to an important extent, the 
defining of the proper manhaj advocates a posture of rejection—the need to avoid and 
reject as a social practice, rather than a set of principles to follow. ‘The Arabic term that 
best encapsulates this process of ideologization [of Salafism] is manhaj’679 The manhaj 
invoked repeatedly in Salafī discourse in this light seems to provide a framework of the 
ideology from which heretical intra-Islamic positions are based, particularly claims 
against Sufism. Its purpose is thus twofold: define ‘religious self’ and ‘religious other’ 
through the manhaj perspective.680 In other words, Salafīs hold that ‘every Muslim is 
obliged to follow the Salafī manhaj, the path of the pious predecessors. For them, the 
Salafī manhaj is the third source of Islamic teachings after the Qur’an and the hadith’.681  
The usage of manhaj has a modern history of appropriation, and thus, it is not 
surprising that Salafī discourse seeks its own appropriation. The meaning and repurposing 
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of manhaj became pronounced in the 1960s with Egyptian academic circles, according to 
Lauziere, the term was used by Egyptian academics in the 1940s. But, in the 1960s the 
term ‘had become something of a buzzword’ when referring to academic rigor. Then 
Islamists used the word in reference to ‘the practical and systemic nature of Islam as an 
ideology’.682 While Haykel traces the modern ideological usages of manhaj within 
Salafism to al-Albānī, as mentioned above, Lauziere contends that although al-Albānī 
‘played a major role in the dissemination of this new presentation of Salafism’, but the 
actual coinage of ‘Salafī manhaj’ is more accurately associated with Mustafa Hilmi (b. 
1932). Hilmi, an Egyptian philosophy professor, was ‘influenced by Islamist thinkers and 
close to the purist Salafī circles in Alexandria’.683 It was Hilmi in the 1970s who actively 
contributed to ‘the systematization of purist Salafism as an ideology and a “method”’ or 
manhaj. Through the manhaj framework, in part, Hilmi ‘reframed Salafism as a 
comprehensive way of thinking, a blueprint for action, and an Islamic civilizational 
worldview’.684  For Hilmi (and Salafist thinking today) ‘this method contained all the 
necessary principles for organizing the social, economic, and political aspects of life. He 
thus subsumed Ibn Taymiyya’s views on politics under the label Salafism’. 685 
As such, the strategic value of stressing the term manhaj in the Salafist texts 
examined in this study becomes clearer, though its presentation demonstrates none of its 
semantic lineage as described above. The notion of rigor in an academic sense is not what 
is being referenced in the Salafī texts. Rather, manhaj represents an unparsed and 
generalized attempt to affirm narrowly constructed hermeneutics in the purported 
methodology of purist Salafism and the ideological nature of Salafī thought, upon which 
charges of heresy and blameworthy innovation are put forth and defended in intra-Islamic 
contestations a new public sphere ushered by emerging digital technologies.  
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While it may be true that we are in a ‘golden age’686 of podcasting, it is important 
to connect podcasts and Salafī messaging as representing more than a ‘relatively new 
beast in the digital media menagerie’.687 One of the key aspects of podcasts, ‘particularly, 
the podcast listened to on the move’ is that it may be viewed as ‘part of an evolution in 
parasocial phenomena’.688 Such interpersonal media consumption, highly personalized 
and decentralized from formal social settings, such as family participation with pre-digital 
media (such as television and radio), affords a marked advantage in religious or 
ideological conveyance without the benefit (or hindrance) of a group setting, in which 
ideas may be challenged more readily. In other words, a listener of podcasts can consume 
information with greater privacy and secrecy in a post-internet environment, that is, 
downloaded podcasts that can be accessed without internet connection. It is a ‘new form 
of mediated interpersonal communication’ that affords greater mobility and privacy.689 
The Salafi Sounds podcasts, as discussed previously and individually analysed in Chapter 
6, have a clear activism, also known as cyber-activism or cyber-populism.690 The podcast 
texts analysed herein represent ‘a formidable power of the dis-embodied human voice’ 
that exerts authority in such persuasive realms as defining a rigid dichotomy between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, between pure belief in the oneness of God (tawḥīd) and 
idolatry (shirk). Essentially, podcasts—and digital media more broadly—reorients 
religious discourses to an important extent toward digital proselytization, relying on 
classical phrases but conveyed in the idiom and effects of the digital age. 
  
Final Remarks of the Chapter: The Public Sphere 
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Analysing polemical texts, as Seesemann writes, ‘can be very illuminating’ with regard to 
‘the reconstruction of intellectual history.’ He then observes that such texts can convey a 
‘subtext’ that affords a ‘better understanding not only of the text itself, but also of 
the circumstances of the production of the text’.691 While Seesemann comments concern 
Ṣūfī literature in Nigeria, his statement applies to this study and, perhaps, most studies 
that explore texts in digital space that seek to contest competing ideological streams.  
Ideologies, religious or secular, have always required mediation in order to pursue 
wider promulgation. Yet in the contemporary world, the close syrgy between media 
systems and religion communication exceeds previously theorized mediation constructs. 
This reality is one of the important subtexts of contentious material in cyberspace that will 
continue to attract academic attention. The competing and newer theory of mediatisation, 
for example, explicitly ascribes to digital media the role of agents of change, rather than 
conduits of information. If true, the study of religion in the contemporary world 
seamlessly connects with deliberations on not only the medium through which people 
engage religion, but the mutual influences of the consequential unions of media and 
religion.  
Inquiry into religious authority has raised questions that have become more urgent 
as a result of disruptive emerging media technologies that have permitted more voices 
into the media ecology. The production of texts in digital space that allude to religion 
have proliferated with unprecedented volume and ubiquity. These texts online represent 
an innovative kind of textuality. It is not a surprise, then, to find evocations of religion 
and its nodes of authority on topics that are more politically driven and subservient to 
pressures of globalization, as Mandaville argues.692 The Arab Gulf crisis is an example of 
this phenomenon.  
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The space of digital media has led to “spatial pluralization” of Islamic religious 
authority, in terms of “what kinds of spaces one seeks authority” and how authority is 
exerted.693 But how does this affect methodology? As Campbell points out, “It is not 
enough to say that the Internet transforms or challenges traditional authority; rather, 
researchers must identify what specific form or type of authority is being affected.” 694 
Direct usages of religious language—and their semantic fields—that are found in 
digital texts and that become fields of analysis include the quotation of textual sources of 
Islam, namely, the Qur’ān (the Muslim scripture) and Hadith (the statements and 
normative practices of the Prophet Muḥammad), also known collectively as Sunna. These 
sources are the very foundation of authority in Islam. It also includes the juridical-ethical 
nomenclature that are based on the primary sources of Islam. However, with digital 
media, the shared idioms of these primary authoritative sources have become, in the view 
of this study, technologized, such that mediation seems to be as important as what is being 
mediated. The digitization of Salafism’s discourses has resulted in a public sphere that is 
not centralized as it has been in previously conceived of spaces, such as the nation-state, 
such as Saudi Arabia, though the inspiration of Salafism is rooted there. The space has 
transcended previous centres of authority and geographies. 
 In Hashtag Islam, Bunt advances the question of authority within the current 
‘phase of sustained information technological development’. As a result, critical media 
technological innovations ‘have combined with diverse Islamic agendas to create a 
significant shift in the ways in which command and control of Muslim contexts are 
driven’.695 One important matter in the authority question that Bunt examines is the 
increasing consequential realm of ‘e-fatwas’, that is, the abundance of formal edicts made 
and spread through digital media. The edicts pertain to benign affairs of personal 
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relationships, as well as more serious considerations regarding violence. The proliferation 
of such material in Cyber Islamic Environments tests the pre-modern constructs of the 
manifest qualifications of those passing such edicts. The e-fatwa phenomenon is 
inconsistent with transparency about the qualifications of the persons offering the edicts. 
It becomes possible, if not likely, that the opinions are based on erroneous scholarship or 
referencing, or perhaps more nefarious purposes of seeking to radicalize youth.  
However, Bunt further develops the contemporary authority-fatwa question by 
linking it with Jürgen Habermas’s influential treatises on the public sphere. For 
Habermas, public opinion and the public sphere were closely related to mediation, if not a 
product of mediation, even rudimentary mediation. His public sphere included a ‘realm of 
our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed’, which 
included ‘conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body’.696 
Habermas’s evaluations of the public sphere on important matters such as democracy and 
state authority have been frequently cited in the decades after Habermas published them. 
Bunt, however, raises the important question of the continued relevance of Habermas’s 
public sphere in light of the digital age.  Habermas’s theory, as Bunt states, ‘played a 
distinct role within the development of theories associated with the impact of mass media 
on formulating public opinion’.697  
In deliberating at length about Habermas and his continued relevance—despite 
differing cultural and technological frames—Bunt expands the intellectual paradigms of 
studying contemporary Islam and Cyber Islamic Environments in an important way. It is 
perhaps easy to be dismissive of pre-digital insights of sociologists, but ultimately Bunt 
argues that Habermass remains relevant in studying Muslim frameworks online, when 
considering the incessant exposure to and consumption of information.  
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Chapter 8 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, FORWARD RESEARCH, 
AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This dissertation pursued a study that seeks to fill gaps in a growing and evolving field of 
digital media and Islam studies. The study focused on intra-Islamic contestations located 
in cyber-Islamic environments. Specifically, the contestations under examination are 
represented by texts that are produced and posted in support of an influential and growing 
religious ideology in contemporary religion, which has both online and offline 
implications. The content producers are advocates of Salafism, and they post mainly 
voice-only presentations that argue for the purity of Salafism as the true embodiment of a 
pristine Islam that professedly follows most closely the early generations of Islam, known 
collectively and, perhaps, canonically as al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ, the righteous (or pious) 
forbears.  
The texts analysed were purposively posted online and remain open to anyone 
with Internet access, and thus they exist and are available beyond narrower online 
environments, such as chat rooms and forums, which often require login credentials and 
passwords to access. The texts also unambiguously pursue an argument for the unique 
role of Salafism as the vanguard of Islam as envisaged, primarily in challenging what is 
considered heterodox views and practices, largely associated with Sufism, that have 
seeped into the tenets and praxis of Muslim orthodoxy, as contended. The study pursued 
the research by examining the texts of self-described Salafī preachers and scholars, posted 
online not only in defence and promulgation of purist Salafī thought and its 
oppositionality to Muslim ‘others’, which happens to include non-purist Salafī views that, 
for example, advocate violence or political involvement. The study pursued the texts that 
represent a flourishing digital product that has expanded the meaning of digital mobility 
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and the performance of acousmatic voice, as argued in the study.698 The voice transmitted 
in digital formats (podcasts in this case) is rich in symbolic meaning with regard to 
religion and culture. They also represent a trend in digital media instrumentality that is not 
measured with a screen-metric.699 
 The use of digital technology for such contestations represents a significant 
disruption of traditional means of knowledge transmission and textual production, as 
argued in several places in this study. But the import of associating media disruptions 
with intra-religious contestations requires an analytical framework that seeks out the 
broader meanings and purposes of such discourse; as such, the strategies and repeated 
terminologies found, collated, and analysed herein are integral to the argument-
construction of present-day Salafism and integral to the endeavour of claiming religious 
authority in contemporary Islam.  
The digital age has destabilized and decentralized constructs of authority and, in 
fact, knowledge construction and distribution, such that the production of knowledge and 
its contestations are generated with ‘unprecedented intensity’.700  As such, the analyses 
seek to situate and demonstrate that the online texts represent an attempt in defining, if 
not restricting, the notions of the orthodoxy and orthopraxy of Islam by relying on 
important pre-modern terminologies and their semantic fields conveyed with new digital 
media technology. In essence, the strategies of the contestations are employed to argue 
that Salafism is the best representation of Islam’s formative generations, al-Salaf al-
Ṣāliḥ—which a plurality of Muslims (including Salafīs and Ṣūfīs) hold in high regard. 
Salafism approaches its purification or restoration program, however, through a 
‘relentless assault’ against religious innovation, particularly Sufism.701 
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 The study focused on two central questions. The first sought out and isolated key 
areas of dispute—loci of contestations—that Salafism contends with Sufism and Ṣūfī 
practices. The first question encompasses a descriptive process of identifying, in the 
online texts, the main loci of dispute, as well as arguing for the analytical framing of these 
loci. The research emphasized areas of dispute that relate to performance rather than those 
that are entirely of conceptual or theological import, since the performance of rituals, such 
as grave or shrine visitations of Ṣūfī saints and intercessory supplications and/or rituals 
performed therein, is stressed in the polemical texts themselves. It is important to note, as 
well, that ritual performances are observable manifestations of what Salafism considers 
heterodoxy or heretical innovations. Because they are observable, such practices lend 
themselves to consistent demonstrable reproach in Salafism’s oppositionality, that is, the 
‘attitudes’ attributed to Salafism in pursuit of deviances ‘with non-Muslims, and often 
with lapsed and/or errant Muslims’.702 However, Salafism’s reproach of errant Muslims 
ultimately serves a purpose beyond censuring, as argued in the study.  
 Hence, the second research question focused on religious authority as an 
analytical framework in conducting the qualitative ideological textual analyses of the 
Salafī texts. The analyses stressed the strategies of argument-construction and the regular 
usage of nomenclature that have pre-modern roots in Islamic intellectual history. The 
usage of these terminologies in the contestations examined herein is meant to expand the 
semantic fields of the pre-modern phrases to produce contemporary idioms deployed to 
claim narrative control and authority over the bounds of Islamic orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy and to raise the profile of Salafism as the surviving faction of Islam that is true 
to the religion’s original form.703 
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While the majority of Muslims acknowledge the importance of the forebears, 
‘what sets Salafism apart’ and the question and framework of authority revolves around 
the Salafism’s approach, which combines advocacy and, perhaps most vociferously, an 
inflexible and broad rejection of ‘all innovations that have entered Islam since its early 
foundational period’, and a purification of the religion achieved by testing everything ‘in 
accordance with the sources and methodology’ of Salafī-approved scholarship as ‘the 
ultimate authorities’. Therefore, ‘Salafi practices build upon the notion of purifying the 
legacy of Islam accumulated in the centuries after the al-salaf al-salih’.704 With this 
pronounced mandate, the religious authority framework comes into clearer focus and its 
importance more prominent. To challenge the orthodoxy of any religious ideology or 
manifestation should be based on some foundational premises. For Salafism, the 
foundation is rooted in the premises of a religious ‘purity’.705  
In pursuing the research questions, the study seeks to add original research, 
analyses, and methodological approaches that help to advance an understudied area of, 
first, media and religion more broadly, and, second, intra-Islamic contestations in digital 
space specifically. The study focused on so-called quietist or purist Salafism, which 
advocates against violence and shuns participatory political activity of any form. The 
choice of studying purist Salafism is guided by the intent to underscore a core or substrate 
ideology that is distilled and separated from more complex, controversial associations 
with violence, as with Jihādī Salafism. Extremist violence is an important phenomenon to 
study in digital space. However, the violence narratives can detract from the core conceit 
of Salafism—the substrate ideology—that, in fact, permeates to an important degree all 
forms of Salafism, quietist or violent iterations thereof: that is, the desire to purge Islam 
from foreign practices, beliefs, as well as foreign, non-Muslim influences—a restoration 
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of an envisaged pure Islam. It is possible, if not likely that the ideals and ideas of purist 
Salafism ‘have been pre-empted by extremist organizations’.706   
 As such, the growth of Salafī thought has attracted much research and will very 
likely continue to do so, particularly as it relates to the disruptive opportunities provided, 
if not created by digital media. Thus, this study examines the critical relationship between 
religious authority and digital media in Salafī online texts and helps to contribute to the 
research in this field.  
The literature review, framework, methodology, textual case study, and findings 
demonstrate the associations between the strategies and language of Salafī polemics and 
claims of authority in defining what is proper and pure Islam and delineating the creedal 
boundaries of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, and, in the process, it essentially places Sufism 
(and other Islamic phenomena or movements) exterior of the boundaries of the claimed 
‘real Islam’ or, at the very least, essentially indicating that Sufism tests the demarcations 
of orthodoxy. The polemics pursue a concerted effort to advance ‘control over 
meaning’—that is, meaning over key terminologies examined in this study.707 
The dissertation pursued careful consideration of the meaning of the term 
‘Salafism’ and its derivatives.708 The reason for this is twofold. First, Salafism has had 
two major connotations, namely, the earlier reform movements of the late 18th and early 
19th centuries. In more recent times, however, ‘Salafism’, as indicated by very same 
descriptor, has come to mean an austere ideology that seeks to remonstrate and purge all 
creedal positions and religious rites of Islamic phenomena that are considered heretical 
innovations or deviations. Second, it was important to come to an operationalized 
designation for contemporary Salafism, as applied in this study. However, the treatment 
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on Salafism’s meanings seeks to respond and to contribute to the contemporary academic 
deliberations on Salafism because the term is unevenly used and is often poorly defined in 
research, particularly after the so-called Arab Spring. In light of the fact that Salafism has 
become ‘shorthand for a complex myriad of positions and definitions of Islam’,709 the 
implications and purposes of defining Salafism in research become more distinct, if not 
more urgent. 
The dissertation also contributes original research as it pertains to theory building, 
specifically a relatively recent media theory that responds to and seeks a greater 
understanding of the unprecedented disruptive qualities of digital media phenomena and 
their effects as agents of change on society and on religion itself.710 Mediatisation 
addresses the findings of research on digital media and religion and proposes that digital 
media technologies have done more than merely expand the reach of communications, as 
theorized by the long-standing ‘mediation’ theory. Rather, digital media per se have 
affected the social conditions in which religion is conducted, with the technologies 
serving as ‘agents of change’ in religion, beyond serving as avenues of communication.711 
The original contribution this study seeks to offer, with regard to theory building, is in its 
argument that the media theory that appears most suitable to explain and expound upon 
the effects of digital media disruptions on religious authority and religious performance 
within Islam is mediatisation, an argument the researcher would like to pursue further in 
future research.  
 
Future Research 
Intra-Salafī Contestations Online: Important research trajectories have manifested 
themselves during the course of this study. They are research projects the researcher 
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would wish to pursue in the future. The first of them concerns an unexpected finding in 
the examining of the Salafī texts under review here, namely, the observable and often 
vehement intra-Salafī contestations, even within non-violent, purist Salafism. As scholars 
have noted and documented, Salafism does not enjoy agreed upon methodologies of 
pursuing the purification project of Islam, and it does not have consensus on the degrees 
of acceptance or tolerance for ‘other’ Muslims (including those who incline toward 
Sufism).712 However, the digital texts posted online demonstrate passionate, if not 
aggressive contestations toward other Salafīs in, for example, the United Kingdom. 
Essentially the contestations otherize dissenting Salafīs with a tenor and bellicosity 
observed in anti-Sufism critiques. In one of the podcasts examined here, for example, the 
speaker offers a severe critique of Yasser Al-Qadhi, a prominent American Muslim 
academic and public speaker, and his ostensible praise of some aspects of Sufism. Al-
Qadhi’s apparent fall out with Salafi Publications scholars invited the latter to proclaim 
about the former’s departure from the Salafī fold as ‘good riddance’ and other phrases of 
reproach, however unsophisticated they may be.  
Intra-Salafī disputes have been studied in discussions and research on the 
differences of approaches and intentions among distinct Salafī typologies that scholars 
have delineated,  namely, jihādī, politicos, and purists (or quietists). The intra-Salafī 
contestations of interest, as a result of this study, concerns ideological analyses of 
English-language, online Salafī texts, produced by so-called ‘super-Salafis’,713 that 
reproach prominent Salafīs, like Yasir Qadhi and Bilal Philips, who have been accused of 
parting from pure Salafism. 
Sufism, Digital Media, and Authority: It should be noted that the framework of 
religious authority with regard to Ṣūfī online texts assumes a differing approach. With 
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regard to Sufism in digital space, it is mainly Lawrence’s second node of authority that 
best suits Ṣūfī discourses. That is, it is the charismatic aspects of religious authority 
within contemporary Islam that inform much of Ṣūfī discourses and online strategies. In 
both emic and etic definitions of Sufism, the Ṣūfī discourse is not a polemic per se. The 
self-definition of Sufism is not framed within the ideation of oppositionality in expelling 
syncretic practices per se, while the raison d'être of Salafism, as Lauziere states, the very 
foundation of its ideology, is premised on the ideas of purifying Islam, with ‘purist 
Salafis’ seeking ‘new targets for religious condemnation’ within Islam.714 
For Sufism, the matter is considerably different because Ṣūfīs discourse concerns 
the esoteric or mystical environment of Islam and a pedagogy for attaining it. The 
discourse of Sufism is said to be categorized in ‘the realm of emotional discourse as 
opposed to’ theological discussions, since, as a ‘practice’, Sufism’s main goal pertains to 
the esoteric path spiritual accomplishment 715 and the concept of tazkiyya al-nafs, the 
purification of the soul.716 As such, Ṣūfīs tend to ‘lay emphasis on the inward life and call 
to spiritual purification and seeking closeness to God’.717 The religious authority 
framework for Ṣūfī discourse and digital media, therefore, would involve pedagogy rather 
than contestation of power or conceits of orthodoxy.  
As part of his research agenda, the author hopes to have the opportunity to develop 
a research design and methodology that addresses the research question of the ‘effects of 
digital media on charismatic religious authority’ in transnational Ṣūfī communities. The 
research would involve both field study and online content analyses. The question would 
centre on the concept (or pedagogy) of ‘embodied knowledge’, as observed in West 
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African Ṣūfī communities. The pedagogy of embodied knowledge conveyance of the 
sacred placed high emphasis on ‘person-to-person knowledge transmission … where the 
student’s disposition or character is primarily emphasized, and the teacher’s physical 
presence represents the actualization’ of knowledge and spiritual disposition.718 Schulz, in 
her thoughtful research on the notion and phenomenon of ‘soundscape and religious 
mediation’ in West Africa, addresses numinous religious transmission through a ‘sound-
touch’ or ‘synaesthetic’ modality. She locates a distinction in West African experiences 
with charismatic authority that transcends text-based approaches to inspiration and 
learning found elsewhere in the Middle East; as such, she conceptualizes the distinction as 
a ‘locally or regionally specific discursion tradition of Islam’.719 
In broader terms, the research questions related to the following: does social media 
necessarily represent a threat or challenge to traditional knowledge transmission of the 
numinous? Can technology serve as a ‘transference’ of charismatic meaning as 
traditionally conceived? Do social media platforms, at the service of conveying the orality 
of sacred knowledge, result in new ‘epistemological categories and mechanisms’ 
legitimating a ‘new orality’?720 Is new media simply a ‘new means of learning and 
retaining oral genres’ of Africa?721  
The researcher expresses genuine interest in continuing to pursuing the 
relationships between religion, new media platforms, disruption, and authority, through 
methodological approaches that would have to adapt to new applications of this 
consequential framework.  
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Concluding remarks 
Initial studies of any new or burgeoning academic field are known to include future 
projections of the discipline and the role of new technologies and their instrumentality in 
society that may exert influence on that discipline. At times, researchers are consigned to 
the roles of futurists in determining important trends in the near and far futures. Such 
projections, however, can be vulnerable to exaggerations at times. The study of digital 
media and religion is not exempt from this reality, as scholars have pointed out.722 The 
initial academic responses to digital media in 1990s and early 2000s have produced 
amplifications about the degree of the revolt in the revolutionary nature of digital 
media—to the point of causing some academics to subsequently amend their prior 
projections.723  
There is, however, a reasonable expectation to anticipate a robust future in digital 
media and religion research, specifically addressing how digital media would ultimately 
affect religion in the contemporary world,724 a particularly urgent pursuit as digital media 
increasingly become destabilizing forces in traditional constructs of knowledge 
acquisition and conveyance and the subsequent challenges of the form and credentials of 
traditional religious authority constructs. as addressed in this study.725 By seeking how 
something as significant as digital media produces its ‘impact’ on contemporary religion 
is a query that is ‘often underrepresented or absent from the otherwise credible output of 
academics’.726 As such, the question of the way digital media makes its impact must be 
advanced by researchers in the field. Digital media studies have received much attention, 
most often as ‘new’ media. Though the digital phenomenon is ‘new’ in important 
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respects, researchers should move beyond historical-linear references and turn more 
attention toward challenging questions, such as pursuing more explained understanding of 
how the impact on religion is ultimately generated. This is especially important for further 
studies on Salafism and digital media. 
In studying Salafism, one cannot help but notice that, at a fundamental level, 
Salafism raises the modern spectacle—if not a product—of some ‘real Islam’. At which 
point, young Muslims in search of their faith naturally gravitate toward ‘real’ over ‘false’. 
Consequently, the real-Islam construct generates an ideological product that is likened to 
‘a market’, as Adraoui words it.727 To succeed in this market and in ‘claiming to supply 
products that represent the true Islam’, Salafists employ strategies of oppositionality to 
distinguish their product and to ‘undermine’ competing, if not flawed, ideologies within 
contemporary Islam. ‘For this purpose, they develop sales strategies, expand their 
communication abilities and launch advertisement campaigns, claiming they alone are 
capable of fulfilling their consumers’ needs’.728 At the forefront of the strategies, digital 
media appears prominent.  
It should also be mentioned that the rise of the profile of Salafī ideologies, 
particularly in the post-Arab Spring world, has been well observed by scholars, some of 
whom see a ‘triumph’ of Salafism in seeking authoritative control over the concept pure 
representations of Islam as embodied in the first three generations of Islam.729 The appeal 
of Salafism, particularly among ‘second-generation Muslim youngsters’ in the West 
today, stems from their rejection of ‘the mosque-centered Islam of their parents’ and their 
subsequent ‘search for a “pure,” “de-localized” and “deculturalized” Islam’, and find 
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themselves attracted to Salafism and its austere and straightforward discourses’.730 Hence, 
the ‘growth and spread of Salafism’ is in itself a religious development that will likely 
gain ascendance in the near future, perhaps as part of the ‘resurgence of Islam’ in general, 
as Sedgwick has suggested.731 Thus, in part, it is the simplicity of the message of Salafism 
that renders it appealing especially for young Muslims, and the direct and highly 
personalized conveyance of the ideology in digital space contributes to its attraction. 
From a theological point of view, the message (a neo-Ḥanbalī reductionist construction of 
the image of the generations of the pious forbears) makes the Salafī ideation plain and 
disarming: for example, the appeal of simplicity is in such evocations of ‘describing God 
as He described Himself and as the Prophet described Him (that is, by affirming divine 
attributes in their plain sense, without alteration, metaphorical interpretation, denial, and 
anthropomorphism and, above all, without modality)’.732 For Haykel, the matter is simpler 
and less of a matter of deculturalized Islam and such; in his view, ‘it is Salafism's claims 
to religious certainty that explain a good deal of its appeal, and its seemingly limitless 
ability to cite scripture to back these up’.733 
In the West, the process of embracing Salafism evolves through a stage in which 
young, secular Muslims undergo a conversion and are usually first introduced to a 
‘peaceful’ message of Islam before being convinced of Salafism.734 The main distinction 
between Salafī messaging and other Muslim discourses is associated with what is called 
‘Salafi clarity’. The youth become convinced through demagogic rhetoric of Salafism 
embodying ‘true Islam’, one which epitomizes the religion in ‘its pristine form’.735 Thus, 
there is an appeal in the message of ‘Salafi Puritanism’ in the manner in which it permits 
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733 Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’, at 36. 
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frustrated and alienated Muslims in ‘not only opting out of society but of creating an 
alternative, superior community based on the unity of God’; and, in turn, the new converts 
to Salafism carry out the mission and assume the language of Salafī discourses in making 
takfīr (accusing Muslims of disbelief) and pointing out the heresy of non-Salafī Muslims, 
especially those who incline towards Sufism.736  
The Salafī argument, moreover, as constructed through literalism, resides in the 
‘argument that something ought to be done because there is a Qur’anic verse or a hadith 
that commends or forbids it’.737 The foundation of this approach is drawn from a 
‘convincing’ or fair-seeming epistemological approach that the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth are the 
only ‘legitimate sources of Islamic practice’, though most scholars in Islamic intellectual 
history ‘rejected these arguments, holding that individual texts must be understood with a 
much larger textual, intellectual, and social context’, a principle that most purist Salafī 
devotees tend to shun.738 The question of identity (perhaps the question of identity crises) 
among young Muslims in the West contribute to their attraction to Salafism, given the 
appeal of immediacy seen in a literalist approach to Islam. For disenfranchised Muslim 
youth in Western Europe who seek out ‘existential answers’ find the ‘absolute Islam’ of 
Salafism to be compelling.739 
Salafism is among the ‘various Islamic trends’ that are said to ‘operate in a highly 
competitive marketplace for religious seekers’. As such, there is pressure on Salafism to 
stand out from among the competing ideologies ‘when addressing issues and concerns 
shared by wider Muslim communities.740 Furthermore, competing for religious authority 
is integral to the branding, as it were, of Salafism and its claims to represent real or pure 
Islam. Thus, the role of digital media in the authority question warrants greater attention 
                                               
736 Ibid. 
737 John Walbridge, God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), at 175. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Adraoui, ‘Salafism in France’, at 367. 
740 Hamid, Sufis, Salafis and Islamists, at 93. 
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in academia, as inevitably new digital spaces and applications introduce elements not yet 
anticipated. Thus, competition for representing Islam, then, is at least as important as 
articulating the core beliefs of an ideology. As Jackson frames the issue, within his 
discussion on Islamophobia in the United States, the question for Muslims in America, for 
example, of ‘what does it mean to be an American’ will persist.741 Perhaps for many 
Muslims, the issue of a ‘collective identity construction’ is in play. This descriptor occurs 
in the context of ‘contesting religious, political and nationalist movements’.742 Thus, the 
importance of contesting Salafī messaging is increasingly intertwined with and 
strategically reliant upon digital media platforms. The analyses of the Salafī texts 
presented in this study hope to contribute to a better understanding of simple-seeming but 
ideological-laced texts that are part of the allure of intra-Islamic competition for souls.  
  
  
                                               
741 Sherman Jackson, ‘Muslims, Islam(s), Race, and American Islamophobia’, in John L. Esposito and 
Ibrahim Kalin (eds.), Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 93–108, at 93. 
742 Cezar M Ornatowski, ‘Rhetoric and the (Re)Constitution of Collective Identity: The Example of 
Poland’, in Ton Van Haaften and Henrike Jansen (eds.), Bending Opinion: Essays on Persuasion in the 
Public Domain (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011), 291-305, at 291-92. 
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Appendix 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Aḥkām:  Rules or rulings derived from the principal sources of Islamic law. Rulings 
describe the virtue or vice of acts. Some acts, for example, are obligatory, while 
some are proscribed.  
Ahl al-Ḥadīth:  Scholars of the traditions and statements of the Prophet Muḥammad, as 
narrated and passed down from generation to generation. It may also refer to 
schools of thought that rely mainly on hadith to generate legal rulings and 
positions, and tend to dismiss intellectual or reason  
Ahl al-Sunna:  The people who follow the normative practices of the Prophet 
Muḥammad. The term is usually used to distinguish  
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamāʿa:  Similar to Ahl al-Sunna, with the addition people who 
belong with the group of people who have fidelity to the practices of the Prophet 
Muḥammad and the early generations of Islam. 
ʿAqīda: Central tenants of belief of Islam, also defined as the articles of faith, including: 
belief in the oneness of God, the unseen (particularly angels), scriptures, prophets 
and messengers of God, the Hereafter, and destination. There are variant schools 
of theology on Islam’s creeds, over which there is a history of debate. 
Asharism:  A widespread creedal school of thought in Sunnī Islam that, for the purpose of 
this study, permits the metaphoric interpretation of God’s attributes of God. 
Bāṭil:  An act or agreement that is considered invalid—like ritual Prayer performed 
without ablution or a contract that includes a proscribed matter. 
Baraka:  A blessing or providential benefit bestowed upon people by God. 
Bidʿa:  Heretical innovation. Usually, a ritual act or belief that has no valid precedence in 
Islam, particularly the first three generations of Islam.  
Dhikr: The remembrance of God, usually articulated as brief but repeated words or 
phrases of glorification. In Sufism, the remembrance is usually a formal part of a 
litany performed every day. 
Dīn:  Religion, often used in polemics to emphasise the importance of an ideology in 
preserving the religion. 
Fāsiq:  An ungodly, corrupt person, whose beliefs or deeds are claimed to be in 
contradistinction of religious norms.  
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Fiqh:  The study of the details of sacred law and their various rulings and categorizations.  
Fuqahā:  Scholars of law or legists who specialize in extracting precepts (or rulings) from 
the sources of Islamic law. 
Ḥadīth:  Statements and normative practices of the Prophet Muḥammad as they have been 
transmitted over the generations. 
Ḥajj: Pilgrimage, one of the five canonically required rites of worship in Islam, wherein 
Muslims travels to Makkah and nearby sacred sites to perform certain rituals. By 
extension, the term has come to mean the ritual visitation of a shrine of a saint. 
Ḥarām: An act that is forbidden according to Islamic law, such that the performance of 
anact is sinful and may call for punishment. 
Ḥizb:  Political or religious party or civic association. Ḥizbiyya refers to sectarian 
divisions and loyalties.   
Ḥijāz: The western strip of the Arabian Peninsula, in which Islam’s sacred cities are 
located: Makkah and Madina. 
Ḥukm: Rule derived from the sources of Islamic law. See aḥkām. 
Ijtihād: The exertion of qualified scholars to reach an independent legal judgment based 
on scriptural sources and methodological approaches of the derivation of rulings. 
See also mujtahid. 
ʿIlm:  Knowledge of various kinds and of various fields, but usually beneficial knowledge 
associated with the affairs and sciences of religion. 
Imām:  Prayer leader for congregational ritual prayers in Islam. It may also refer to the 
leader of a tribe or nation.  
Jahmiyya: A school of theology that essentially denied that God has distinct attributes. 
However, the attributes of God are unequivocally alluded to in the Qur’ān and in 
the statements of the Prophet Muḥammad. Other schools of theological thought 
have variant views on what the attributes or names of God truly mean, but they do 
not deny them, for to deny their very existence is considered heretical. 
Jinn: Sometimes translated as ‘spites’ or ‘spirits’; these are normally unseen creatures 
made of smokeless fire. 
Kaʿba: Located in the sacred mosque in Makkah, the cubed-shaped structure serves as the 
point of direction toward which observant Muslims stand when performing the 
ritual prayer.  
Kalām:  Theology or dialectical theology that often refers specifically discussions on 
God, His attributes, and His relationship with creation. 
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Khuṭbah:  Sermon or formal talk. More commonly, it is the formal sermon of the Friday 
congregational prayers.  
Kufr:  Disbelief or any act or creed that is considered in violation of Islam’s articles of 
faith. It is most serious accusation a Muslim can level against another Muslim, for 
it suggests that the person is no longer within the theological confines of the 
religion and is no longer part of the community of the faithful. 
Makrūh:   An act or deed that is considered reprehensible, which one is discouraged from 
performing, although there is no sin or punishment associated with its 
performance per se. 
Mandūb:  A recommended act in which one is encouraged and rewarded for its 
performance, although there is no punishment associated with its abandonment. 
Manhaj:  The way or method of Islam. More specific, it refers to the methodology 
employed to interpret the scriptural sources of Islam.   
Maʿrifa:  Experiential knowledge, usually knowledge of God. It is knowledge that is 
achieved through constancy in the remembrance of God, as opposed to 
philosophical knowledge and discursive knowledge.  
Mawlid: The birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad or the celebration thereof. The term 
may also refer to the celebration of a saint. The practice has ritual significance, 
which has attracted the ire of Salafism for representing an innovated act of 
worship that has no precedence.  
Mufassir:  A qualified exegete or scholar of Quran interpretation. 
Muḥaddith:  A scholar of Ḥadīth, the statements, normative practices, and deeds of the 
Prophet Muḥammad, 
Mujtahid : A scholar who is qualified to make independent legal judgments, with the 
assumption of rigorous investigation. 
Mutakallim:  A scholar of Islamic theology. 
Muʿtazilites: A school of theology that started in Basra (in present-day Iraq) in the second 
century of Islam. The Muʿtazilites hold to a rather strict rational interpretation and 
view of religion, often privileging reason over textual proofs from the Quran and 
Ḥadīth.    
Mandūb:  An act that Islamic law recommends as virtuous, though neglecting it does not 
result in sin.  
Nafl:  Any supererogatory act of worship, an extra devotion beyond canonical 
obligations, that one is encouraged to perform, though there is no blame in 
abandoning it, such as the ritual prayer late at night. 
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Qubūriyya:  A pejorative word to signify ‘grave worshippers’, a charge that Salafīs 
accuse Ṣūfīs of when visiting graves of their shaykhs.  
Ramaḍān:  The ninth lunar month of the Muslim calendar in which able Muslims are 
obliged to fast from dawn to sunset. 
al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ: The first three generations of Muslim history, which includes the 
lifetime of the Prophet Muḥammad and two following generations.  
Salafism: A modern movement and ideology that seeks to purify contemporary Islam of 
syncretic practices and creedal views that are considered to be heterodox or 
heretical innovations.   
Ṣalāt:  The prescribed ritual Muslim Prayer that is performed five times a day. 
Sharīʿa: The entirety of religious values, laws, ethics that guide the Muslim way of life. 
Sharīʿa often references more specifically Sacred Law. 
Shirk: Idolatry, associating other gods with God or attributing God-like attributes to 
people or things.  
Sufism:  Often defined as the mystical aspect of Islam, that encourages constancy in 
observing the remembrance of God and, often, refraining from the worldly affairs. 
(Taṣawwuf in Arabic.) 
Ṣuḥba: Visiting and spending time with the Shaykh of a Sufi order in order to derive 
spiritual benefit from him or her. 
Sunna:  The second source of Islamic law after the Quran. It encompasses the deeds, 
statements, and practices of the Prophet Muḥammad.  
Tabarruk: Seeking blessings from someone or something, which includes seeking 
blessings in the proximity to a living saint or at the grave or shrine of an interred 
saint. It is one of the loci of disputation between Salafism and Sufism, since the 
former accuses practitioners of such an act of seeking blessing from a source other 
than God. 
Ṭahāra:  Ritual purity that people acquire through formal ablution and bathing.   
Takfīr:  Accusing Muslims of disbelief because of creedal beliefs that are considered 
outside the articles of faith of Islam. 
Tafsīr:  Commentary or exegesis on the Quran. 
Taqlīd:  Blind or mere imitation in which one follows the ruling of a scholar without 
inspection. 
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Ṭarīqa:  A formal order of Sufism, such as al-Qādiriyya, al-Naqshabandiyya, al-
Shādhiliyya, al-Tijāniyya, and others. 
Tawassul: The act of seeking intercession with God through the aegis of the Prophet 
Muḥammad or saint. 
ʿUlamā’: The class of scholars in every generation in Muslim intellectual history, who 
specialize in one or several Islamic sciences, such as, law, jurisprudence, scriptural 
exegesis, theology, Arabic language, rhetoric, family law, and more. Also, they 
are scholars of the Quran and Ḥadīth.  
Ummah:  The universal global community of Muslims. 
Walī:  Literally, a friend or ally. In the context of religious standings, a Walī is someone 
who is a Friend of God, also referred to in translation as a Saint.   
Wird:  A specific litany of worship that Ṣūfī orders oblige upon their followers. (Plural is 
awrād.) 
Zakāt:  One of the five canonical pillars of Islam, in which an adult Muslim man or 
woman must pay alms or charity for the benefit of the needy. If one is unable to 
pay, then he or she is exempt.  
Zawiyya: Ṣūfī lodges or other places of gathering for the purpose of performing litanies 
(awrād) of remembrance (adhkār) and religious practices such as the Mawlid and 
tawassul.  
Ziyāra:  The act of visiting someone or someplace. The essential linguistic connotation of 
ziyāra is not associated with doctrine or ritual practice, since the simple act of 
visiting may have entirely social motives of no doctrinal or ideological import. 
However, in the context of Sufism and its performances, ziyāra is the practice of 
visiting a living saint or his or her grave, for the purpose of gaining providential 
grace or blessing. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
